D-5703

Translation of Exhibit No. 1 dropped by the 1st accused Yang Yih Ling(楊一林) at No. 877 Changping Road on March 2, 1934.

ESTIMATES FOR THE TRAINING CLASS

(A) Living expenses..... $114.00

(1) Students (12 men at $6. each) $72.00.

)2) ? ? $42.00

(B) House.....$188.40

(1) Rent.....$51.80

(2) Key money.....$19.60

(3) Municipal rate..... 6.00

(4) Coolie..... 1.00

(5) Expenses relating to transfer of lease. $30.00

(6) Electric meter $14.00

(7) Removal expenses 6.00

(C) Additional Expenses

Beddings	$48.00
Furniture	$50.00
Miscellaneous articles	$15.00
Stationery	[illegible]

(D) Communication Expenses. $[illegible]

[redacted]

Translation of Exhibit No. 3 dropped by the 1st accused Yang Yih Ling(楊一林) at No. 677 Changping Road on March 2, 1934.

WORKING PLANS FOR FEBRUARY

In compliance with the general plans of Central, the following activities will be undertaken:-

(1) Consolidation of principal organs:-

a) Chief of the Executive Bureau of the National Labour Federation: The Shantung delegate to the 9th Plenary Session will be appointed Chairman of the Committee of the Shanghai Labour Federation. Lau Tsung Loo(老李) will be appointed Acting Chief of the Executive Bureau of the National Labour Federation.

b) Executive Staff of the Central Propaganda Department:- Withdraw the tailor and instruct either Toh Foo(托夫) or Liao Sih Kwung(廖錫昆) to work with the Executive Staff.

c) Chairman of Military Committee.

d) Executive Staff of Peasants' Committee.

e) Shanghai Labour Federation: The Shantung delegate will be appointed Chairman of the Committee.

f) Manchurian Committee: To transfer a member of the Shansi Special Committee for work in Manchuria, and to instruct Comrade Yang Poo(楊波), member of the Delegation to Eastern Manchuria, to participate in the work of the Manchurian Provincial Committee.

g) Szechuen Provincial Committee: To instruct Ah Kung(阿根) and Kwoh Foo(郭夫) to work on the Szechuen Provincial Committee.

h) To send responsible persons to Hupeh, Honan, and Anhwei.

i) Proposals relating to the Central Bureau of Soviet Areas in Szechuen and Shensi.

j) Assistance to Kiangsu.

(2) Important Duties:-

1) The transfer of information relating to the 9th Plenary Session.
2) The Conference of Soviet Representatives and the Movement to support the Red Army.
3) Movement to support the Soviet.
4) Unemployment movement.
5) Anti-Imperialist movement.
6) Assisting in the convention of a conference of Shanghai Wharf Workers and the organization of a Federation of Wharf Workers.

(3) Work in Principal Cities:-

1) [illegible]
2) Inspecting the work along the Nanking Railway(Kiangsi).
3) Discussing the work in Southern Anhwei.
4) Work done along the borders of Hupeh and Honan.

(4) Executive Staff:-

1) Sending students to Party Schools in White territory.
2) Operating a Training Class.
3) Studying the work of the Executive Staff in Kiangsu and Hupeh.
4) Preparing the dispatch of students to Moscow.

- - -

Exhibit No.4

Translation of a draft dropped by 1st Accused Yang Yih-ling (楊一林) at No.677 Changping Road, on March 2, 1934.

--

Li --{ Nantao District Secretary
Cultural Committee (Er-yang-chi-sieu)
Organization Dept.
Staff Members
Secretariat
Kai (?)
Tz-zai (?)
Wife (?)
Pao (?)
Tu (?)

Sung Zoong-kwei ---- Ningpo
Sung -- native of Liyang.
Ma, Wusieh, 1929, printing.
Organization Dept. of the "Truth" paper.

Sin Wan Pao	- 7 men
Eastern Times	- 1 man
Shun Pao	- 1 man
Ya Zung Printing	- 3 men
Wah Vung "	- 3 men
Chung Wai	- 1 man
Sung Yuen	- 3 men
Gas	- 3 men
(?)	- 3 men
Bath house	- 3 men
Dah Ming Bhhb	- 3 men
---	- 3 men
Telephone	- 2 men
San Yeu	- 2 men
Medicine	- 9 men
Second Hand clothing	- 5 men.

TRANSLATION OF EXHIBIT NO. 5 DROPPED BY 1ST ACCUSED YANG YIN LING(楊一林) AT NO.677 CHANGPING ROAD.

Decision to dismiss Mah Ziang Sung and Lau Tsang etc. from the Party.

Mah Ziang Sung(馬祥生) and Lau Tsang(老藏), natives of Tientsin, attached to the Federation of Printing Workers, have been proved to be negligent of their duty. They brought doubtful characters to their offices and this resulting in the disappearance of certain comrades connected with them. They then changed their addresses without making a report and are now in hiding. Doubtless, they have turned traitors and are now in the employ of our enemies. Consequently, the District Committee has decided to dismiss them from the Party permanently and desires to warn all comrades to be careful.

Translation of Exhibit No.6 dropped by 1st accused Yang Yih Ling (楊林) at No.677 Changping Road on 2/3/34

Letter No.2, 1934.

Brother Kwoh Wen (國文)

1) Tsoong Tsing Foh (蒲福) and Ngah (喀) have safely returned to Kuala Lumpur. They report that you have simply given them some literature (one copy each of the "Struggle" issues 56, 58 59 and 60; one copy of "Letter to Chinese Communist Party from the Presidium of the 3rd International", one copy of the "General Principles of Propaganda in connection with the Fokien Incident", and one copy of the "Manifesto relating to the Sino-Japanese Direct Negotiations") and a sum of $110. for travelling expenses, but you did not give them any particular work.

2) We recently met a Javanese comrade named "Monica" of the American Communist Party. He states that he is a member of the Communist Party in New York where he once participated in the work of the Party and the Labour Federation. In December, 1932, by order of the American Communist Party, he left New York for Shanghai in a cargo boat the "Gty of Uninasor" (?) on which he was employed as a worker. The ship arrived in Shanghai in February, 1932 (?1933). On the date of arrival, at 7 p.m. he waited in the "middle" cabin for your representative, because, according to arrangement, your representative would call on him with the words "Green and Smith". However, he waited for five days without being approached by anybody and then he returned in the same ship to Kuala Lumpur from where he intended to return to New York. Upon arrival at Kuala Lumpur, however, he was dismissed from the ship and was thus compelled to remain in Selembang for over ten months. He was only recently recommended by a comrade, whom he knew formerly in Java, to join the Red Labour Union here. He has decided to return to New York in the near future but we have asked him to remain here as we are in need of him. He is still here but we have not yet formally established connections with him.

He is about 28 or 29 years of age of strong build. He was a student and at one time became a labour. He is well versed in the English and Dutch Languages (about secondary school grade), knows a little Malayan language, and can speak some Indian dialects. His attitude towards revolution is firm, and he has a clear conception of the principle of the Party and politics. Do you know anything about this Comrade? If what he has told us is true, can he be recommended for work with us? We wish to know your opinion regarding him.

3) The Central of the Chinese Communist Youth League formerly promised to recommend to us a comrade who had been deported by the Chinese Government to the Netherland East Indies. This man was born in the Netherland East Indies and is of dual nationality (Netherland and Chinese). We are now in urgent need of such a comrade.

4) We are too busy at present to write a report on the work done by us. We shall send a comrade to Shanghai to report to you in person.

5) We hope you will send us a subsidy without delay.

6) Please send your letters to ensure safe delivery. We have already given you the communication address.

Our present communication addresses are given hereunder:-

A) Ling Yui Foh, c/o Ling Gee Ling, Hwa Jao Bank, Tsui Lih Ka, Singapore.
星加坡,珠烈街華僑銀行林英麟轉交林郵福

B) Li Sieu Lai, c/o Zung Yam Kai, Siao Peo Jui Tsi Tuh Lih, Sing Toong Public School, Singapore.
星加坡(小坡)如得律里星東公立学校

TRANSLATION OF EXHIBIT NO. 74 SEIZED FROM NO. 677 CHANGPING ROAD ON MARCH 2, 1934.

Address on envelope: Wong Foo Sung(王輔生)
c/o Yui Soong Ts(于松之), Bank of China.

Central,

At the beginning of December of the year before last (? 1932) I was instructed by Central to undertake certain activities among the soldiers of the 19th Route Army. I then proceeded to Amoy in company with the "clerk" of the Amoy Committee, and after staying there for about one week, I left for Chienchow by order of the Amoy Committee to carry out work among the troops of the 61st Division stationed in that city.

Upon arrival at Chienchow I received the following information:-

(1) Shortly after their transfer to Southern Fokien, one Regiment of the 78th Division of the 19th Route Army stationed near the borders of Soviet Areas rebelled and joined the Red Army.

(2) Once a meeting of about 40 or 50 persons was discovered by reactionary senior military officers. In consequence of this, many party organizations in the 60th and 61st Divisions were dissolved. Several hundreds of junior officers and soldiers were secretly executed and many were repatriated to their natives places.

The Party at Chienchow had been inactive for over six months before my arrival owing to negligence on the part of the two leading comrades. I have now succeeded in re-establishing connection with the 61st Division by getting into touch with Comrade Yeu(楊) attached to the 3rd Company, Special Service Battalion of the said Division. In his Company there are 6 comrades and 5 "mass members" who are on intimate terms with him. The movements of soldiers are always watched by their senior officers and "spies" of the Kuomintang.

I have interviewed Comrade Yeu on several occasions and explained to him the present political situation and the importance of the movement among the soldiers. At a meeting held by Comrade Yeu, at which were present an assistant-commander of the 128th Battalion and a secretary of the 3rd Company and myself, the following working plans were decided upon :-

(1) To establish a branch in the 3rd Company with a special cell in the Cadets Regiment under its supervision. Comrade Yeu is to act as "Clerk" of the Branch with the Secretary of the 3rd Company as his assistant.

(2) The Branch to enlist four comrades and the cell two comrades within two weeks.

(3) The Branch and the Cell to organize within 2 weeks a volunteer army to proceed to the Northeast to resist Japan.

(4) To issue literature pointing out the traiterous acts of the Kuomintang and urging soldiers to join the Anti-Japanese Volunteer Armies.

(5) To organize boxing, chess, football, and amateur dramatic clubs with the object of uniting the soldiers

and inducing them to conduct struggles.

(6) To assist the Red Armies by damaging the firearms of white troops and obstructing the transportation of military supplies and spreading rumours against the Kuomintang troops and inducing White soldiers to join the Red Armies.

While working at Chienchow, I received two letters from the 78th Division stationed at Lung Ngan and Liencheng reporting on the favourable conditions in their districts. As it was difficult for me to go there, I submitted a report on this matter to the Amoy Committee who then sent a comrade to take my place and instructed me to proceed to Amoy to attend a conference. When I went to consult with Lai Ts Ming(賴子明), a traitor named Tsaung Yoh Ying(莊銘英), who had been shadowing us, called upon the police to arrest us. Lai was arrested while I fled into the Kulangsu Settlement and stayed over night in a lodging house there. Meantime I made arrangements with a "clerk" of the Amoy Committee to remove all offices known to Lai for fear that he might eventually surrender to the Kuomintang. I returned to Chienchow the following day.

About twenty days after, Central, on receipt of a report from the Amoy Committee, sent another comrade to Amoy. At that time progress had been made in the activities among the soldiers of the 61st Division. We have two new comrades in the Artillery Company and the 2nd Company of the Special Service Battalion. Comrade Yeu has been promoted Commander of the 1st Company.

On February 30, the Amoy Committee sent Comrade Wong to Chienchow to summon me to Amoy. I went there on March 1 and stayed in a lodging house. When I was leaving the lodging house on the morning of the third day of my arrival for the purpose of keeping an appointment, I was arrested by Chinese police at the instance of Lai who had turned traitor after his arrest.

(Signed) Yih Van Tshung(葉芳芸).

February 11.

SUMMARISED TRANSLATION OF EXHIBIT NO. 75 SEIZED DURING THE COURSE OF A RAID AT NO. 677 CHANGPING ROAD ON 2.3.34.

1) Report from Shansi Committee, dated 10.2.34

The movement to collect contributions for the support of Red Armies was carried out for the first time in Shansi with successful results. More than 600 persons were engaged in this movement and the majority of the contributors were peasants and labourers who gave generously.

About 5 or 6 "Red Army Friendly Societies" have been organized with a total membership of about 30, and connections with workers of arsenals, railways, printing works and tailors' shops have been established.

2) Report from Shansi Committee, dated 10.2.34

Particulars of Party and Mass organizations in Shansi are given hereunder:-

(1) Teachers' Federation - This has a membership of about 15 who are mostly middle school teachers. The Communist cell established in this Federation is inefficient and most of its members do not work regularly.

(2) Mutual Aid Society - This was inaugurated in August with a membership of 15. Meetings are held regularly but direct connections with gaols have not yet been established.

(3) Anti-Imperialist League - This was inaugurated about two weeks ago with a membership of 12. It has established two branches and is endeavouring to develop its movement.

(4) Federation of Left Wing Writers - This organization will be inaugurated in the near future. It already has 10 members. Many students have expressed their willingness to render assistance.

(5) About 6 or 7 "Red Army Friendly Societies" have been established with a total membership of about 30.

3) Letter from Central Committee of Northern Anhwei to Young Pai Haien(Anhwei) Committee, dated 1.2.34.

The movement of the Party to smash the 5th Anti-Communist Campaign is being carried out successfully in various Haiens in Northern Anhwei. This has incurred the enmity of the reactionary ruling classes who are now trying their best to counteract our move. Consequently, we advise you to pay special attention to the activities of traitors and to accelerate the work against White terrorism. You should instruct every revolutionist to meet interrogations by authorities with false statements prepared beforehand and to remain legal to the Party even after arrest.

As a number of comrades were recently arrested, we urge you to collect contributions from the revolutionary masses for the support of their relatives and to issue manifestoes and posters relating to this matter. In this connection, you should work in cooperation with the Red Aid Society and anti-imperialist organizations.

4) Report from Pai Haien, Anhwei, dated [illegible]

Please publish the following in the "Chinese Soviet"-

On February 2 the Red Guards [illegible] of the Red Army advanced upon two large villages. They seized 4 rifles, [illegible] long-setting Mauser pistols, [illegible] of ammunition, and a small sum of money. [illegible]

destroyed several hundred land certificates and killed four rowdies. The strength of the guerilla corps of the Red Army is growing daily.

5) Letter from Honan Committee, dated 24.2.34.

We send Comrade Li Tsung San(李宗山) to Central to undergo training for a short period, after which he is to be sent back to Honan for work.

This comrade is an ex-cotton mill worker at Chengchow. Although he is not performing his duties as energetically as might be desired, he is loyal to the Party and is willing to learn. Owing to the dissolution of his organization, the Authorities are seeking his arrest.

6) Report from Honan, dated 20.2.34

We send the following two comrades to Central for training:-

(1) Zao Sz Jih (邵世傑) - Joined the Party about four or five years ago. He has received little training from the Party and yet he is a good worker. He is to be sent back to Honan after training.

(2) Kwoh Foh Lai(郭福來) - Mill worker.

Comrade Ying Shiang Ching(尹香卿) is now in Southern Honan. He will be instructed to go to Central to discuss his work.

7) Report from Manchurian Committee, dated 27.2.34.

Owing to the coronation of Pu Yi, special precautions are being enforced in Manchuria especially at Dairen, Shanhaikwan, Mukden, Changchung and Harbin railway stations from 1.2.34 to 15.3.34. Therefore, your couriers should exercise the greatest care when bringing things to us.

8) Report from Szechuen Committee, dated 10.2.34.

We submit hereunder a list of persons who were recently elected to the Szechuen Provincial Committee and beg to ask your approval for their appointments:-

1) Comrade Sz(史) - Joined the Communist Youth League in Szechuen in 1927; appointed Chief Secretary of the Szechuen Provincial Committee in 1931. Member of the Standing Committee in September 1933.

2) Comrade Tsang(張).- Joined the Communist Youth League in Szechuen in 1927, and appointed member of the Standing Committee and the Military Committee in October, 1933.

3) Comrade Tseng(曾) - Joined the Party in North China in 1926, after which he returned to Szechuen to work for the Party. Arrested in 1931 and released from gaol in 1932. Was in Soviet area in 1933, and is at present holding the position of Inspector.

4) Comrade Liu(劉) - Joined the Party in 1929 and appointed Chief Secretary of the Szechuen Provincial Committee in October, 1933.

5) Comrade Tsoong(龔). Joined the Party in 1932 and played a prominent part in the movement to refuse payment of tax and other struggles of peasants in Chung Kiang Hsian.

6) Comrade Wang(王) - Joined the Party in 1932 and appointed Chief of the Organization Department of the Party in Chung Kiang Hsian.

7) Comrade Wang(王) - Joined the Party in 1932 and is at present a candidate for the position of Clerk to the Pang Hua Special District.

8) Comrade Yuan(袁) - Joined the Party in 1932 and is at present member of the Standing Committee of Kading.
9) Comrade Zau(曹) - Arsenal worker; joined the Party in 1935.
10) Comrade Tseu(鄒) - Joined the Party in 1928 and is at present holding the position of Inspector.
11) Comrade Yu(俞). Joined the Party in 1927 and is directing the work of guerilla parties.

9) Letter from Szechuan Provincial Committee, dated 8.2.34.

In order to facilitate communications with the Soviet Areas in Szechuen and Shensi, we have purchased a radio set of the latest model. Subject to your approval, we shall send a reliable comrade to you to be taught how to operate the apparatus.

We have received from you $650. for December and $7 50. for January. We have paid $100. to the Youth Leagues.

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Translation of Item "A", Exhibit No.77, seized at No.677 Chungking Road on March 2, 1934.

I- Condition of the District:

(1) Number of factories, their type, nationality, capital, and the names of the main factories?
(2) Total number of workers - percentage of male, female, child and juvenile workers?
(3) What is the average capital? Which is the largest and which is the smallest?
(4) Livelihood of workers - their treatment and demands?
(5) Number of location of poor people and their living conditions?
(6) Number of unemployed and particulars of their demands and living conditions?
(7) Number of shop assistants and their treatment?
(8) What is the attitude of the workers?
(9) Number of foreign troops - their nationality and location?
(10) Number of policemen - their nationality and treatment? What are their demands? What is their attitude?
(11) What new forms of attack are contemplated by enemies?
(12) Number of schools - their grade and number of students?
(13) What are the activities of the reactionaries and their effect on the masses?
(and)

II- Duties of the District Committee

A- Organization of the District Committee:-

(1) Under what form is a district committee organized?
(2) How many members are there on the Standing Committee and the Executive Committee? Their elements and their political knowledge?
(3) How to work separately? Is every Standing Committeeman required personally to direct the main industrial cell?
(4) Is every Standing Committeeman provided with an understanding?
Does any "employed" man participate in the organization?
(5) Are there any committees in various sections of the District Committee? Are workers' cells absorbed by the committees?

B- Meetings of the District Committee and the execution of orders from "Central" and the Provincial Committees:-

(1) Has any meeting of district representatives been held?
(2) How often are meetings of the Standing Committee held? What persons participate and what are the subjects discussed?
(3) Has any plenary session of the Executive Committee been held? If so, how many times?
(4) Has any extraordinary meetings been held?
(5) Are activities planned in accordance with instructions from "Central"?
(6) How are instructions of "Central" transmitted to the cells? Is the method of executing orders of "Central" supervised? How many orders have been executed?
(8) What has been done regarding the 13 questionnaires issued by "Central" to various grades of the Party?

C- Workings of the various sections of the District Committee:- propaganda, organization, women, trade, distribution and military:-

(1) Has a Propaganda Committee been organized? How many members and what is the composition?
(2) Have any newspapers been published? How often are they issued? How many correspondents? The number of copies distributed?
(3) What propaganda matter has the District Committee published following the Manchurian Incident? The number of copies?
(4) How many factories are issuing wall papers? Are they printed or written? Are the papers issued with the help of the District Committee or solely by themselves? Are they issued regularly? What effect have they on the masses?
(5) Are there any propagandists in factories? How many?
(6) Has a Propaganda Corps been formed? How many

persons and how many of the public participate
(7) Are there any Reading Classes? How many?
(8) How is the Organization Committee formed? Its workings
(9) How to enlist Party members during struggles and the daily route work?
(10) How many main cells?
(11) How to establish cells among main industrial concerns?
(12) How many cells in the whole district - their location, workings and efficiency?
(13) How to train and promote cells? Are there any training classes (movable or otherwise?)
(14) Is there any work for the educating of comrades individually?
(15) Does every comrade pay his membership fee regularly?
(16) What means are employed in the inspection of the work of each comrade?
(17) How to uphold discipline?
(18) Have statistics of work done been completed? What is the number of Party members?
(19) Are there any Storming Corps?
(20) Are there any distribution sections?
(21) How are the decisions of the Party and propaganda matter distributed to the cells?
(22) How many distribution stations are there? How many cells have distributing agents?
(23) How to supervise and inspect the work of distribution?
(24) What is the quantity of propaganda matter distributed among the masses?
(25) Is there any Women Committee? How many members?
(26) How many female workers' cells are there?
(27) How to train and unite female workers (such as Sisters Groups, Reading Classes, etc.)
(28) How to absorb female workers to participate in the work?
(29) What is the feeling of female workers towards the question of participating in the work?
(30) Are there any newspapers published for female workers? Are they published regularly or temporarily?
(31) Are there any male comrades working among female workers?
(32) Are there any Party or other revolutionary organizations among foreign soldiers,-sailors and police? What should be done to create contact with them? What propaganda work should be carried out,especially among Japanese soldiers?
(33) What means should be adopted to make the acquaintance of Chinese soldiers? Are there any Party or other auxiliary organizations? What organization and propaganda work should be undertaken,particularly after the Shanghai Incident?
(34) How to prepare for the formation of the Military and Civil Mutual Society?
(35) What work is being done among policemen in the Settlement and Chinese Territory?
(36) What are the living conditions of soldiers, their relationship to senior officers and their revolutionary tendencies?
(37) What work has been performed among reactionary Volunteer Armies? How is it done?

D- Direction of Cells :-
(1) Is there any special place for meeting a "clerk" of cells? Does it take place at factory entrances?
(2) Has a responsible comrade of a cell any means to locate a District Committeeman directly?
(3) Are joint meetings of "clerks" of cells held regularly
(4) How many meetings have been held since the Manchurian Incident and what are the subject discussed?
(5) How many comrades of cells know the homes of District Committeemen? Are there any District Committeemen living in the homes of comrades of cells?
(6) Are there any working plans to assist and supervise cells in their work?
(7) How many comrades of cells do not understand instructions

from "Central" and the Provincial Committee? What means should be employed to make them understand?

(8) What means should be employed to mobilise cells prior to a political movement?

(9) How many main cells are there? What work should be performed to establish cells in those main factories with which you have no connection?

E.-Secret work :-

(1) Is there any limit fixed for the duration of meetings and the number of persons participating?

(2) What means should be employed to establish a base? Is it to be located within or without the labourers' district? Is any alarm installed?

(3) Has any base been "destroyed"? What was the cause? What lesson has been derived from it?

(4) Do any of the District Committeemen associate with persons who have no connection with the work?

TRANSLATION OF ITEM THE, EXHIBIT NO. 77, [illegible] NO. 877 CHANGPING ROAD ON MARCH 2, 1934.

THE FOKIEN INCIDENT.

1) The Background of the Incidents

This incident is the consequence of the present national crisis as evidenced by the surrender of the Kuomintang to British, American and Japanese Imperialists.

2) Economic Crisis:

The Kuomintang is at present advocating the rehabilitation of farming districts and other arbitrary propaganda. On the other hand, taxes are being exhorbitantly increased, huge foreign loans contracted, etc.

3) Our Policies:

a) We must employ every means at our disposal to develop our anti-imperialist and anti-Chiang Kai Shek war front.

b) We must conduct an extensive propaganda to expose the deceit of the People's Government of Fokien.

c) We must protest against foreign imperialists interfering in our national affairs.

d) We must intensify the movement against Fascism among the masses.

e) We must establish connections with soldiers and urge them to mutiny, to kill their reactionary officers, to join the Red Army and to smash the 5th Red Suppression Campaign launched by the traitor Chiang Kai Shek.

TRANSLATION OF ITEM "C", Exhibit No. 77, seized at No. 677 Changping Road on March 2, 1934.

LETTER TO THE KIANGSU PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE
IN CONNECTION WITH DISTRIBUTION WORK.

To the Kiangsu Provincial Committee,

The revolutionary tendencies of the masses are growing more and more positive as the result of the partitioning of China by foreign imperialists, the shameless betrayal of the people's interests by the Kuomintang and the success scored by the Soviet Red Army. On this account, the masses are in urgent need of Party leadership and propaganda matter.

For instance, a female worker of a certain factory has voluntarily asked to become a member of the Party because she had read the "News of Victory". Also, the coolies of a certain wharf have been known to assemble to read a wall paper and did not disperse until the poster had been torn away by a policeman.

Despite the urgent needs of the masses, the Kiangsu Provincial Committee has neglected its distribution work. The following are the grounds of our allegation :-

(1) The distribution work does not rest upon the whole body of comrades of the Provincial Committee and this work is being regarded by Standing Committeemen of the various branches of the Party as being mot routine work.

(2) Most of the organizations are defective and some District Committees are without Distribution Sections (such as the Wharf District Committee, the Shanghai Central District Committee, the Pootung District Committee, the Woosung District Committee and the Kiangsum District Committee). In their distribution work the various District Committees lack contact with their respective main cells.

(3) The distribution work has no connection with other activities especially with the struggles of the masses.

(4) There is no plan or estimate for the distribution work.

Central Distribution Bureau

February 28.

TRANSLATION OF ITEM "D", EXHIBIT NO. 77 SEIZED AT NO. 677 CHANGPING ROAD ON MARCH 2, 1934.

DRAFT OF ACTIVITIES TO BE WELL TAKEN BY THE LABOUR UNION AMONG RICSHA COOLIES.

Although ricsha transportation is not an industrial enterprise possessing any fighting significance, yet it is essential to a revolutionary labour union when the question of organising the ricsha coolies and directing their struggles is taken into consideration.

This may be explained on the following grounds :-

(a) In Shanghai there are nearly 100,000 ricsha coolies.

(b) Of this number, 60% are poor peasants and labourers in rural districts who have to return every Spring or Summer to the rural districts in north-west Kiangsu. Our work among them constitutes a most important link between the industrial proletariat and the peasants. We should do our best to utilise this link for the development of our work among the rev lutionary masses in rural districts. About 25% of the ricsha coolies in Shanghai are dismissed factory workers who maintain very good relations between the employed and unemployed workers. Through this, our labour union can establish numerous connections.

(c) The struggles of the ricsha coolies will bring about a direct conflict not only with the Kuomintang Government but also with the imperialistic Shanghai Municipal Council.

(d) Every year thousands of ricsha coolies are being forcibly conscripted by Kuomintang warlords to fill the Kuomintang armies. On this account, this will serve us as the best means to conduct our anti-militarist work and anti-5th Red suppression campaign among the Kuomintang forces.

The labour union should first of all go among ricsha coolies in order to understand existing conditions. Then the union should prepare short and clear principles of demands and struggles for the ricsha coolies. Such principles should include the following points :-

(a) They should be brief; they should reveal vividly the distressful conditions of ricsha coolies and indicate the persons responsible for their plight.

(b) They should give a clear analysis of the suggestions recently made by the Shanghai Municipal Council, the French Municipal Council and the Chinese City Government (see the recommendations of the Ricsha Committee recently published by the S.M.C.) and also of the more unreasonable demands which the ricsha owners are going to submit. They should expose the absurdity of the so-called "improvement" plan of the S.M.C. and the quarrel between the Settlement Authorities and the Chinese Government over a share in the profits.

(c) They should clearly disclose the "pacific" protest lodged by the Yellow Labour Union with the S.M.C., the Chinese Government and the ricsha owners and other forms of deceit.

(d) ~~They should embody the fundamental demands of the ricsha coolies.~~

(e) They should point out ways by means of which the demands could be realised.

The following are the demands of the riesha coolies :-

(1) That the rental of a public riesha for 24 hours should not exceed 50 cents small money; that the rental should be calculated proportionately in case the riesha has been hired for less than 24 hours; that coolies should be guaranteed an earning of not less than 50 cents big money a day; that if the earnings of a coolie do not reach this amount, then the rental of the riesha for the day should not exceed one-third of the total earnings of the coolie.

(2) That all fines imposed for contravention of regulations be defrayed by the riesha companies or foremen and that the assaulting of coolies, the seizing of cushions and licences by policemen be stopped.

(3) That a rice allowance of 10 cents big money be deducted every day from the payments to riesha companies and/or foremen.

(4) That all debts as well as interest due by coolies to riesha companies and/or foremen be abolished; that the deposit money, clothing money, fines, etc. be cancelled, and that no coolie be dismissed for failure to pay his riesha hire, or debt or fine, etc.

(5) That the riesha company and/or foremen should issue a daily allowance of not less than 20 cents big money and also medical expenses to coolie in case he is sick or some accident befalls him; that the riesha company defray funeral expenses of a coolie and issue a compassionate grant of $50 to the family of the deceased; that five hospitals to provide for free medical treatment of coolies and their families be established in the International Settlement, the French Concession, Chapei, Western District and Nantao, and that the expenses for the upkeep of these institutions be borne by riesha company proprietors and the civic authorities of the Chinese Territory and Foreign Settlements in Shanghai.

(6) That repairs to rieshas, regardless of the cause of damage, be carried out by the riesha company and/or foremen.

(7) That riesha companies and/or foremen issue periodically and free of charge blue coloured and durable uniforms, warm clothing, raincoats, caps and shoes.

(8) That riesha companies erect huts for the accommodation of coolies and their families and that free bedding be issued to every coolie.

(9) That riesha companies and civic authorities establish schools for the free education of the children of the coolies.

(10) That the system of restricting the parking of rieshas be abolished.

(11) That the stipulation of the authorities of the International Settlement, French Concession and Chinese Territory to reduce the number of rieshas be opposed.

(12) That the joint proposal of the authorities of the three Municipalities for the payment of riksha hires and riksha license fees by coolies every quarter be opposed.

(13) That private riksha coolies be given a pay of..... dollars per month and be provided with free clothing, bedding, medical treatment and rice allowance.

(14) That the forcible conscription of coolies by the Kuomintang be opposed.

(15) That a system of 8-hour shift be enforced.

Translation of Item "[illegible]", Exhibit [illegible]77, Seized at [illegible]677 Changping Road on March [illegible], 1934.

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(1) Name : Den Ding Keng 安[illegible]

(2) Age: 27.

(3) Nativity : Ping Yau Hsien (平遥縣), Shanse.

(4) Family Standing: My family belongs to the bourgeois class. My father was a shop assistant and is at present staying at home. I have one elder and one younger brother. They are all merchants; the former being a cloth peddlar (with a capital of [illegible],000), while the latter is a cloth shop assistant. We have about 150 mow of lean soil (worth about $5 a mow), which is ploughed by farm hands. Several years ago the income from the land exceeded our living expenses, but nowadays we are on the verge of bankruptcy.

(5) Profession : I studied in the Peking University for 3 years and was expelled. Later, I was employed as teacher in a middle school and in a military academy.

(6) Place and date of joining the Party and the introducer: I joined the Party through the recommendation of Liu Soong Yoong (劉松雲) in January, 1932. (This man Liu has at present lost connection with the Party owing to illness.)

(7) Positions occupied since joining the Party: Clerk of the District Committee of the Anti-Imperialist League; Chief Secretary to the Hopei Provincial Committee of the Anti-Imperialist League; transferred to Shanse in February, 1933, and appointed Secretary to the Propaganda Department of the Shanse Special District Committee.

(8) Mistakes and punishment : Nil.

(9) Ever been arrested?- I was arrested once while engaged in propaganda work, but was soon released owing to lack of evidence.

(10) Educational Standard : University education.

(11) Dialects spoken: I can speak Shanse, Peiping and Hopei dialects as well as English.

(12) Any speciality: Leather making.

TRANSLATION OF EXHIBIT NO. 78 SEIZED FROM NO. 677 CHANGPING ROAD AT 12.30 A.M. ON MARCH 2, 1934.

Name of Publication	Year	Author and where published	Remarks
Proletarian revolution & Renegate Kautsky.		Lenin.	
Civil war in France.		Marx.	
Use Latin to replace Chinese.		Central Publishing Bureau.	
Lenin's Selections, Vol. 12.		Central Publishing Bureau.	
Duties of Communist Youth League.		Lenin - Central Publishing Bureau.	Speech delivered at the 3rd Conference of Union Communist Youth League.
Chinese Peasants - their living & struggles.		Mei-lang - Soviet Union Foreign Workers Publishing Society.	
Problem of Chinese Trade Movement.		Jui Chiu Bak - Central Publishing Bureau.	
On opposition to Waung Ching Wei and the Reorganization Clique.			
Two speeches at the Conference of Communist Youth.		Stalin - Central Publishing Bureau.	Given by Stalin at 5th Session of Soviet Union Communist Youth.
A Year of Great Change.		Stalin.	
Speech on the State.		Lenin.	
On the Food Tax.		Lenin.	
Marx's argument at the Kannam Court.			
Economics in the transient period.			
Land policy.		Lenin - Publishing Section of Chinese Labour Communist University.	
Origin of Family Private Property and State.		Engels.	
Present political conditions in China and main duties confronting the Chinese Communist Party.		Wong Ming - Soviet Union Foreign Workers Publishing Society.	
On the eve of New Fights.		Gussev.	
Attention to movements in rural villages.		Motoloff.	
Right Wing Elements in American Communist Party.	1930	Stalin.	
Women, female workers and female peasants.	"	Lenin.	
Argument between Buharing and Lenin.	"		
Elevation of production rate and improvement of quality.	"		

Outline of Chinese Trade Movement, Vol. 1.	1930	Dung Tsong Hsia - Central Publishing Bureau.	
Chinese Communist Party in time of emergency.	"		
Political report submitted by the Central Committee to the 16th Plenary Session of Soviet Union Communist Party.		Stalin - Central Publishing Bureau.	
Women of the East.	"		
To the Road of New Victory.	"	Central Publishing Bureau.	
	1931	Soviet Union Foreign Workers Publishing Society.	
Complaints against cases framed by the anti-revolutionary Menshevik,		Central Publishing Bureau.	
Danger of War and duties of Fascism and Communist Youth International.	"		
Important resolutions and decisions of the 11th Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.	"		
About the Opposition.		Soviet Union Foreign Workers Publishing Society.	
Summary of the Chinese Trade Movement.	"	Stalin.	
	"	Jui Ching Bah - Central Publishing Bureau.	
Livelihood of proletarian leader Olossileff.	"	Central Publishing Bureau.	
Revolutionary movement in colonies.	"	Central Publishing Bureau.	
Duties of the economic working staff.	"	Stalin - Central Publishing Bureau.	
World Economic Crisis and the Danger of an Armed Attack on the Soviet Union.	"	Central Publishing Bureau.	
Japanese intrigues in Mongolia & Manchuria.	1932	Soviet Union Foreign Workers Publishing Society.	2 copies.
Chinese Revolutionary Red Army.	"		
The Second Five Year Plan and the Completion of the Socialist Reconstruction.	"	Soviet Union Foreign Workers Publishing Society.	
Biography of Stalin.	"	ditto.	
National Economic Plans for 1932.	"	ditto.	
Chinese Revolution.		ditto.	
The Second Five Year Plan.	"	ditto.	
About the Second Five Year-Plan.	"	Far Eastern State Publishing Department.	
Japanese Aggressions in Manchuria.	"	Soviet Union Foreign Workers Publishing Society.	

Copy of Exhibit No. [illegible] seized at No. [illegible] Changning Road on March 2, 19[illegible]

Report of the Panshih Central Heien Committee

To the Manchurian Provincial Committee.

I. The 3rd Anti-Reds Campaign of the Japanese imperialism and its puppet Manchukuo in South Manchuria and the favourable establishment of our united front in the destruction of their campaign :

1. The Japanese imperialism with its lackey Manchukuo began the offensive against us on December 1, using the military strength of about 2,000 men to attack our forces by two routes. The first route is that the enemies used the Kirin-Hailung Railway as their centre like in North Panshih etc. while the 2nd Route is to use Hsanyang, West Panshih, etc. as a base for an operation against our troops. The main force of the enemies to fight us is the 2nd Teaching Corps (now is re-organised into the anti-Red Partisan Force) numbering between 700 and 800 men, the 14th Regiment and the Logone Force. In the beginning of the campaign of the Japanese imperialists, the 8th Company of the Logone Force on Dec. 6 conducted a heroic meeting under our leadership, administering a crushing blow to the 3rd offensive of the Japanese-Manchukuo bandits, causing the enemies a shocking surprise.

In the course of the offensive, the fierce measures taken by the enemies are : 1) they employed their small units to fight us by means of the partisan fighting tactics. For instance, when meeting with our anti-Japanese forces, the enemies hand in hand with the other units begin fighting by surrounding us. Sometimes, they storm us at night. In all times, they arrested and butchered the anti-Japanese masses and our comrades in particular. 2) Not only were they resorting to the cruel bombardments, the settling fire to houses and countries, the arrests, the slaughter, the assailing of women, etc. but as well they employed various kinds of the reformist methods like the distribution of handbills, etc. causing the masses to wander away from us. 3) they positively bought and guided the renegades, landlords, gentries, etc., enforced the mutual guarantee system, and forced to put the laws of the Manchukuo into operation, in hopes of consolidating the regime of the Manchukuo in the villages in breaking the organizations of the revolutionary masses. 4) they positively disarmed these troops that, capitulating to the Manchukuo before, are regarded by them as unreliable and untrustworthy forces. At the same time, they prosecuted the "lean-up" campaign in the Manchukuo troops in the forms of the re-organization, disbandment, dismissals and shootings. 5) they immorably paralysed the revolutionary united front between the Chinese and the Korean toiling masses. For example, the Japanese militarists used their Korean agents to slaughter the Chinese masses, on the one hand and made rumours that the leaders of the red army are Korean on the other.

2) During the course of this anti-Reds Campaign, the various anti-Japanese forces and volunteers have decreased by 2/3 in their numbers. (For instance, the regiment under xx has now only 120 men left.), but

there has been a considerable increase in their determination to fight wars against Japan, as well as in their confidence in our leadership. For instance, the volunteers and partisans willingly made activities with our forces in one place, reluctantly leaving us for other places.

Our army led to Kiangnang a corps of the soldiers who broke out in mutiny on Dec.6. According to a recent letter from Kiangnang, we have under our leadership the anti-Japanese army of about 400 men.

3) Under such policies as the re-organization, disarmament, etc. taken by Japan, the wave of the anti-Japanese mutinies of the Manchukuo soldiers and especially those Manchukuo troops that are under the influence of our party and army is steadily growing. The prestiges and influences of our party and army are greatly developing and raising among the Manchukuo soldiers. For instance, a unit of the Manchukuo Troop spontaneously offered to [illegible] before us and when our 1st Regiment fought the Manchukuo troop from without this unit then began to go on mutiny. Due to the mistake in our leadership, scores of mutineers ran away with arms but now there are only 4 mutineers, over 10 rifles and 3 horses left in our corps.

At present soldiers in various Manchukuo forces urgently want to break out in mutiny but, unfortunately, we're not able to penetrate into the Manchukuo troops in bravely leading the heroic revolt of the Manchukuo soldiers for the sake of lack of cadres.

4) Under the most barbaric slaughtering and exploiting policy that the Japanese imperialism pursued, the sentiment of workers, peasants and toilers for the struggle against Japan and against the Manchukuo is higher and higher. They show the extraordinarily warm welcome and protection to the victory of our army over the Japanese-Manchukuo troops.

The above facts prove that the Reds Suppression Campaign of the Japanese Manchukuo bandits not only failed to suppress the anti-Japanese revolutionary war in South Manchuria but on the contrary engendered the consciousness and fighting determination of the broader anti-Japanese masses, leading to the condition favourable to the united front of revolution.

II. Out victory and loss during the course of our destruction of the enemy offensive :

1. (1) We led the mutiny of the 8th Company of the Legend Force (one of the main forces to fight us), dealing a smashing blow to this anti-Reds campaign of the enemies, (2) our first Regiment guided the anti-Japanese army of about 400 men in Kiangnang in extending the partisan districts and consolidating the united front against Japan. (3) Out headquarter developed the partisan districts in South Manchukuo, enlarging the anti-Japanese armies, and propagandizing and organizing [illegible] the leader masses (but due to our poor work, the large masses are not yet clear about the correct proposals of our party). (4) our 1st Company and Youth Battalion led the anti-Japanese army of about [illegible] men in Panshih.

2. Our losses: (1) On November 19, our 1st Company and Youth-Battalion in Panshih were surrounded by the Japanese Manchukuo troops with the result that over 9 fighters were sacrificed, 3 fighters were arrested and 14 rifles were wrested by the enemies. The main cause for this failure was due to the under-estimation of the enemy offensive by our leading comrades as well as because of the mistakes in our partisan fighting tactics. (2) In East Panshih accompanying the arrest of our nucleus cadres by the enemy, our organization was subject to the raid. In Itung, the masses, organized by us, were kicked out by the local enemy and our nucleus could not exist. (3) In West Panshih, except two or three Korean comrades who continue their work, many of other comrades expressed pessimism and some of them made their escape. Not only are we unable to do work among Chinese masses at present but we cannot live in this country any long. In the conclusion of the said facts, we may say that we have many new victories in the extension of anti-Japanese war but in the partial districts of Panshih our party work, as well the man work, is in a state of the setback and collapse instead of the development and consolidation.

III. The recent decision of the Hsien-Committee on the work.

1. Concerning the work among the Manchukuo soldiers: The responsible comrades of the Hsien Soldiers Committee must shortly be sent to the 14th Regiment and the Logone force to recover our relation, to continue to organize the mutiny and to inspect the soldier work done by comrades in various places.

2. As to the work in the anti-Japanese forces, the Hsien Committee emphatically pointed out that the "left" phrase of the united front means in fact an opportunism of breaking the united front. In accordance with the instruction from the P.C., we should intensify to lead the partisan forces and organize the headquarter in uniting our command. Meanwhile, we should carry on our work in the force under Wang and in the Korian Independent Regiment in pursuance of the policy of the united front.

3. As for the problem of the local parties, we must first send the local cadres to adjust and restore the organizations of the party and the masses. Capable and new cadres must be sent to Weinan, Kingshuan, etc. (new partisan-districts) in creating our work.

4. Our work among workers of the Kirin-Mailung Railway was ceased to be carried on for a short period due to the return of comrade Chang who, not making his activities for the sake of the enemy, was sacrificed during the operation after his participation in the 1st Company. Now, a cadre must be sent to this railway in adjusting our past work. We should regularly send inspectors to Sian nucleus in helping its work because we consider that the miners in Sian will be the reserves of the People's Revolutionary Army.

5. A part of the partisan force must be called back to Panshih for the purpose of wiping out the [illegible] of Japan and waging and leading the [illegible] disturbances in the enemy rear.

IV Concerning the problem of the Hsien-Committee itself :

Its leadership is very weak due to the fact that comrade Liu was sacrificed comrade Chang deserted, a peasant comrade did not take part in any practical work, and a worker-comrade also did not do any work. Now, the H.C. has only one secretary left.

V. Our demands :

1. In order to examine our work, in order to settle the whole of the organizational problem and in order to guide our work, you should send an inspector.

2. We demand you to send several cadres in assuming the work of the secretary and the propaganda department.

3. Please tell us our organizational relation in the 2nd Teaching Corps if you know because this corps is one of the main forces of the enemies to fight us.

The Central Hsien Committee of
Panshih.
Dec. 30, 1933.

Copy of Exhibit No.81 seized at No.677 Chungking Road on March 2, 1934

January 24, 1934.

Report of the Central Hsien Committee of Panshih, Kirin On its Organizational Problem

I. The following shows the organizational situation of the mass bodies and the party after the inspection of the work on September 18 :

1. Concerning the party :

Name of Parties.	No. nucleus	No. comrades
xx district party	5	80 (13 Korean)
xx " "	4	35 (5 ")
East Panshih	1	16 (9 ")
	1	15 (5 ")
	1	16 (4 ")
		11
		5
		4
		3
The People's R.Army	unknown	unknown
The partisan forces		100
The Hsien Committee The Secretariats		7
The total :-		282

The composition of the party members is :- 30% workers; 10% soldiers; 37% poor peasants; 15% intellectual; 8% middle peasants and the rest.

2. The mass organizations;

Places	No.members of the anti-Japanese Asso	No.members of the Peasants Committee	No.members of the Self-Defence Peasants forces	No.members of the Federation
x x	1,[illegible]	1,[illegible]	110	
x x	[illegible]		40	150
x x	[illegible]			[illegible]
South Panshih	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]
East Panshih	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]
Railways	[illegible]			
The total :	[illegible]	1,[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

3. From June to Sept., the Hsien Committee inspected three times the nuclei, sending the instructions and letters twice to various nuclei per month.

4. A 5-day training class was opened once.

5. On Sept. 18, about 150 comrades and 3,500 toilers were mobilized in holdingthe mass meeting and conducting the demonstration.

II. The exising situation from Sept.18 to the end of Dec.:

1. Concerning the party: The railway nucleus has [illegible] cells with 21 comrades. In Northern Panshih there are 3 nuclei with 20 comrades. In Poleho there are 2 nuclei with 7 comrades. In xx there is a special nucleus with 6 comrades (3 Korean). In xx there is a special nucleus with 10 comrades (6 Korean). In Eastern Panshih, the nucleus comrades have now lost their relation with us following the arrest of the nucleus-secretary.

No report is available from the People's Revolutionary Army. But we are sure that it must have a more development than before. In the 14th Regiment, 3 new members have been drawn into our party and there is a prospect of the growth in our organization.

Under the circumstance of the enemy military campaign against us, our village-nuchei can only maintain their present condition and the work of the nucleus comrades in extremely weak.

Turning to the work of the special nucleus in the Sian coal-mine, the party still does not send its inspector in examining the work of this nucleus while the league has sent an inspector.

2. As to the mass bodies :

Many anti-Japanese organizations, the peasants committee, etc. in various parts of Panshih, under the oppression of the Japanese-Manchukuo bandit troops and the forces of landlords, are now ceasing to carry out their tasks.

Recently, the Hsien Committee has dispatched an inspector to examine the work in the railway nucleus, resulting in not only finding old comrades who lost the party relation but absorbing a number of new members into the party. Meanwhile, about [illegible] railway workers under the leadership of our comrades are now prepared to go on strike, the object of which is 1) to oppose the meals provided byforemen but demand by themselves; 2) to protest against the dismissal, 3) to reduce the working hours, etc.

3. As having said that the Hsien Committee is not healthy, we quite hope you to send [illegible] able to [illegible] the work of the [illegible]. At the present time when the [illegible] the struggles in various places, we consider profoundly that the work to foster the cadres is one of the most urgent tasks.

4. A responsible comrade of the ex-secretariate has been deprived of his work and punished by 3 months approbation because he has committed many mistakes in all works. Now, comrade xx is responsible for the work of the secretariate.

5. Under the lack of cadres, the Hsien Committee can not regularly carry on the examination of work in various ranks of the parties, only depending upon the letters and instructions etc. An guiding various ranks of the parties. However, it has inspected twice the work wf in the railway nucleus and in the 1st Regiment. No examination of work has been carried on for 3 months in the headquarter and the 3rd Regiment.

6. More serious is the problem at present that the cadres of the local parties are for the most part Korean comrades who, under the gravity of the white terror, ask the H. . to transfer them to other places for the sake of the secret work. If we transfer the Korean cadres to other regions, the local parties will soon meet with the lack of cadres.

7. In Seinang, etc., several new nuclei have been set up.

8. In connection with the league, though the league has more than 80 members, but there are only 10 members capable of carrying on their activities. The execution of the league work becomes the more talk of the "left" opportunism as evidenced in the fact that the decisions and reports of the C.Y. were quite contrary to the practical work.

The Panshih Central Hsien Committee
Jan. 24, 1934

Received on Feb. 8, 1934.

Copy of Exhibit No.62 seized at No.677 Changping Road on March 2, 1932

Report from Tangshan

I. The situation in various mines in Tangshan : There are 5 mines in Tangshan. The 5 mines are divided into two kinds, namely, the internal mine and the external mine.

1. The number of workers and their "Bankow" (regional) idea: According to the information made by the yellow trade union, the employed miners number no less than 10,000 while the miners thrown on the street are about 2,000 in number.

The mining workers are for the most part the ruined peasants and small sections of them are rascals. The life of the bulk of workers is rascalization. Their regional notion is heavy a good deal. They are divided up the Tangshanese, the Shantungese, etc.

The heaviness of the reginal conception among workers always affords the facility to capitalists to shatter the influence of workers, causing workers not to consolidate themselves together. At the same time, the regional conception is utlized by the yellow trade union leaders as a weapon to capture the higher position. For instance, in the year before last year, a yellow leader (Pootingese), by using the regional conflict, called on his countrymen, the Peholese, etc. to oust another yellow leader (Tamingese) by declaring the crimes of the latter that the latter embezzled the public funds of the yellow union and deducted the wages of workers etc. while the latter appealed to the Tamingese etc. take up the cudgels against the former. As a result the workers in the two factions contributed money to their respective wings for the funds of the petition. In August last, the same event took place and the workers on two sides fought each other with stones, sticks and even pistol, resulting in that workers donated money for the expenses of going to the court.

2. The working hour ranged from 8 to 18 a day in various mines. Sometimes, various departments of the mines employed the jobbers. The wages of workers ranged from 30 to 70 cents per day.

3. The capitalists employed various forms and methods to exploit the workers. The exploitation may be divided into two kinds, namely, the direct and the indirect. The direct exploitation is to want workers to take photo and to have name plate. Otherwise, it is difficult to go to work in the mines. If discovered by the management that the photo or the name plates are false, the workers must be deprived of their [illegible] and even dismissed, and if they are injured or killed during operation, no pension be paid by capitalists to them. If one having a name-plate and having taken a photo is wounded or killed, about [illegible] be paid no pension to him by capitalists. The other method to exploit workers is to deduct their wages for the [illegible] expenses. For instance, the wages of workers be deducted for the funds in performing the theatre on May Day. The indirect method to squeeze the workers is that the capitalists and the yellow trade union force the workers to pay the membership dues, beating workers, watching their actions, etc.

4. Following their occupation of Tangshan, the Japanese imperialists and capitalists intensified their exploitation and oppression against workers by suspending two-days work per week, doing away with the contract made formerly between workers and capitalists, allowing no workers to stop their work, abolishing the yellow trade union, etc.

Aside from sucking the blood and sweat of workers by using the above methods, the Japanese imperialists opened many gambling houses, opium dens, etc. for the purpose of squeezing the workers on the one hand and watching the movement of workers on the other. At the same time, they organized the Japanese Society in which workers are induced to join with payment of two dollars as membership due and to be nationalized in Japan, forming the socalled "National-Salvation-Army" that is ordered to shift for itself in the local places, ransacking indiscriminately the countrysides.

5) Subject to the cruel exploitation and persecution on the part of the Japanese imperialism, the workers and peasants hated and detested it bitterly. In June, the miners looted the Japanese treasury and organs, killing a Japanese. In xxx, the workers ransacked the Japanese treasury, resulting in the arrest of 12 workers, 5 policemen and one officer (some were fined by one hundred dollars and some were sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment).

Meanwhile, in the villages, the peasants arrested the officers and soldiers of the so-called national-salvation-army as soon as seeing them, burying them alive. Some of villages held up the motor-cars of the Japanese troops.

6) The accounts of the past struggles and the present demands of workers: When waging the struggle for the payment of bonus, the workers bravely surrounded by management.

The struggles, against the deduction of wages, for the increased pay, against the yellow leaders, etc. resulted in success.

The influence of the party has penetrated into the workers of various mines. Especially during the past victorious struggles, the majority of workers knew that the C.C. is brave and fights for the interests of workers. Scores of workers said that "the struggles are not successful were they not led by the C.P."

Following the outbreak of the Kalgan event, the workers said "Chiang Kai-shek co-operated with Japan to the C.P. in Kalgan". Some said "The method of the C.P. to mete out the feed of landlords and rich men to the poor people is correct". But they considered that the communists are the returned students from abroad and that the workers have no qualification to join the C.P.

The present demands of workers are: (1) to abolish the two-days' suspension of work in a week; (2) to put the previous contract into operation and to increase wages; (3) to oppose the dismissal; (3) to set up the trade union; etc. However, the workers in general considered it impossible to go on strike at present, saying that if we declare the walkout we must have no food to eat because the capitalists would soon carry on the lockout due to the fact that the coal are not yet sold out. They proposed that they lay down their tools and go on strike as soon as the coals are sold for the capitalists will certainly comply with our demands at that time when we conduct the strike. As considering it difficult to go on strike without the trade union, the workers are anxious to form their trade union.

7) The number of the unemployed workers must not be 2,000 for the dismissal of workers by batches is daily occurrence. Furthermore, the wrecked peasants flocked into the industrial regions and cities, causing the employed workers to sustain the further exploitation of the capitalist.

II. The situation about the party organization:

In the course of the loss of its connection with the upper party, the Tangshan party, through not enlarging its organization in various mines, has recovered many nuclei. At the same time, every comrade took part in the production, penetrating into the masses in comprehending their life and establishing our new contast with them, and especially displaying our party leadership in the factions of workers.

1) There are 4 nuclei with 18 comrades (one woman-comrade) the composition of whom is: 13 workers, 3 unemployed workers, 1 teacher of the primary school and 1 petty merchant.

2) The life of various nuclei is far from healthy. Though the lack of the organizational work, comrades can carry on the propaganda and agitation work.

3) The mass organization

There are 3 members of the Saving Country Society, 3 members of the Friends of the Red Army and 60 members in the Fighting Society of the Daiming-Guild in which our party leadership has been set up. No new intend to convert the members of the Fighting-Society into the pickets.

4) The propaganda work: In addition to making oral propaganda work, the Tangshan party published a small paper which played a relative role among the masses for it could be openly read by them.

January 1, 1934.

Received on Feb. 8, 1934.

Copy of Exhibit No.83 seized at No.677 Hangping Road on March 2, 1934

January 15, 1934.

Report from the Hailung Party to the Manchurian Provincial Committee

I. Concerning the problem of the organisation:

1. You should strengthen the Panshih Hsien Committee, causing it to regularly inspect the work in Hailung, Fengtien.

2. If possible, you should send a standing inspector to South Manchuria for the purpose of examining and directing our work.

3. The Special Committee of South Manchuria must be shortly set up if possible.

II. Concerning our work :

1. Following the conclusion of the 3rd meeting of the Executive Committee, 3 new comrades have been drawn into our party, and 30 toilers have been organized into the mass body. About $100 were raised from the masses in support of the People's Revolutionary Army. No reports are received from two Hsiens (Shian and Fungfeng).

III. As to the activities of the People's R. A.:

Since the attack on Shanyuanpoo, the P.R.A., on Dec. 23, launched an attack upon a village in Hewhe Hsien. In the course of this movement, a Japanese agent was killed, 2 Chinese agents (masters of the Tax-Collecting Bureau and the Telephone) were captured and about 100 houses of agents were set on fire by the P.R.A. After that, the P.R.A., in conjunction with a unit of volunteers (about 700 men), advanced towards Linkiang with the main object of joining hands with the other units of the anti-Japanese forces. Our partisan company and a section of the 9th Company made their activities in Shanyuang etc., arresting of late 2 Korean lackeys of Japan, promising to free them on ransom. According to a report from Panshih, a Regiment of the Manchukuo troops going on mutiny, the volunteers under xx and a unit under xx were incorporated into the People's Revolutionary Army.

IV. The influence of the P.R.A. is great among the volunteers. They said: "The P.R.A. is the real troop to save the country and we should follow it to do". The masses in the partisan districts said that they never saw the good troop like the P.R.A. They asked the P.R.A. to participate in their regions, saying that they should protect the P.R.A. in all ways including supplying it with food and informing it of the whereabouts of the enemies.

V. The anti-Japanese sentiment of soldiers in various places is very high. Recently, about 200 men of the Manchukuo troops stationed in xx Hsien took out for mutiny. The disarmament of the Manchukuo troops by the Japanese accelerated the mutiny and the anti-Japanese ferment of soldiers.

VI. Some of the anti-Japanese forces making their activities in Hsanlung, etc. along the Mukden-Hailung Railway buried their arms in the ground or are disarmed by the Japanese imperialists due to the escape or betrayal of the Kut leaders and bandit-chiefs. On the other hand, the soldiers of the anti-Japanese forces are well aware of the crimes of their reactionary leaders and continue their activities under our influence.

VII. After the new year, the enemy again mobilized on a large scale the troops to attack on our volunteers from xx place to xx place and from xx region to xx region.

Jan. 15, 1934.

Hailung Hsien.

Copy of exhibit No 84 seized at No 677 Changping Road on March 2, 1934.

Report of the Chairman of the Front Committee.

Despite the temporary defeat it has met with as the result the savage combined attack of Japanese Imperialism and the Kuomintang, the betrayal of militarists and politicians in the ranks of the Anti-Japanese Allied Forces of the People, the disruptive activities of the Right opportunists under the leadership of Chang Ma Tao ( ) and the political vacillation and mistakes of the Frenct Committee, the mighty Anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist revolutionary movement in Chahar is of tremendous significance and importance for the revolutionary movement throughout China as well as in North China.

The revolutionary movement in Chahar broke out at the critical juncture when Japanese imperialism was invading Peiping, Tientsinand Charhar and when the Kuomintang Gocernment had signed the Tangku treaty. During this period the broad masses of workers, peasants, soldiers and petty bourgeois of North China were subjected to the constant danger of being slaughtered, and being bombarded by Japanese airplanes and guns and they were therefore fired with anti-Japanese and anti- imperialist enthusiasm and sentiment . The open surrender of the Kuomintang Government, cutting off the supply of anti-Japanese forces , suppressing and dissolving the spontaneous anti-Japanese forces of the people, launching a severe white terror against the anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist movement served only to sharpen the revolutionary struggle of the broad toiling masses. Hundreds and thousands of white army soldiers revolted against their officers and continued to carry on their war against Japan,(the 119th Brigade of the 41st Armyand several regiments in the Northwestern Army Several thousand men of the self defence corps of peasants in Chayong and Chifeng (Jehol) waged gallant war against the Japanese invaders, while columns of peasant armies , anti-Japanese volunteers , Student battalions, first aid squads sprang up like mushrooms in Peiping, Tientsin and Taiyuan. Most significant of all was the growing struggle of workers in Tientsin and Tongshan and the peasant uprising and partisan warfare in South Hopei.

In spite of the fact that the number of organised workers, peasants and soldiers participating in the very commencement of the revolutionary movement in Chahar was insignificantly small , the toiling people of Chahar Province later on joined the revolutionary movement in greater and greater numbers day by day. The industrial workers of Kalgan (Railwaymen and electric lighting workers) quickly organised themselves and developed class struggle, thus becoming the prop and stay of the revolutionary movement. Peasants of such out-of-the-way rural districts as Whanchuan, Chonpei and Tolon set up their own own organisations and played a great part in the revolutionary movement.

The wide establishment of soldiers committees and anti-Japanese groups of soldiers in white army units (the 2nd and 5th Divisions the 41st Army and the Volunteer Armies) deserves special mention The development of the revolutionary movement offered a very strong impetous to the revolutionary struggle in Hopei, Honan and Shensi(The creation of anti-Japanese Iron and Blood Armies in Central and Eastern Honan , the revolt of one brigade and one regiment of the Shensi general Yang Fu Cheng ( ) Indeed it is no exaggeration to say that the outbreak and growth

revolution ry
of the tremendous anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist movement in Chahar Province has played a big part not only in the anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist fight of millions of workers peasants and soldiers in North China, but also in the general revolutio nary movement of the Chinese toiling masses as a whole.

II

As has already been stated in the above, the revolutionary movement in Chahar broke out at the criti l juncture when the Japanese imperialist was invading Peiping, Tientsin and Chahar and when the Kuomintang Government had signed the Tangku truce treaty. It is necessary however to point out that this revolutionary outburst was at the same time an uprising against unbeleivable oppression and exploitation by the reactionary ruling classes. The plight and misery of the toiling masses of Chahar is notorious and terrible. The heavy burden of taxation nearly broke the back of the people. For example the farmer has to pay two dollars and fifty cents in land tax for each mow, the crop of which is hardly worth one dollar. More than ten kinds of taxes are imposed on the transportation of agricultural produce from the farm to the market. It need scarcely be said that this economic background has had a good deal to do in urging the toiling masses of Chahar along the path of the revolution. Nevertheless we must not lose sight of the cultural backwardness of the masses and their lack of experience in the revolutionary movement. These two weaknesses enabled disgruntled militarists and politicians, landlords and reactionary leaders not only to join the revolutionary movement of the broad masses under false colours, but also to take into their hands the leadership of the movement. It was an open secret that their ulterior motive for joining and controlling the revolutionary movement of the broad toiling masses was to utilize the revolutionary enthusiasms of the masses for gaining their private ends and enhancing their personal power.

The Front Committee had a correct understanding of this question. It had from the very outset waged a merciless struggle against the opportunist line of Chang Ku-tao, who contended that the party must do its best to sharpen the differences among the Kuomintang generals. For this very purpose, he suggested that the activity of the party must not oppose Feng Yu-hsiang so that Feng might be strong enough to fight Nanking. This was his notorious "watermelon policy." Acting upon this policy our comrades in the 2nd Division under the leadership of Wang Ling and Chao Chuan-jung pursued a typical "officer line," maintaining the position of officers at the expense of the interest of soldiers.

Unfortunately the fight against Right opportunism was limited to the people at the top only and had not penetrated into the lower strata, thus giving the opportunists the possibility of exerting their influence in various forms upon some of our leading Comrades as well as upon the rank and file and the soldier mass.

The fight against the deception of militarists and politicians was a little bit better and satisfactory. In addition to issuing special manifestoes on several important occasions, all the legal papers of the party had paid the greatest attention to exposing the disgruntled militarist and politicians in the actual practice and thereby indicating the way out for the toiling masses. The Front Committee had organized and guided a good number of heroic struggles of the workers, peasants and soldiers (the struggle of railwaymen and electric lighting workers, the fight of students against Nanking education, the anti-Japanese movement of soldiers and their revolt against their reactionary officers.). The mighty demonstration of thousands of workers, peasants, soldiers and students in protest against Feng Yu-hsiang's alleged betraying the

Anti-Japanese Allied Forces represented a tremendous flare-up of the revolutionary enthusiasm of the broad masses and forced Feng Yu-hsiang to give way. The intensification of this movement and especially the historic campaigns for the National-Salvation Conference of the People for North China laid bare the deception of the reactionary elements, who had to cast off their masks and show their true colours. They arrested revolutionists and prohibited public meetings and propaganda. The Front Committee at this decisive movement could not estimate correctly the forces of the Revolution and of the Reaction on the Bolshevist point of view and fell into the pit of opportunism of another type by "maintaining the existing state of affairs as long as possible so that we may increase the revolutionary forces." In reality the Front Committee forgot the important immediate task of preparing and leading decisive battle with the disgruntled warlords and political adventurers.

The lukewarm state of the fight against Right opportunism within the party enabled the Right opportunists to hold leading and responsible positions in some of our main forces (the 2nd Division) and to put up organized resistance to any reconstruction in the work of the party. The Right opportunists in the 2nd Division refused the representative of the Front Committee participation in their leading organ. They detained the directors and instructors of the Front Committee without transmitting them to the rank and file.

III.

The revolutionary movement in Chahar province confronted our party with the central tasks of leading the anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist struggles of the workers, peasants and soldiers; of developing the anti-Japanese partison movement of the broad masses and of coordinating this growing revolutionary movement with the revolutionary struggles of workers and peasants in Cha-Pei toward the common object of creating new Soviet districts and Red Armies in North China. For convenience's sake, we divide the movement into three periods as follows:-

1. The first period begins from the outbreak of the revolutionary coup in Chahar to the first vain attempt of Feng Yu-hsiang at compromise. In the 1925-7 great revolution the revolutionary struggle of the worker and peasant masses of Kalgan was at its height. Following the defeat of the Revolution a reign of white terror set in and the various revolutionary mass organizations were smashed to pieces. Nevertheless, the revolutionary struggle of workers and peasants continued. The leadership of our party and the organizational strength of the mass organization were weak in the extreme. When we first came to Kalgan, we had no local connections at all. Thanks to one month's strenuous work we succeeded in establishing an anti-Japanese decury among the workers and students. This organization had six groups, with a membership of 60, but it lacked revolutionary life. Later on the Model Regiment came to Kalgan from Pengyang. We had seventy comrades in this regiment. Sometime afterward the troops of Feng Chen-wu and Cheng Zou-chi were transferred to Chahar and there were scattered groups of our party in these units. The anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist feelings of the soldiers of these army units were very high and the influence of the Chinese Soviets and Red Armies was spreading among them far and wide.

During this period the main tasks of the Front Committee were to rally the broad masses of revolutionary workers, peasants and soldiers under the flag of the Revolution, to initiate their daily struggle against Japanese and other imperialists and against the traitors, to unmask the disgruntled warlords and politicians, to develop and champion this

revolutionary movement, to enlarge our party organization, to consolidate and reorganize the leading organs of the various party committees and to establish on independent leadership of the party. With these tasks in view the Front Committee concentrated its attention upon the most important branches - the railwaymen and electric lighting workers in Kalgan and the troops commanded by Ten Wen-yi, Lee Chen-hai and Sun Ting-yen. The Front Committee spared no efforts in broadening out the anti-imperialist, anti-Japanese and anti-Kuomintang movements and in exposing the hypnotical talk of the warlord and of the various reactionary groups. The railwaymen in Kalgan set up their own militant railwaymen's Union and overthrew the domination of the yellow union and the Kuomintang office. They fought against the exploitation by foremen, for the payment of all back wages, for Sunday rest and for the refunding of the so-called "patriotic tax" and "airplane tax" collected by the authorities. The Chahar National Salvation Society had organized in its ranks thousands of workers, peasants, soldiers, and students. Our work in the various White army units had likewise scored a series of achievements. Most significant of all was the wide recruiting of soldiers into the party.

2. The second period begins from the armed attack by the imperialist-Kuomintang bloc to the valta-free on the part of Feng Yu-hsiang. At the beginning of this period the Anti-Japanese Allied Forces had already increased to 50,000. Although some of these army units were poorly equipped and ill diciplined, yet the fact remained that revolutionary and anti Japanese feelings of the soldier mass were very high. The intensification of the revolutionary movement in Chahar province was a crushing blow to the rule of the imperialists and of the Kuomintang, which were therefore forced to act on the offensive in every respect to check the advance of the reolution. At that time the main forces of the Anti-Japanese Allied Army were concentrated in Kalgan. The 41st Army under the command of Sun Ting-yen was stationed along the railway line between Kalgan and Nankow, while about two divisions of Shansi troops were stationed to the west of Kalgan. In view of the ever-growing revolutionary situation the 41st Army and the Shansi divisions adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude, thus rendering it extremely difficult for the Kuomintang to send troops direct against the Anti-Japanese Allied Army. Moreover the signing of the Tongku treaty by the Kuomintang government had offered a strong impetus to anti-Japanese, anti-imperialist and anti-Kuomintang movement throughout the country, and even the Kuomintang and the imperialists dared not carry on military operations openly and directly against the Anti-Japanese Allied Forces. Then they commenced their offensive first on the political front, conducting an intensified propaganda campaign about "Red Kalgan", "Communism and public ownership of women in Kalgan" and so on. This lying propaganda served a double purpose; it justified on the one hand the slaughtering of the revolutionary toilers in Chahar by the Kuomintang generals who were clearing the way for the dismemberment of China among the imperialists and increased on the other hand the reactionary activities of vacilliating war-lords, politicians, landlords and reactionaries in the ranks of the Anti-Japanese Allied Forces who were already trembling at the radical swing of the revolution in Chahar. It was [illegible] that the Christian General made his [illegible] with Nanking. It was also under [illegible] the Right opportunists (Chang Ku-tao and company) raised a bellyfee in publisher his [illegible] "[illegible] policy."

When Feng Yu-hsiang made his attempt at compromise

the military preparations of Nanking were just beginning. At that time the Anti-Japanese Allied Forces had sufficient advantageous conditions for acting on the offensive and with victories too. The recapture of Tulon from the hands of Japanese and Manchukuo troops had greatly elevated the revolutionary enthusiasm and self-confidence of the broad masses of workers, peasants and soldiers in Chahar.

The Front Committee decided to organize a large scale mass demonstration against imperialist-Kuomintang's armed attack and against the alleged compromise and surrender of the warlords and politicians. Mass meetings were held. Inspite of Feng Yu-Hsiang's stern orders forbidding soldiers to attend these meetings, many soldiers set the order at defiance and other held meetings in their barracks, at which delegates were elected to the demonstration. The soldiers and workers were especially militant and radical and many low-ranking army officers filed protest against compromise. As a result of this demonstration, Feng Yu-hsiang had to yield on the surface to mass pressure and staged a show of making active military preparations to resist the impending attack by Nanking and by Japanese imperialism. The influence and the work of the party developed with astounding rapidity. The electric lighting workers and bus drivers waged a victorious struggle respectively for their immediate interests. The former fought for division of bonus, increase of wages and shortening of the working day; the latter against the guild. The organization of anti-Japanese League of soldiers cropped up like mushroom after a spring rain. They fought against reactionary officers (the 4th Division) demanded their pay and better rations (the 2nd Division). Soldiers of the 4th Division bound up their reactionary officers hand and foot and Feng's bodyguard regiment staged a "walk out." The organizations of peasants in Whomch, Chengpei and Tolon increased by leaps and bounds. The self-defense army of peasants in Tolon was several thousand strong, playing an active part in building fortifications and performing sentry duties..... There were at that time 11 comrades in the 1st Division, 50 in the 4th Division, 100 in the 2nd Division, 10 in the divisions commanded by Koo Shu-lai and Lee Chun Hai respectively, 48 in General Feng Chen-wu's troops and 40 in the Military Academy. The ten days' recruiting drive enrolled more than one hundred new party members. The party organization in the city of Kalgan increased considerably (about 100 party members and Komsomols).

The People National-Salvation Conference for North China took place in Kalgan in spite of Feng Yu Hsiang's intimidation and deception. More than two hundred delegates were present.

With the transfer of Sun Ting-yun's troops to Peiping, Nanking's troops penetrated into Chahar step by step. General Ho Yun-chen, Chairman of the Peiping Branch of the Central Military Affairs Commission, had despatched six divisions to the Southern part of Chahar. At the same time Manchukuo troops under the command of Japanese imperialism marched onward from Kayin and Tolon. The main forces of the Anti-Japanese Allied Army were concentrated in Kalgan and vicinity. Each of the anterior commanders looked subordinates to Yiehs. [illegible] to the Yiehs. [illegible]

sought to kick out the reactionary generals and politicians and to put the leadership of this tremendous revolutionary movement in the hands of the revolutionary toiling masses themselves. It was decided at that time to establish a committee in Sanwha and three Commissions on Front Work, whose business it was to organize the revolutionary war of soldiers and workers and peasants in the war zone against Nanking armies and to spread over agitation and propaganda in the enemy troops. Owing to over increased activities in General Lee Chen-hai's army, Lee's Chief of Staff and political advisor , who were more or less sympathetic with the revolution, were summarily executed by Lee. A storm of opposition broke out against General Lee Chen-hai. The soldiers arrested and shot more than ten reactionaries. Part of General Sun Tin-yen's army refused to go to Paotoo and revolted. But due to the "officer line" pursued by our leading comrades in the 41st Army, the revolt was crushed. Nevertheless this revolt had had a great effect on the soldiers of the 41st Army.

All this was going on when General Ki Hung-chong's troops retreated from Tolon and Kuyen to Kalgan; which accelerated and sharpened our conflict with Feng Yu-hsiang. But as the result of our own mistakes and weaknesses we failed in our aim, thus giving Feng Yu-hsiang the possibility of reaching an ultimate compromise with Nanking and issuing a circular telegram announcing the dissolution of the Anti-Japanese Allied Forces. At that time we had only one thousand soldiers with three hundred rifles absolutely under our command and control. In view of the fact that there was no fighting heavy odds we were therefore forced to give up Kalgan and retreat to Chonpei.

3. The third period covers our retreat from Kalgan and our march into Hopei (please refer to previous reports -- tr.)

IV

The process of the revolutionary movement in Chahar testified to the ever-growing revolutionary situation arising out of the revolutionary struggle of the broad masses of workers, peasants and soldiers. All these objective conditions were capable of guaranteeing the victorious development of this revolutionary movement. But also we were beaten in the long run. We shall never forget the lesson we have learnt from this dismal and disastrous defeat. In summing up the causes of this defeat it is absolutely necessary to call serious attention to the following mistakes and experiences:-

1. From the very commencement of the revolutionary movement in Chahar Province the party had pointed out the only path to victory lay in developing and extending the revolutionary movement on a larger scale and to a higher stage. A check up on the work we have done shows that the Front Committee wavered in the execution of this decision. It is of course true that we have never openly rejected this decision, but it is equally true that we have done very little serious practical work to put this decision into effect. For instance we paid insufficient attention to our party work in the southern part of Chahar when we were in Kalgan. Indeed truth compels us to confess that we have never had any intention of creating a base in the southern part of Chahar, nor had we concentrated our forces in this part beforehand in order to facilitate our marching northward. As late as we reached central districts north of [illegible] many leading comrades still lacked determination to carry out the decision on moving southward.

2. The most vital condition for emerging victories from the life-and-death battle with the desperate class enemies consists in that our party must have its own independent leadership. We must rely upon the growth of the revolutionary mass struggles for organizing a revolutionary offensive. The Front Committee did realize the importance of this condition but failed in taking concrete and effectual steps for creating this condition.

3. On the question of determining our tactics toward the war-lords, the Front Committee had done right in combatting the views of the Right opportunists, but it fell into the pit of opportunism by another type by trying to maintain the existing state of things as long as possible in order that we may gain more time for organizing and consolidating our revolutionary forces. It need hardly be said that this policy had weakened our exposure of the militarists and our fight against them. This is the reason why after the publication of Feng Yu-hsiang's circular telegram announcing the dissolution of the Anti-Japanese Allied Forces we could not make a decisive reply and had to retreat unconditionally. I stuck to this same mistaken view later on in our dealings with General Ki Chong-lay. This accounted for the heavy losses we sustained in the 16th infantry Division and the 8th cavalry division.

4. Right opportunism has demonstrated to the fullest extent its reactionary role in this revolutionary movement as spy and agent-provocateur of the reactionary ruling classes. From the very beginning of the revolutionary movement the Right opportunists in Kalgan had given wide publicity to their "policy" of following at the tail of the war-lords. Although they sometimes acknowledged their mistakes as a result of the anti-opportunism fight waged by the Front Committee, yet they continued their "water melon" policy just the same in their practical work. However they made use of their connections with the G.P.U. to act independently of, and sometime in direct opposition to, the party.

In the meanwhile we must point out that the fight of the Front Committee against Right opportunism was highly insufficient and unsatisfactory. The Front Committee had not mobilized the rank and file against the Right deviations, nor had it exposed systematically the mistakes and demagogy of the Right opportunists before the broad masses. The Front Committee forgot to kick out in time the hopeless rotten opportunist elements and reorganize the leading organs which were in the hands of the opportunists. In reality, the Front Committee compromised and temporized with the opportunists time and again, thus enabling the opportunists to demonstrate to the fullest extent their reactionary role and influence the Front Committee on many important questions.

5. The most serious mistake made by the Front Committee in the mass work was its Left closed door policy. First and foremost, the party did not know how to organize and initiate the struggle of the masses for their immediate interests. We only issued stereotyped slogans that had very little appeal to the broad toiling masses of workers, peasants and soldiers. Secondly the party were at loss how to win over the masses under the influence of the various reactionary organizations and rally them around our party. In other words, the party could not make the tactics of the united front from below, and committed a big mistake in splitting up the masses into "Red" and "White". In some cases the tactics of the united front from below was interpreted as meaning [illegible] and "White" [illegible] the party. [illegible] the [illegible] for the party [illegible]

struggle into a higher stage. The party failed to organize greater sections of the masses in the course of the struggle. The various revolutionary mass organizations paid very little attention to enlarging the organization of the party and rallying as many militant elements as possible around the party. This is the reason why following the defeat of the revolutionary movement many mass organizations in Kalgan collapsed to pices like a house of cards. Last of all, the Front Committee could not do its best to overcome all the difficulties. It did not know how to make use of the many favourable conditions for developing the present movement, especially the present movement along the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway.

6. Bureaucratism in the leading organ of the Front Committee.

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Copy of Exhibit No.[illegible] seized at 677 Changping Road
on March 2, 1934

Lessons learnt from the revolutionary [illegible] in Chahar - excerpts from the decision of the Hopei Provincial Committee on the Report of the Front Committee

1. Under no circumstances is it permissable that the political party of the proletariat can keep secret its true colours from the broad toiling masses, neglect the popularization of its policies or give up the right to criticise its ally as well as its enemy. Only the wide popularization of our policies and uncompromising a severe exposure and criticism of all the class enemies can draw a sharp constrast between the deception of the opportunist militarists and the revolutionary programme of our party, and thus free the broad toiling masses from under the reactionary leadership and rolly them under the independent leadership of our party. It must be constantly kept in mind that the establishment of the independent leadership of the party is the basic condition for the victory of any revolutionary movement. Obviously the party has failed to pursue such a fundamental line with iron determination in the anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist movement in Chahar, assuming a negative attitude toward fighting for the independent leadership of the party. Even under the exceedingly favourable conditions arising out of the ever-developing revolutionary struggle of the masses in Kalgan, the Front Committee never so much as tried to organise on the basis of the united front from below revolutionary attacks and counter-attacks for the overthrow of the reactionary leadership of Feng Yu-hsiang and other petty war-lords. Feng Yu-hsiang raised under public pressure such lying slogans as "abolition of all illegal taxes and miscellaneous levies", "absolute freedom of speech, press, meeting and strikes", but in reality the burden of taxation upon the back of the Chahar people had increased instead of lightened. Moreover Feng Yu-hsiang did everything to increase exploitation and repression. In spite of this, our party did nothingwhatever at that time to give wide publicity to these facts nor organise and mobilize the masses to fight for the realization of the slogans issued by Feng Yu-hsiang. The press of the party did poor work in exposing and counter-acting the propaganda of the counter-revolutionary war-lords. For worse was that it after receiving a "warning" from Feng Yu-hsiang our papers gave up altogether mentioning the "Anti-Japanese Allied Forces".

Despite the fact that the Front Committee had anticipated theinevitable volte-face on the part of the Christain General and had waged a more or less vigorous struggle against the action of the opportunists Chang Mu-tar and Company in "[illegible]" with war-lords, the Front Committee had, however, fallen in this struggle into a mere concert quagmire of [illegible] opportunism. At that time the Front Committee adopted this [illegible] policy: "[illegible] of [illegible] possible for organising and preparing the [illegible] forces. It is [illegible] in making the split". [illegible] Feng Yu-hsiang and his [illegible]. [illegible]

Feng's demagogy remained unexposed and the class struggle undeveloped, it was impossible to "gain as much time as possible for organizing and preparing the revolutionary forces", let alone to establish our independent leadership. Since the Front Committee considered it bad policy "to take the initiative in making the inevitable split" the only cause to follow was to "avoid cautiously any possible conflict with Fen Yu-hsiang. Therefore despite its constant discussion as to the possibility of Feng's staging a dramatic right abrut at any movement the Front Committee was rather inactive in preparing rightly revolutionary counter-attacks in decisive reply to Feng's open reaction at any time. From the very beginning the Front Committee had had no determination to raise the slogan "Down with Fen Yu-hsiang". Precisely for this very reason, the Front Committee hoped to revolutionize the whole "Anti-Japanese Allied Forces" instead of sharpening the internal class struggle in the Anti-Japanese Allied Forces on the basis of the united front from below, and thus rallying the majority of soldiers and lowrank officers under the leadership of our party. Such a policy only led us to a state of helplessness when Feng Yu-hsiang announced the dissolution of the Anti-Japanese Allied Forces after his successful compromise with the Nanking Government. We had no alternation at that time but effect an unconditional evacuation of Kalgan.

This very mistake was repeated and continued when we retreated to Hopei Province. The hostility of Generals Feng Chen-wu and Chang Yen-yu to the revolution was traditional and widely known to everybody. Our party failed to disarm them by revolutionary offensive. Moreover the Front Committee made a gross blunder in holding the view that these war-lords would not attack us pretty soon. Opportunist hesitation and indecision on our part costus dear (the disarming of the 16 infantry division and the dissolution of the 5th cavalry division were disarmed by the enemy). Although we could have disarmed the bodyguard brigade of Ki Chen-kun, the Front Committee made allowances in view of Ki's "devoters" to the Revolution. The commandeering of wagons and carts and violation of women by soldiers and officers of this brigade shattered the prestige and popularity of the "Anti-Japanese Allied Forces" and threw great obstacles in the way of our mass work among the peasants (they deserted their homes and fled away at the approach of the army. Sometimes we could not find a single soul in the village. The Front Committee gave in to Ki in every way, though it could have kicked him out. The true face of the party were hidden and the party just followed at the tail of war-lords!

2. Shortly after the occurrence of the Kalgan coup, both the Central Committee and the Hopei Provincial Committee charged the Front Committee with the basic task of "moving southward in cooperation with the mighty revolutionary struggles of the broad [illegible] in Hopei in order to create new Soviet [illegible] and Red Armies". From beginning to end, the Front Committee had [illegible] on this "moving southward" line. The Front Committee, when in Kalgan, [illegible] did not devote serious attention to the work in South Chahar, which was of decisive importance. Upon the retreat from Kalgan the Front Committee determined upon Changpei as the second base and thus [illegible] the preparations for marching southward. The [illegible] revolutionary forces in the [illegible] had had very little effect on [illegible] revolution of the peasants.

3. The Front Committee made a gross mistake in joining the "Anti-traitor Allied Forces", which served only to discredit the revolutionary character of the "Anti-Japanese Allied Forces". The Front Committee regarded this as a mere military expediency enabling us to march through the territory of General Fang Chen-wu and Liu Kwei-tang and even went so far as to entertain illusions about winning over Generals Tan Yu-ling and Liu Kwei-tang through diplomacy under the cloak of "moving southward against the traitors". This opportunist mistake was by no means accidental; it was the logical result of the want of a clear understanding on the part of the F.C. as to the Japanese imperialism and her agents and to close relations between political and military matters. Under such circumstances it stood to reason that we should have failed in exposing forcibly the reactionary character of the warlords in the "Anti-Traitor Allied Froces" who were nothing but paid agents of Japanese imperialism. Small wonder we should have surrendered to the war-lords and gave up the banner of the "Anti-Japanese Allied Froces". The Front Committee was of pinion that "our object is to move southward and that we must take every means to attain the object. We don't care muchwhether Fang Chen-wu and company are lackeys of Japanese imperialism. If they can afford us facilities, we would be very glad to make cats paw of them". But the fact is just the reverse. It was we that had been utilized and fooled by the war-lords.

4. Lack of persistent and serious mass to work in the lower strata. The existence of the "officer line" was the greatest obstable to our party to first to last. Most comrades did not know how to apply correctly the tactic of the united front from below for capturing the masses. The shortening necessarily gave rise to two extremities. One was the closed-door policy. Some comrade advanced the theory that "the masses must be either Reds or Whites". Time and again our comrades denounced a whole unit commanded by a reactionary officer as a gang of hopeless rotten reactionaries" and therefore did no active work whatsoever to win over the rank and file in of the lower strata. Despite the fact that more than twenty army units had gained the Anti-Japanese Allied Forces, the Front Committee paid attention only to the army units in which we had comrades and gave the go-by to the others. This accounted for our inability of increase our armed forces which remained stationary. The other extremity was "peaceful development" instead of increasing our forces through leading and organizing the daily revolutionary struggle of the masses. These two extremities served as a check upon the ground of our party and mass organizations, which lagged behind for the radicalization among among the masses and behind the extension of the political influence of this party. We had every possibility of carrying on our openly in the 5th and 6th cavalry divisions, but we only [illegible] five[illegible] comrades within two months. The situation in our main force (the 5 and 10th Divisions) was no better. Most of the anti-Japanese League of soldiers were empty [illegible] not to speak of functioning as leader and organizer and propagandist of the [illegible]. As [illegible] our work in the 5th and 10th [illegible] the Front Committee held this mistaken idea that since these two divisions were our loyal main force and most of the officers belonged to our party, our task consisted now in [illegible] between soldiers and officers, which would lead to [illegible] of the forces, or in leading the daily struggle of the [illegible]

but in adjusting and compromising differences, if any, between officers and soldiers. Therefore our party nucleus, the soldier committee and the political department had nothing to do but make speeches and guess about weather.

AS our forces were not based on the initiative of the soldier mass, we had therefore to consult the will of officers before making any decision, sometime even in utter disregard of the views of the rank and file. When certain officers wavered, the party was helpless, unable to do anything at all but follow them. In the long run the party had lost its leadership and its authority and become an echo of the officers. This told the tale about the betrayal of the 2nd Division by several officer "comrades." After leaving Chongpei, the Front Committee decided on the reorganization of the various army units under our command on the partisan footing in order to meet the requirements of the agrarian revolution, but this decision was never carried out as a result of objections raised by officer comrades who protested on grounds of "actual difficulties". Leading officer comrades in the 5th Division on several occasions ignored and refused to execute decisions of the Front Committee, inflicting heavy losses to our forces, politically as well as strategically. The party could ~~xx~~ do nothing but yielded. Needless to say that this phenomenon was the inevitable and logical consequence of the isolation of the party from the masses and the rank and file and its adoption of an officer line.

5. The fight waged by the Front Committee against Right opportunism was far less active than the disruptive activities of the Right opportunists Chang Ku-tao and his followers. It was rather late when the Front Committee intensified the fight against Right opportunism. The fight looked determination and stubbornness and in some respects the influence of Right opportunism had found reflection in our own ranks. For instance, the Front Committee resisted the so-called "water melon policy" of Chang Ku-tao, but it at the same time adopted an equally opportunist policy of "maintaining the existing state of affairs in Chahar as long as possible." The "tactic" of joining the "Anti-Traitor Allied Forces" was undoubtedly the result of Chang Ku-tao's theory of "acting in league with the Japanese against Chiang Kai-shek". From the very beginning Chang Ku-tao had served as agent of the warlords to split our organization. The Front Committee did not realize the seriousness of the question till Chang Ku-tao came forward openly against the revolution and the C.P. Before Chang Ku-tao cast off his mask, Comrade X even suggested that Chang Ku-tao be allowed to serve on the Front Committee and that a compromise be reached with him. Despite the significant fact that the 2nd Division under the control of Chang Ku-tao and Wang Ling had refused from the very beginning to accept the leadership of our party, the Front Committee, nevertheless, paid no serious attention to this question and failed to mobilize the rank and file party members in the 2nd Division to fight against these opportunists, thus giving the reactionaries the possibility of betraying the revolution at the most critical junctures, when it was too late to get rid of them. Even when we were in Kalgan the fight of the Front Committee against [illegible] a personal [illegible] this question before the [illegible] Chang Ku-tao and his clique, [illegible] supplied from the party, were [illegible] [illegible] the reactionary Right wingers in a [illegible] against the revolution and an act of treason to the proletariat.

6. The weakness of the class basis of the party and the imperfection and bureaucratism in the leading organ constituted one of the basic causes for the ultimate dismal failure of the revolutionary movement in Chahar. Generally speaking, the Front Committee was unsteady politically, unable to determine correct tactics and policies to meet the ever-changing situation in Chahar. Instead of doing its best to overcome actual difficulties and obstacles, the Front Committee assumed a negative attitude in giving way to actual difficulties and wavered in its determination to push its way through. Some leading comrades, at the most critical juncture, not only failed to adopt prompt emergency measures in the spirit of heroic self-sacrifice so as to fight a way out, but also betrayed shameful vacillation. Old Chow(now a traitor) ordered that a white flag be hoisted when a company of the 18th Division was surprised by the enemy. When the army was surroundered in Sunyi he advocated unconditional surrender and transferred his duties as acting Chairman of the Front Committee to Comrade X, while he himself ran away for personal safety.

Responsible comrades of the Front Committee betrayed profound bureaucratism in their methods of work and most of the time of the Front Committee was spent on political discussions and abstract questions to the neglect of the nucleus life and the daily struggle of the masses. The leading comrades paid no heed to the views and mood of the rank and file, much less make decisions according to the views of the comrades of the lower strata. As a matter of fact the Front Committee existed isolated from the masses. A typical example was furnished by Old Chow, who already appeared on horse back in company with the divisional commander and had never had any talk with comrades of the nucleus. There was such thing as inner-party criticism from below. The initiative and the activity of the rank and file of the party were suppressed and stifled under the high-hand practice of bureaucratic leadership. As time went on this phenomenon went from bad to worse and became a pretty serious problem. Most of the nuclei had no daily work and could not hold their nuclei meetings. The Front Committee discussed every question with officer comrades and left the rank and file in the dark. After our retreat from Changpei comrades of the nuclei were anxious to know what course the party was taking, asking eagerly the leading comrades: "Say, Tsewich, what are we going to do and where are we going? We really don't know what you fellows have of your sleeves." But our leading comrades put up airs and said in reply: "You boys shut up! We cannot disclose military secrets. ... Don't you worry, men. You bet the party must certainly do something. ..."

The Front Committee itself had neither a scientific division of labour nor correct leadership. The conducting of the affairs of the Committee was practically concentrated in the hands of the chairman who was all but a dictator. Since the departure of the Chairman for Peiping, the prestige and the authority of the Front Committee declined considerably.

As a result of inattention to the practical mass work, the class basis of the party was anything but solid and healthy. Notwithstanding the existence of highly favourable conditions the [illegible] many military [illegible] or in [illegible] of the party. The Front Committee [illegible] rejected the request of about [illegible] the anti-Japanese army. The [illegible] the Hopei Provincial Committee [illegible] it was absolutely necessary [illegible] the lower [illegible] was. Like [illegible] of a [illegible] work. [illegible]

the revolutionary movement in Chahar were all petty-bourgeois intellectuals. Under these circumstances it was no wonder that many comrades at the most critical juncture should have wavered or even betrayed the party.

7. Finally we must point out that as a result of police raids on the illegal apparatus of the Provincial Committee, the relations between the P.C. and Front Committee broke off for more than two months. During this period the Front Committee had received no instructions from the Provincial Committee and therefore could not correct its mistakes in time. The provincial committee must hold itself responsible for not having dealt swift blows to its representative on the Front Committee who shielded the Right wingers and resisted the directive of the C.C. Besides the provincial committee must subject itself to severe self-criticism for its failure in rendering timely assistance to the Anti-Japanese Allied Forces when the latter were attacking Tongshan near Peiping.

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EXHIBIT NO. 86 (in English) SPEED [illegible] NO. 577
CHANGING ROAD ON [illegible]

Jan. 30, 1934.

REPORT OF COMRADE MA ON THE KALGAN EVENT

1. The beginning of the development in Kalgan

When militarist Feng Yu-hsiang left Taisan (Shantung province) for Kalgan, it was just at the time when the red armies won the overwhelming victories and simultaneously when the Japanese imperialism was anxious to capture Peiping and Tientsin, workers, peasants, soldiers and students throughout the country knew very clear the selling of China by the KMT and were perfectly cognizant of the imperialist dismemberment of China so that their sentiments against imperialism and against KMT were steadily growing from day to day. During this period when the masses in general were subject to revolution all over the country, Feng Yu-hsiang, having a knack of embarking on the speculation and circumventing the masses, had to find his new way out, creating his fresh military strength. However, Feng Yu-hsiang failed to utilize this opportunity due to his ignorance of the fact that the masses at the present day are quite different from those in the previous years (1926 etc.), at the same time being fully aware of the deceptions of new and old militarists.

When his arrival at Kalgan, Feng Yu-Hsiang used his every strength to find our party. Through the introduction of Hsu Wei-Len(nephew of Hsu-chien), a comrade in our special department went to Kalgan and made several talks with Feng. According to a report of this comrade negotiating with Feng, Feng promised to supply our party in North China with $10,000 per month as our working funds, asking us to send a great many of comrades to work in his troops. He said that he was willing to employ the Russian officers, wanting our party to devise ways for him. He said that he was prepared to set up a new government in Kalgan, promising to submit to all proposals made by the Party. He said that it is better to establish a relationship with the Third International. At the same time he acknowledged his past mistakes, saying that he has had a transformation in his thought. Following the conversation with Feng, our comrade in the special department returned to Peiping from Kalgan, consulting with the Provincial Committee members as to whether we might establish a formal connection with Feng by sending several comrades to his troops or not. Unanimously considering the necessity of setting up a relationship with Feng, the provincial committee members and the comrades in the Special Department were prepared to find a suitable comrade to be sent. But no suitable comrade was found everywhere because we were unwilling to send those comrades being responsible for the party work there to [illegible]. [illegible] that Feng intended to [illegible]

started making his personal activities as evidenced by the fact that he called many of his own people and friends to Kalgan, simultaneously arbitrarily transferring a number of comrades who had a relation with him in the past to Kalgan from various places, later constituting two opposite parties ----One is the Front Committee under the party leadership and the other is the Tehcoo group under the leadership of Comrade XX. After receiving the report from the Front Committee, the P.C. shortly asked the Special Department to call Comrade XX back to Peiping. In spite of the fact that the Special Department wrote him three letters and sent comrades two times to call him back, Comrade XX refused to return to Peiping. Deeming this comrade much questionable, the P.C. and the Special Department were determined at any rate to transfer him to Peiping and then sent a responsible comrade of the S.D. to Kalgan to call him back to Peiping. Due to the repeated calling back by the P.C., this comrade returned to Peiping. Following his arrival in Peiping, we don't know why the S.D. sent this comrade to Kalgan once more.

2. <u>The situation of that time in Kalgan</u>

At the time when the arrival of Feng Yu-hsiang in Kalgan, Sung Chen-yuan (a former subordinate of Feng) led his men to Kupeikow for resistance against the Japanese imperialists, leaving only one regiment in Kalgan as the safeguard corps of Feng. Feng sent all his representatives to canvass in various units, including the bandits and volunteers retreating from Manchuria. Before holding up the banner of the People's Anti-Japanese Allied Army, Feng Yu-Hsiang wired to his Teaching-Training-Regiment, which was left by him in Fuyang(Shensi) to proceed to Kalgan, in hopes of making this regiment as his basic force. In this regiment we have our party organization with good basis but it was completely under the leadership under of Comrade Wang-Ling. When this regiment arrived at Kalgan, our Hopei Party sent comrade Big-Nose to make a talk with Comrade Wang Ling. According to a report of Big-Nose, the conversation with Wang Ling was satisfactory. However, two months before the talk between Big-Nose and Wang Ling, the Provincial Committee received a report of the Shensi Special Committee to the effect that Wang Ling did not accept the leadership of our party, then calling Wang Ling to Peiping to have a talk with him with the result that Wang earnestly accepted all directions of our party. At present Wang is said to have been expelled from the party by the Front Committee. But, we considered that the P.C. and the Front Committee failed to pay due attention to the vacillation of Wang Ling until he betrayed the 2nd Division.

As soon as Feng Yu-hsiang had transferred his training regiment to Kalgan from Shensi, he began incorporating the bandits and the volunteer forces in which there were our party organizations but our these organizations were not by Feng Yu-hsiang (for instance, Lu Chin-Ting was appointed by Feng Yu-hsiang as a commander of the division). [illegible] P.C. and a number of comrades and a [illegible] comrade to Kalgan in accordance with the wishes of Feng. In the beginning, P.C. did not send comrades by larger numbers until the leaders of the Anti-Japanese Army [illegible] Committee in Kalgan under the leadership of which were [illegible] weeks there.

When Feng Yu-hsiang formally set up the head-quarter of the commander-in-chief of the People's Anti-Japanese Allied Army on May 24 of last year, declaring the independence from Nanking, our party in Kalgan aside from having its organizations in the troops under Feng, did not have any work among peasants, workers, and students because no work was made in the past in Kalgan. Following the declaration of independence from Nanking, the Front Committee decided to penetrate into the factories to establish our work, also dealing with our work in the villages. It began organizing the Saving-Country Association which led the work of various factories, schools, etc. During the short period, the trade union of railway workers, the ricsha pullers' union and the other unions were formed. The composition of the S.C.A. was so complicated that landlords, gentries, students, workers, etc. participated in this association. In the beginning, the landlords attended the meetings of the S.C.A. and later were absent at each meeting, denouncing the students as unlawful. The S.C.A. made some of the propaganda work (as the publication of paper "The Anti-Japanese Front.", the handbills, slogans, etc.). Feng Yu-hsiang wanted to suspend the issue of this paper on the ground that this paper was too red lest the attention of the Nanking government was attracted to his infection with the Red views. In addition, the mass meetings were held, and speeches were made in the streets, factories, etc. with good influence over the masses. Workers in XX factory whose demand for the payment of wages met with the refusal of the authorities threatened to go on strike at once. Upon hearing the news of the walkout, Feng Yu-hsiang consulted with Chang King-ying on this problem, saying that "we may conduct the trade union movement but should not allow the workers to declare the walkout". As to the side of workers, they wanted to wage a demonstration before the government, directly asking Feng Yu-hsiang what interest he gave them. The attempt of workers to directly ask Feng was thwarted by Comrade Chang King-ying. At that time, Comrade Yuan (representative of the P.C.) who was in Kalgan had several conversations with Chang King-ying, considering the proposal of Chang was correct. Although some achievements were made in the propaganda work, however, many slogans like the "overthrow of the Red bandits" etc. written by the K.M.T. formerly were not yet cleaned up and remained on the walls until we withdrew from Kalgan.

Feng Yu-hsiang heterogeneously incorporated many troops numbering between 70,000 and 80,000 men in all. Aside from setting up our work in the troops under Sun Ho-chang and in the 2nd Division (re-organized from the Training Regiment) of Feng Yu-hsiang, we confined our work to the circles of officers in the other units without having our work among the soldiers. In order to escape the misunderstanding from our party, Feng appointed one of our comrades (Wang Ching-ho), commander of the 10th Division. [illegible] to form the division. [illegible]

men. [illegible], the commander of this Brigade, who intended to make mutiny from us was executed. The composition of those unit deserting from the 51st Army of Ho was good. At the time when leaving Kalgan, the 18th Division had only 400 or 500 men poor equipped. The enemies along the roads that we took were always prepared to disarm our 18th Division. Meanwhile, any one knew that the 18th Division was the force of the C.P. Due to the mistake of the Front Committee, the 18th Division was put under the command of Yu n Van u (militarist) who, on the way to Changpei Hsien from Kalgan, was in hopes of disarming our 18th Division but his attempt was not realizable. Yuan Van au always said that he did not fear anything else, but fearing the revolutionary party for it fought to the last even with a single rifle left.

In the beginning of June, Feng Yu Hsiang called a congress of representatives of various units, forming the so-called "Revolutionary Military Committee". These representatives were nothing but the division-commanders, commanders-in-chief etc. but not a soldier, worker or peasant was present at the meeting of this congress. After coming into being, the Revolutionary Military Committee held two meetings, reaching many decisions belonging to the left deviation. In case of putting these resolutions into effect, Feng dared not offer the slogans like "down with the KMT" etc., not to mention about the execution of the decisions. After the second meeting of the Revolutionary Military Committee, the Nanking Government sent several divisions of troops to Shacheng and Kuka-hwayuan intending to attack on Kalgan. At the same time Ho Ying-chen (agent of Chiang Kai-shek in Peiping) has bought over the leaders of the Feng Yu-hsiang troops like Feng Shen-hai, Deu-wing, and Lee Chung-ko by using the "buying-policy". Even Chang Yen-Je whom Feng Yu-hsiang regarded as his trustworthy agent was bought over by Nanking. During this period, Feng Yu-hsiang ingratiated himself with Sung Chen-yuan (his former subordinate) by welcoming Sung to rule Chahar and opposing the entrance of the troops under Fang Ping-hsun into Chahar.

Before Kalgan was sought by Feng Yu-hsiang and bought by Ho Ying-chen, various units positively wanted to fight the Nanking troops but their attempts were thwarted by Feng Yu-hsiang. By that time, our party estimated that if the war took place between Kalgan and Nanking the victory of war would be our units because the Nanking troops like the 25th Division, the 42nd Division, and the 40th Army considered that the Kalgan forces are the anti-Japanese troops and that Chinese should not fight Chinese. Meanwhile, sections of the 25th Division and the 40th Army went on mutiny as soon as their arrival at near nearby Kalgan, causing their officers great surprise. Furthermore, the troops under Sun Tienying were unwilling to advance westward (this troop under Sun is just now fighting with the Nanking troops in Chungtiao + [illegible]). After estimating the situation, the Front Committee sent commands to various units, ordering that we should fight a desperate battle with the Nanking troops. At the same time, the [illegible]

that time, the real face of Feng Yu-hsiang to betray the allied forces, to cringe upon the Japanese imperialists and to oppress the masses was unmasked totally.

At the last day when Feng sold out Kalgan and Sung Chi-yuan took active part in attack against Kalgan, the Front Committee, considering it hard to continue in Kalgan any longer, called an emergency meeting of responsible comrades of various units, deciding to retreat to Changpei Hsien (North Kalgan) and to join hands with Tsie-Feng-Chong and after that to discuss our future programme. The following day, we concentrated those units influenced by us such as the 18th, the 5th, the 16th and the 12th divisions and moved in the direction of Changpei Hsien. After the evacuation of the said units from Kalgan, Sung Chen-wu had no other alternative but to follow the other units to advance towards Changpei Hsien.

3. The time from Kalgan to Changpei Hsien.

When we withdrew from Kalgan, a section of the troops under Sung Chen-yuan had arrived at the railway station. At that time, the white terror was very severe than before. Without having the good preparedness before, our units retreated at sixes and sevens. It is also due to the fact that the estimation of each development by the Front Committee was insufficient as indicated in the fact that the F.C. considered that Yuan Yan-wu was revolutionary owing to his being disgruntled militarist and having no way out, and handed over our 18th Division to the commandm of Yuan. By that time, I resolutely opposed the putting of our 18th Division under the command of Yuan, proposing that those units under our influence should be incorporated into a group on the ground that it is much convenient in our action in the event of the accidents. In view of many difficult problems, the Front Committee, though agreeing to my proposal, put the 18th, 16th Divisions under the command of Yuan Yan-Wu. On the first day when our 18th and 16th Divisions left Kalgan and arrived at a village about over 10 li's distance from Kalgan, they were ordered to cease to advance; Yuan and then stopped in this village for a day. On the following day, they continued to stop in this village. On the third day, they left this village and stopped in another village (80 li away from Kalgan) where we stayed for several days. At that time, we wanted to advance towards Changpei but Yuan refused our demand by saying "There is no event, you (we) should not fear." Continued he: "If I do not participate in revolution I do not want you (we) not to take part in revolution." Although fooled by Yuan, we have always no reliance on the utterance of Yuan. Because the other forces under our influence had been in Changpei and only our 18th and the 16th divisions were left in the Hsien, we were at that time prepared to leave Yuan and advance towards Changpei. But because Yuan was a staff-general of Sung Chen-Wu whose troops were stationed in our neighbouring village, our units had no way to escape to Changpei. Then, we wrote a letter to the Front Committee, wanting it to contact the higher officers in Changpei in causing us to proceed to Changpei. Later, Yuan, detecting our determination to go to Changpei, ordered our troops to leave for Changpei. On our way to Changpei, we made the preparation, [illegible] among [illegible] which there was no good [illegible] the forces in our front improved the [illegible] the [illegible] etc. of the [illegible] troops. We (18th Division) stopped in a village about 8 li's distance from Changpei Hsien, for waiting for the arrival of the 16th Division. On the other hand, we intended to discuss the

Mongolian force (80 men) as we were informed the presence of the unit of the Mongolian troop in a village, but when our force arrived at a village the Mongolian unit had wandered away from this village. In the meantime, due to the shortage of food in the city of Changpei, we stationed our force in the country. But we wrote a letter to the Front Comrade asking it whether we could get food if we entered the city. A reply from the F.C. said that there was no shortage of food. When entering this city, our 18th Division got nothing about food. Fortunately, we lived in the food store and therefore we, beyond supplying ourselves, could supply with food the 16th Division and the North China Saving Country Asso.

When our arrival at Changpei, the Front Committee criticized our delay in action. We considered that our delay was due to the mistake of the F.C. that put us under the command of Yuan, saying that the F.C. should be responsible for our delay. The F.C. acknowledged its mistake of incorporating us into the forces of Yuan.

When we entered the city of Changpei, there were many mass-organizations, welcoming our 18th and 16th divisions, writing many slogans on the walls. These mass bodies, not being the mass bodies of Changpei, were removed from Kalgan. These slogans were posted by the Saving Country Association and the political departments of the troops. These "left slogans like "Down with the KMT" etc. were torn away by the Bureau of the Public Safety under the instruction of Fang Chen-Wu who, as an old member of the KMT, declared that the badness of the KMT was due not to itself but to Chiang Kai Shek.

The units that were not bought by Sung Chen-Yuan (K.M.T. militarist) were concentrated in Changpei and the forces under Fang Chen-Wu also arrived at Changpei. Yuan and Chang negotiated Sung Chen-yuan regarding their betrayal of the allied forces with the result that Yuan and Chang led sections of the allied forces to capitulate to Sung Chen-yuan. At that time, the situation in Changpei was steadily growing worse and the troops under Sung Chen-yuan came not far from Changpei. While the offensive of the enemies was much serious, our party (the Front Committee) did not take any concrete measure in coping with the situation, waiting for the method from Tsio Pen-cheng and Fang Chen-wu. By that time, Tsio Pen-cheng took his men to Eltaifu(place) and even led away the [illegible] Division which was under our leadership. Within the city of Changpei, besides our 18th and 16th Divisions, the other forces belonged to Fang Chen-wu. While we considered that the situation became worse due to the fact that Fang Chen-wu ordered the Saving Country Society not to write slogans at its places, and that our responsible comrades of the F.C. and working members in the [illegible] would be subjected to the danger of being arrested by Fang Chen-wu, our comrades in the F.C. together with Chang [illegible] said that Fang Chen-wu and Yuan would not betray us.

The first day when we [illegible] from Changpei, [illegible] was decided to [illegible] our 18th and 16th divisions but dared not do so due to the fear that he was not able to [illegible] 18th division [illegible]

Lee San. At the time when we left the city, our division commander wrote me a letter saying that he could not come to the troop and entrusting me to command [illegible] this troop. Then I wrote our division-general a letter asking him to come to our force, at the same time writing a letter to comrades of the F.C. urging them to leave Changpei city. Meanwhile, I sent a report to Yuan to the effect that we would certainly return to the city for we were prevented by the self-defence army from advancing to the appointed village. Being afraid of our real return to the city, Yuan gave us an order to the effect that "we might settle the self-defence army by force had it refused our passage and that it is not necessary to return to the city". Before receiving the order from Yuan, we knew that the self-defence force has only about 20 men, 10 horses and few rifles. The self-defence force was disarmed by us within about 10 minutes.

On the following day, the responsible comrades of the F.C. and working comrades in the S.C.A. came to our force, saying that Fang Chen-wu led his men to Dozekow, Sung Chen-yuan's troops entered the hsien city of Changpei, the other allied forces left the Changpei city and Yuan with his men remained in Changpei and disarmed our 16th Division. Then, all comrades both in the F.C. and in the S.C.A. followed our 18th Division to advance. On the same night, we arrived at Elchuanginze and were in conjunction with the 2nd, 15th divisions, the 16th Division of the Cavalry under Tsie Fen-chong, and a unit (deserting from the troops of Sun Tien-yin) which was under the command of Liui Zen Yuan.

The following day after the arrival of our forces at Elchuanyinze, a military meeting was held at which the high officers of various forces were present, including our responsible comrades like Big-Nose, Chang Mou-tou etc. At this meeting, Tsie Fen-chong was elected as a field general of the allied army and the Revolutionary Military Committee was set up the members of which were Tsie Fen-chong, Big-nose, Chang Mou Tou, etc.

On the third day, when the discussion of where we should go, various units proposed to go to Songtu for a temporary rest, where the troops under Kao were stationed. Tsie Feng-chong said that he might be responsible for the negotiation with Kao regarding our borrowing regions from Kao for a rest due to his friendship with Kao. On the 4th day, we started to Songtu. In the evening of the same day, there were only the 18th and 5th divisions and the 3rd Division and Pistol Company of Tsie Fen-chong moving towards Songtu while a unit of about 100 men under Wang Ying and the 2nd Division that Comrade Chang Mou-Tou regarded as our basis for the future creation of our new Soviet districts in North China did not proceed to Songtu but capitulated to Sung Chen-yuan. This 2nd Division was under the command of Wang Ling (comrade) who said that "there is no way out in case we follow the Front Committee." Wang Ling is now expelled from the party by the Front Committee.

[illegible]

the 18th Division were re-organized the 2nd Regiment of the 18th Division with me as colonel while the Special Company of the 18th Division was not subject to the reorganization. The original commander (Hsu Chuan-chang) of the 18th Division was appointed the vice-commander while Lin Zen-fang as the commander of the 18th Division. The 5th Division was not reorganized. We did not agree to change the division commander on the ground that Liu was new comrade and was devoid of the military experience. Although the Front Committee considered our opinion correct, it had to appoint Liu as a division commander in order to avoid the discontentment of soldiers coming to us from Sun Tien-ying. After the conclusion of re-organizing our force, we informed Tsai Fen-chong to formally appoint them whom we decided before.

Taking this opportunity to make activities, Chang Mou tou assailed the Front Committee by saying that the F.C. has now withdrawn the work of Hsu Chuan-chang and would oust the old comrades and Shensiese comrades from the troops. In fact, Chang used the provocative words to fool the comrades and meanwhile Hsu Chuan-chang did not manifest any discontentment to the change of his position by the F.C. when the F.C. had several talks with him about the appointment of him as a vice commander.

After the settlement of the problem regarding the reorganization of our force, we began discussing the problem of our action but the opinions of comrades were divergent. Some proposed that we should go to North Shensi; some advocated to move along the Peiping-Hankow railway, some were in favour of that we should first proceed to Yuhsien and then to go to the regions along the Peiping-Hankow railway; some contended that we should first go to Doshkow where the Fang Chen-wu forces were, co-operating with Fang Chen-wu to rush into the vicinities of Peiping and then advancing towards the Peiping Hankow Railway. As a result, we yielded to the proposal of Tsai Fen-chong who advocated to advance towards Doshkow because he received the repeated telegrams from Fang Chen-wu who urged Tsai Fen-chong to go to Doshkow due to the fear that Fang Chen-yuen would disarm his men. At the same time, Fang Chen-wu, aside from promising that all problems about supplies would be easily settled if we come, said that he had joined hands with Lin Kwei-tang and Tang Yu-lin in order to attack on Peiping, and that our future action might be discussed after your (our) arrival.

Chang Mou-tou proposed to go to North Shensi while the Front Committee persisted in going to Central and South Hopei due to the fact that in Central and South Hopei we have good mass work. By that time, masses of comrades asked the F.C. "How can we go to South Hopei?" The F.C. answered: "We may go with Tsai and Fang and after that we may discuss this problem." Some of comrades asked before the F.C.: "Why do we go towards South Hopei?" A responsible comrade of the F.C. said that this is an instruction from the S.C. and there is no necessity for discussion. This word of the F.C. aroused the discontentment of Comrades towards the F.C.

The result of our discussion was that we were unanimous as to the resolution of the F.C. to go to South Hopei. However, comrades at large were not satisfied with the resolution of the F.C. to go to [illegible] South Hopei.

5. The details about our departure for Dozekow from Szetaifen.

The 5th and 18th divisions under our leadership, together with the 3rd Division of the cavalry (about 1,000 men) of Tsie Fen-chong and his men (less than 1,000) left for Dozekow. On the first day, our 18th Division, on its way to Dozekow, met with the forces of landlords that fired us in preventing us from passing. Thus, we ordered our force to attack on the castle of the landlord militia and within 3 hours the castle was captured by us. During this operation, about 50 rifles, 30 horses, clothes and other were wrested by us from the militias. Meanwhile, several landlords were executed. The victory of this engagement promoted the fighters to the high spirit for war.

Following the capture of this castle by us, propaganda work was made. Properties of Church and landlords were meted out to poor people, but the poor people dared not take. On the way to Dozekow, beyond distributing handbills among masses, we conducted the struggles for the division of food. Some of villages were almost vacant and only the aged and children were left at home, who said that all men made their escape, fearing the arrival of Tang Yu-ling's men looting our countryside.

Not far from Dozekow, we stopped in a village where no food was found for the mass ran away in advance. In the night, we were ordered to enter the city of Dozekow where the forces of Tsie Fen-chong had come in while the men of Fang Chen-wu had left for Yenchow. In Yenchow, Fang Chen-wu called a military conference of officers above the rank of the division-commanders. A discussion was made regarding the problem of the banner, resulting in doing away with the banner of the Anti-Japanese Allied Army and in holding up the flag of the Anti-Traitor Allied Army. At this meeting Fang Chen-wu was elected as commander-in-chief; Tang Yu-ling as vice-commander-in-chief; Tsie Fen-chong as Field Commander of the Left Route, etc.

When leaving Dozekow, all forces were ordered to change the anti-Japanese banner into the anti-traitor (Chiang Kai-shek) banner. At that time, we heard that Fang, Tsie, etc. stipulated for certain terms with Japan and the Manchukuo, many signs and small flags of which were distributed to soldiers, causing them great hesitation. Scores of soldiers asked our comrades by saying "Have we capitulated to the Manchukuo? If true, we will wander away from the troops." They have always shown hesitation, although we, under the instruction of the Front Committee, explained before them that this is our tactics. Their skepticism vanished until the Japanese forces attacked us from the air.

In Dozekow where we had stayed for 4 days, the Front Committee held a conference of our whole comrades, at the meeting of which the F.C., aside from reporting on the political situation of the present day, as well as on the dismissal of Chang [illegible] from the party, did not make any discussion regarding the other problems. Before this conference was to be held, some comrades like [illegible] did not agree to hold the conference of comrades, on the ground that this [illegible] and it would be [illegible] conference of [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] at any rate among the [illegible].

Some comrades, not informed by the Front Committee [illegible] the holding of the party members' conference, [illegible] whether they are members of the party [illegible] F.C. did not tell them of the convocation of the [illegible]

of the party members if they were comrades. Some of comrades asked the F.C. how we dealt with the converting of the anti-Japanese banner into the anti-traitor banner by Fang and Tsie. The answer of the F.C. was that it had means after we followed Fang and Tsie to attack on Peiping.

At the meeting of the military conference held by Fang in Yenchow, one of decisions was to advance towards Meeyen etc. and to occupy Peiping before the 15th day of 8th month by of the lunar year.

6. Action from Dozekow to Meeyen.

Following the men of Fang Chen-wu, our forces spent about one week in their walking from Dozekow to Meeyen. In the course of the travel, the F.C. did not discuss our future method after the arrival at Meeyen, only following the troops to walk. Despite the lack of shoes to wear and food to eat, soldiers were in high spirit on walking, hoping to have good prospects following the arrival of their destination. Along the road we took, we never met with a single peasant because the masses ran away a long time due to the fear of the bandits incorporated by Fang Chen-wu into his forces.

The responsible comrades of the Front Committee explained before comrades that they have decided our own measure and effected our own independent military movement. However, in fact, the F.C. did not do any preparatory work, excepting limiting its work to the intercourse with the high officers. Later, Fang Chen-wu informed us of the arrival of his men at Kaoleeyen, wanting us to follow them soon. Upon the arrival at a village (south of Hwei-yuan), we heard that the men of Fang Chen-wu were defeated by the K.M.T. troops and retreated from Kaoleeyen. Meanwhile, a unit of the enemy cavalry attacked on our force. During this period, our comrades in general asked the F.C. what method our party would take. The F.C. answered by saying that we will take our own way at night.

Arriving at Daishikko, the F.C. changed its original line, wanting to proceed to East Peiping (East Hopei) instead of South Hopei. At a place where the enemy cavalry made ferocious attack on us, many comrades proposed to wander away from Fang Chen-wu and Tsie Pen-cheng, effecting our own independent military movement. That is, they advocated to go to either South Hopei or various hsien east of Peiping. The Front Committee deemed it dangerous to set up our independent movement so that it persisted in not wandering away with Fang Chen-wu and Tsie Pen-cheng.

7. Retreat from Tsuikkow to Hsihkow.

In order to avoid the attack from the enemy, our force retreated to Tsuikkow. At the same night, our force left for Hsihkow where the responsible comrades of the Front Committee ordered us to rush Shantungkow at 12 o'clock in the following night in hopes of crossing the Peiping-Hsinkiang railway and said that if we not leave this place the enemy will send large units of the troops in checking us from passing through Shantungkow. Due to the failure of the 8th Division to arrive at Hsihkow, we did not begin conducting our military movement. On the night, the enemy attacked at Hsihkow. On the 4th day, we left for Kaoleeyen, intending to pass and place behind the enemy and cut large troops in pursuing us from [illegible] direction, we were again prepared to [illegible] to Shantung and to go to Kaoleeyen through Shantungkow. But at the step that we were [illegible] a report to us, saying to us that [illegible] Division of [illegible]

help it retreat for it had suffered a heavy loss with a colonel being killed. Then we did to do so as it demanded. At night when the 5th Division returned, we with it came to Heishan, in the preparations for the second attack on Toulinkow through where we might advance towards East Peiping (East Hopei). Unexpectedly, the men of Fang Chen-wu had been concentrated in Heishan, saying that it is difficult to pass through Toulinkow because this pass is guarded by the Japanese troops. In Heishan, Fang Chen-wu held a military meeting at which the decision was reached that there is no other alternative than to rush Shantungkow. When we returned to Nojitown again, Big-Nose (comrade) had left our force for Peiping.

The responsible comrade of the F.C. said before us that after passing through Shantungkow we certainly effected our independent action, rushing across the Peiping-Suiyuang railway and marching in the direction of the Peiping-Hankow railway. Later when all of our allied forces repulsed the enemy and passed Shantungkow, our units were ordered by Tsie Fen-chong to advance towards the Peiping-Suiyuan railway in attacking on a village where, about 20 li from the railway, the unit of the enemy troops was stationed. After the occupation of this village, we continued to advance and arrived at a place about 10 li from the railway. By that time, the whole of the 2nd Regiment of our forces proposed not to go back but write a report to our army-commander, asking him to concentrate all our forces in preparation for crossing the railway and advancing in the direction of South Hopei. Unexpectedly, the repeated orders came to our hands, instructing us to return and saying that there is an another plan. In pursuance of the order from above, we then returned. Later, the Front Committee sent a comrade to us, saying that the preparation is made to leave Fang and Tsie in the same night and to march towards South Hopei and inviting us to express opinion. Our answer was that we have none to express but quite agreed. Then, we ordered our force to prepare for departure at 11 o'clock in the night.

One hour after our force had been concentrated in the playground, we did not see the arrival of our division-commander together with the workers of the division-headquarters. Then we sent many men to find our commander and workers everywhere, discovering them still in would sleep. Then our officers were angked and came to the playground. The 5th Division and the 10th Division surrounding towards Shantungkow in accordance with the order of Tsie Fen-chong. Men were sent everywhere to find the 5th Division because the F.C. lost its connection with the 5th Division. Therefore we had to return and to advance towards Shantungkow in pursuance of the instruction from Tsie Fen-chong. The attempt to effect our independent action was not realised.

At 10 o'clock in the following morning after we [illegible] in the vicinity of Shantungkow, the enemy positively fought us and the 2nd Division of Fang under command of Tsie Fen-chong retreated after being [illegible] by the F.C. [illegible] from the 10th and the 5th Divisions came to the rescue of Tsie [illegible] Fang [illegible] that we have no other way but to fight. Fang [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] our forces fought [illegible] [illegible]

After the engagement of Shantung, we stayed [illegible] 4 days [illegible] Big-Nose [illegible] Shantungkow, [illegible] the F.C. [illegible] table. The F.C. suggested that we should follow Fang

and rain to advance towards East Peiping, considering it impossible that our 18th and 5th divisions establish their independent movement. When we left Huloho and advanced eastward, it was reported that the Japanese troops were there and it is difficult for us to pass. According to our investigation, there was nothing but rumour made by Fang Chen-wu who intends to surrender to Ho Yin-ching (agent of Chiang Kai-shek in Peiping), unwilling to make us wander away from him. Due to the hindrance by the Japanese force, our force had to return to Huloho. When returning, we discovered that this village had been occupied by the enemy, and, after a bitter fighting, we recaptured Huloho.

One day, in the early morning, the enemies launched an attack on all lines against Huloho, with the support of the Japanese air forces. At that time, our shots and shells were nearly exhausted and our army commander Liu, considering we would be disarmed by the enemy unless we fight a desperate battle, sent a report to Fang and Tsie asking them what to do. Their answer was to "rush out." After getting the order, we prepared to begin rushing.

The order from Fang and Tsie said that they conducted the counter-attack on all lines. In fact, the 18th, 5th divisions, together with sections of the forces under Tsie and Fang, took part in the counter-attack against the enemy, with the result that within 3 hours the small and big hills (Tamshan) were reoccupied by us and about one regiment of the enemy was disarmed.

After the recapture of Shoutanshan(small hill) comrades in general considered it better to leave Shoutanshan, either going to North or South. At the same time, they demanded the P.C. to concentrate our forces and those under our influence together in order to facilitate our actions. I, with comrades acting the political work in the troops, asked the P.C. what measure we should take. When visiting the P.C., we met with an opposition from our army-commander (Liu Zen-Fang) who expressed an angry manner causing our extreme dissatisfaction. Seeing that the situation was not good, the P.C. called me out of the room, saying that Liu was very vacillating recently, and explaining many problems for us. However, I was not satisfied with such explanation.

Since we re-occupied Shoutanshan, we stayed there for one week during which the enemies attacked on us everyday. In their attempt to surrender to Nanking, Fang Chen-wu and Tsie Pen-cheng every day dispatched their representatives to Peiping to consult with Ho Yin-ching(agent of Nanking) with regard to the capitulating plans while our P.C. viewed this problem with equanimity, waiting for the betrayal of Fang and Tsie. Every day, comrades visited the members of the P.C. and asked them whether we follow Fang and Tsie to surrender, or go away out our independent military action. The P.C. answered "We leave for our destination tomorrow." Today our unmovable comrades in the P.C. said "tomorrow" we go towards Northwest than said still "tomorrow." Of course such military policy of the P.C. not only causes it to lose the confidence among comrades but also [illegible] disadvantageous with it and [illegible] our army [illegible] the enemy [illegible] P.C. and our military leader (Commander Liu Zen-Fang) [illegible] in the side of Fang Chen-wu and Tsie Pen-cheng to surrender to the enemy by selling out our 18th and 5th divisions.

In Shoutanshan, little propaganda work was made by us due chiefly to the oppression on the part of Fang and Tsie. Although it was difficult to make the propaganda openly, the semi-open activities of ours were not sufficient at all. The F.C. must naturally be responsible. Knowing that comrades and soldiers were anxious to leave Shoutanshan and fearing that the events would break out internally if they were dilly-dallying any longer, the members of the F.C., as well as our leading comrades responsible for the military work began to canvass Fang and Tsie for the departure for East Peiping from Shoutanshan. Fang Chen-wu advocated to march in the direction of East Lepei (Jehol) while Tsie Fen-cheng was in favor of advancing towards the Peiping-Peokow Railway with the intention of surrendering to Han Fu-chu, Chairman of the Shantung Provincial Government. Our Front Committee agreed the proposal of Tsie to go along the Peiping-Peokow railway, saying that we might to Kaoyang etc. (Central and South Hopei by utilizing the line pursued by Tsie.

At that time, the opinion of comrades at large was that "it is better to leave Shoutanshan no matter to what place we go", due to the fear the further drive by the enemy. Comrades considered we had better to discard Fang and Tsie, setting up our independent leadership, saying it is detrimental to our action that we continued to join hands with Fang and Tsie, under the following causes :-

(1) the larger numbers of the troops cause our military movement inconvenient, at the same time attracting the attention of the enemy.

(2) In case we want to carry through our tasks, they (Fang Chen-wu and Tsie Fen-cheng) will prevent us from doing so and in some cases dismiss us by force.

(3) If we go with the troops of Fang and Tsie, the masses are cannot incapable of discerning the difference of our troops from Fang and Tsie.

(4) Our forces will succeed in running at any place should we wander away from Fang and Tsie and establish our independent military movement.

(5) We should immediately leave Fang and Tsie, advancing in the direction of South Hopei.

(6) And we continued not to wander away from Fang and Tsie, we forces will steadily be growing decreased as evidenced in the fact that during each war Fang and Tsie sent our forces like the 20th Division etc. to the foremost front as their main forces, with the result that we had no method to replenish our forces after sustaining losses.

(7) The 9th Division be re-organized such as, the 10th and 9th Divisions be re-organized into a filing corps under which are divided the big, middle and small units.

(8) In view of the problems being settled unfavorable and because of the combination of cavalry, gunners and soldiers and heavy soldiers make their footpaths then in Shoutanshan.

The activities of our leading military comrades to leave Shoutanshan decided in consult. Thus, our forces left for Hopeiyu from Shoutanshan. When we left our original position and going south by the enemy did not know our evacuation, [illegible] our original line.

[illegible] of Shoutanshan [illegible]

[illegible]

the troops in a village about 5 li far from Shuemi Hsien for the discussion of the further methods.

In fact, as the bottom of this stream is sand, some parts are deep but some parts are not deep for us to pass. But Fang did not know about it.

When we arrived at Shankazen, the enemies in the city of Shuemi Hsien still did not know our presence, mistaking us for their own men to be sent to fight us, and therefore they conveyed the war-supplies like about 70,000 rounds of ammunition etc. in about 10 carriages to the front in reenforcing their men. Taking this opportunity, we captured all of their war supplies.

After the arrival at Shankazen, comrades proposed not to stay there any longer, saying that we should shortly devise means and ways to cross this stream and that if not able to cross this stream we should directly rush towards the vicinities of Peiping where the enemies must be not well prepared because they are focussing their attention on Shoutanshan and Knoloeyen. Our leading military comrades and the F.C. said that "we should not run the risk;"

Until at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, the enemies launched the counter-attack on us. The 3rd Division of Tsia Fen-chong was first engaged in resisting the enemies but not an hour passed the 3rd Division was defeated with great losses. No sooner had the 3rd Division retreated than the enemy troops began fighting our 5th Division. By that time, the soldiers of the 5th Division wavered. We sent a section of the 18th Division in re-enforcing the 5th Division, instructing the 5th Division that it should not retreat whatsoever. As a result, this village was not captured by the enemies. But, the Japanese air forces continued to drop bombs into our positions, causing us to find no villages to camouflage our forces.

In the night, what measure we should take was discussed without result. Some proposed to rush out with the best of our abilities, and some suggested that we device our method until to-morrow while our Front Committee contended that to rush out is dangerous. For this reason, no troop movement was made in the night. During this time, comrades and soldiers were so vacillating that many of them made at night their desertion which is much great in contrast with that made in Shankazen.

In the early morning of the following day, although the Hunking troops, making the second battle against us, were repulsed by us, the Japanese sent the airplanes by larger batches to fight us from the air attack. During this engagement, enormous great many of houses were killed by the Japanese bombs and though the men killed were not in great number but the minds of soldiers, officers and comrades were filled with consternation. Knowing that there is no way out, all of leaders were decided to rush out at night. In the middle night, all of our forces fought the desperate battles against the enemies, with the result that the enemies were defeated and the captured places and positions were wrested from the enemies. As soon as the day was just dawning, the Hunking troops launched a counter-attack, fighting by 10 battles [illegible] but as great number of our men were killed, the Japanese airplanes also played the most important role in attacking us and all the villages where we were stationed were completely burnished. We were always pursued by the Japanese forces when we retreated from villages to villages. Under the protection of the Japanese forces, it was absolutely impossible for us to [illegible] to the hills. By that time, [illegible] officers showing [illegible] and Tuke-Tan-Chang [illegible]

Having no alternative to cope with the situation, desiring nothing short of finding a way to cause them to escape to the safe place.

At that time Fang and Tsie had made up their mind to surrender and sent their representatives to Song Cheng (agent of Yen Shih Shan), promising to lay down their arms. In the afternoon, they succeeded in capitulating to Nanking and then left the troops for the headquarter of Song Cheng who promised to send them by motorcar to the place where we don't know. Our forces were ordered to be stationed in the appointed places where the enemy troops surrounded us with machine guns.

Hsu Chuan Ching was instructed by the F.C. to leave the force. I also left the troops. It was said that our forces would be re-organized and our army commander (Liu) would be appointed as colonel. I considered that the enemy will force us to lay down arms while the F.C. deemed it possible to re-organize our force by Nanking. In the evening, an instruction came to our hands from the enemy, ordering us to lay down arms. Otherwise, we are settled by force. After disarmed by the enemy, comrades, the F.C. members, and sections of soldiers went their respective way.

During the period of the disarmament by the enemy, soldiers shed tears, saying that "we (the anti-Japanese forces) are disarmed by the Chinese troops."

The main causes for this failure, I consider, are the following:-

1. The Front Committee did not play the important role in its leadership, failing to penetrate its political influence into the mass of soldiers and instead limiting its activities to the circles of officers and commanders.
2. The Front Committee failed to appraise the whole of the work, never carrying on its organizational work, especially in the forces under Fang Chen-wu and Tsie Fen-chong.
3. The work done among soldiers of the 18th and 5th Divisions was still insufficient. The Soldiers' Committee could not play a leading and important role, failing to discuss the opinions expressed by lower mass of soldiers, and even was dominated by the student-elements of the Special Guard Company.
4. There was lack of the prompt military action and the vacillation was shown in each military movement.
5. We did not pay attention to the mass work when our forces were stationed in the villages causing the masses to look upon our forces as the bandit-units like the forces under Ting Ta-ling. Although we led the poor people to conduct the food-dividing struggles, we committed a number of mistakes in them.
6. Each action lacked the pre-arranged plan and then there was no method in the course of the action.
7. This failure was a result of the leadership of the right opportunism. Our F.C. completely became a sort of a tail of militarist.
8) The F.C. had no determination to carry out the decision of the C.C. to prepare to go to South Hupeh where we had better work. We (lower committee) agreed to the proposal of the C.C.
9) The departure of Comrade Hsu Hsiao for Nanking caused course of complete the further [illegible].

Ma. Feb. 20, 1934.

TRANSLATION OF EXHIBIT NO. 80 SEIZED DURING THE COURSE OF A RAID AT NO. 277 CHANGPING ROAD ON MARCH 2, 1934.

Budget of the Publishing Department

May 1933

A. - House rentals: $36.00
1) Yu's (于) house rent: $14.00.
2) Li's (李) " " : $12.00.
3) Yu's boy: $5.00.
4) Li's " : $5.00.

B. - Living Expenses: $52.00.
1) Yu's living expenses: $25.00.
2) Li's " " : $15.00.
3) Siu Ying's (秀英) living expenses: $12.00.

C. - Expenses in maintaining offices: $350.50.
1) Northern Distribution Station: $300.00.
2) Tientsin Factory: $50.50.

D. - Miscellaneous expenses: $28.50.
1) Newspaper advertising for missing persons: $27.00. (This money should be defrayed by the Entertaining Section, but as their fund has already been spent, it is therefore mentioned in this budget).
2) Stationery: $1.50.
3) Bargain money (renting of room) lost by Li: $1.00.
4) Bargain money (renting of room) lost by Tsang([illegible]):$2.-

GRAND TOTAL : $470.00.

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General Budget of the Publishing Department

May 1933

Receipts : $1259.50.
1) Balance b/d from last month: $4[illegible].[illegible].
2) Fund for the current month: $800.00.
3) Sale of machinery: $ 40.00.
4) Sale of books: $ 16.29.
5) Party membership fee: $ 1.30.

Expenditure: $1132.70.
1) Personal expenses of the Dept: $470.00.
2) Printing: $[illegible].
3) Machinery (?): $[illegible].
4) To the Second Section: $167.[illegible].

Balance: $[illegible].

Translation of Exhibit No. 90 seized from No. 677 Changping Road on March 2, 1934.

How will the Party Branches in villages carry out their activities?

It is worthy of discussion as to how the Party will promote and develop the activities of Party Branches in villages. Our decisions can be reached by studying the following points:-

(1) Secret work in villages is absolutely impossible as the farmers in one village are always familiar with one another and are always ready to disclose our secrets.

(2) If we desire to carry on secret work in safety by limiting our activities to a considerable degree, we practically close our door against the farmers.

In view of the above we are of the opinion that although we desire to keep to ourselves the secrets of the Party in connection with activites in villages, we must at the same time conduct mass movements among farmers openly and undaubtedly. We must have a clear conception of the above points and bear them in mind for they concern greatly the future of our revolution.

<u>Our duties and policies in peasant movements</u>

1) Lead the peasant masses in their daily struggles and develop the struggles to land revolution and racial revolution.

2) Unite the poor peasants and middle class peasants and urge them to oppose rich farmers, landlords, and the gentry.

3) Arm the peasants and induce them to carry out guerilla warfare against reactionary elements.

4) Hired peasants and poor peasants should be made the basis of the party in villages.

5) Rich farmers and landlords should never be allowed to participate in Party activities or mix with poor peasants.

6) The activities of the Party in villages should be [illegible] [illegible] the peasants.

Translation of Exhibit No. 91 seized at No. 677 Changping Road on March 2, 1934.

1) Li Teh-zai(李德才), representative of the Eastern Indian Archipelago, has been here over two months. His case has been settled and he is now staying in a hotel. He can start at once, although some minor questions require further discussion.

2) Teng Zu-ming(鄧樹明), a doctor in Manchuria, has been here over three months and is already in touch with "Kiangsu" (Kiangsu Provincial Committee). Owing to some trouble at the place of reception, he has removed and is now staying in a hotel. "Kiangsu" can be instructed to look out for him.

3) Zao Hang(趙亨), representative of the Manchurian Anti-Imperialist League, came here to attend the National Salvation Conference and inspect the Soviet District. He has been here over two weeks and finished his reports which should however be supplemented. He stays in a hotel.

4) Feng Lao-dur(馮老頭) has returned from Soviet Russia and has been here over one month. His work has been decided upon and now he stays in a hotel. Tell "them" (?) to see him at once.

5) Keng Ying and Jieh(根英及傑) have been here over two months. Their work has been decided upon but they require further explanation. They are staying in a hotel.

6) Zao Doo-tsiar(趙大姐) has been here one month and is staying in a hotel. Her work has been decided upon and she can start at once, but it has not yet been decided whether she may go by herself or with the help of some other comrade.

7) Chiang Chien-tsing(蔣朝青) was sent from Peschow to Shanghai to undergo training, but failed owing to difference in dialect. It is learned that he will be sent to the Soviet district. He is staying inside the house.

8) Mao Teh-fu(毛德夫) was sent here by the Publication Department about two weeks ago [illegible] will be sent to the Soviet District. He is staying inside the house.

9) Soong Liang-chuch(宋良曲) and [illegible] (郝老頭) came from Hupeh and Honan boundary. They are staying inside the house.

10) Sung Tsing(陳青), Ngien [illegible](嚴恆祥), Lin Lao (刘忠) and Lao [illegible] came from the Soviet district. Wang [illegible](王[illegible]) [illegible] the [illegible]'s General. They will all go [illegible] to undergo training but have not yet [illegible] [illegible]

11) Li [illegible](李家[illegible]) [illegible]

12) [illegible](吳婉賢), [illegible] [illegible]

13) Hsu Ching-wuh(徐 益 全), Yui Kwong's (余 光) wife, came here about 2 months ago and is staying in hospital, but will soon come out.

14) Doctor Hsu(許 医 生) has been here for 3 months. It is decided to send him to the Soviet District, but he is now still staying at "home" because the courier has not yet left.

15) Two students who have been here from Anhwei to undergo training, are now staying in a hotel.

16) The work for Siau Zung(陳) has been decided and he will start as soon as accounts are cleared up.

17) Zung Daung(陳 榮) has been here for about one month, butbut we have lost our connection with him owing to entertainment problem. He might be located to-day.

Soo Lee(苏 黎)

28.5.33.

TRANSLATION OF EXHIBIT NO. 92 SEIZED DURING THE COURSE OF A RAID CONDUCTED AT NO. 677 CHANGPING ROAD ON MARCH 2, 1934.

Particulars of White troops in Shantung are given hereunder :-

(1) 20th Division. "A" Class. Divisional Commander Sung Doong Shoen(孫桐宣). Divisional Headquarters at Yenchow. 58th Brigade stated south of Tai-an; 59th Brigade at Li Tsing and vicinity; 60th Brigade in the vicinity of Tsi-ning.

(2) 22nd Division. "B" Class. Divisional Commander Koh Liang Ming(谷良民). Divisional Headquarters at Tsinan. 64th and 65th Brigades stationed in the vicinity of Tsinan.

(3) 29th Division. "A" Class. Divisional Commander Zau Foh Ling(曹福林). Divisional Headquarters at Tseu Tsung. 85th Brigade stationed at Foh Shan and vicinity; 86th Brigade in the vicinity of Kiaochow-Tsingtao Railway Line; 87th Brigade near Kiaochow.

(4) 74th Division. "C" Class. Divisional Commander Jao Lih Ts(蕭立志). Headquarters at Kao Tong. 220th Brigade at Toong Chong and Yang Koh; 222nd Brigade at Kao Tong and Yuichen.

(5) 81st Division. "C" Class. Divisional Commander Tsai Ngoh Daung(展玉堂). Headquarters at Ling Chi. 241st Brigade at Ling Chi and Tsao Chong; 243rd Brigade at Chi S, Loo Hsien, and Jih Tsao.

(6) Pistol Brigade consisting of 4,000 men armed with "Slate" pistols and portable machine guns. Stationed at Tsinan.

(7) Cavalry Brigade consisting of about 1,000 men. Stationed at Tsingchow.

(8) Armoured Train Corps stationed at Tsinan.

(9) Engineering Battalion under the direct control of the Chief Commander.

"A" Class Division: one regiment of artillery, one regiment of stake gunners, one "pistol" battalion, one company of of cavalry, and three brigades of infantry.

"B" Class Division: one pistol company, one cavalry company, one engineering battalion, and two infantry brigades.

"C" Class Division: one pistol company, one cavalry company, one engineering battalion and two infantry brigades.

Total strength of the White Army in Shantung [illegible].
Strength of People's Volunteers under the control of General Han Foh Jou: [illegible].

TRANSLATION OF EXHIBIT NO. 95 SEIZED AT NO. 677 CHANGPING ROAD ON MARCH 2, 1934.

A letter sent by the Central Organ to its various branches in Manchuria and the whole body of members in connection with the condition at that place and the work of the Communist Party.

Since the occupation of Manchuria, the Japanese imperialists have laid bare their ambition to interfere with the Chinese revolution by force as a preliminary step towards the attack upon the Soviet Russia. They are endeavouring to colonize this large tract of land, but their efforts do not show any great success. The economic condition in Manchuria goes from bad to worse. Numerous exhorbitant taxes have been imposed and the farmers have been ruthlessly deprived of their holdings. In consequence of this terrorism, the labourers, farmers and the bourgeois in Manchuria are hostile towards the invaders and their running dogs. Meanwhile, a revolutionary movement is being started by the labourers and farmers in Japan against their militarist government. It seems that the Japanese jingoists are now confront(with opposition from within and without, but they still have aims on North China, made possible by the non-resistance policy adopted by the unscrupulous Kuomintang.

The Nanking Government has exposed to the public her weakness in resisting the Japanese imperialists. The only hope to defeat the invaders depends upon the masses. All the volunteer leaders in Manchuria who were either under the leadership of Chang Hsueh Liang or the direction of the Kuomintang disappeared following the attack by the Japanese, but the anti-imperialist movement motivated by the labourers and farmers goes forward with increasing momentum. These warriors are the members of the "Red Guerilla Corps" directed by the Communist Party. They are the real revolutionists who wish to fight for the freedom of the masses. It is, however, a pity that the "Red Guerilla Corps" have not yet become the leaders of the anti-Japanese movement, despite the weight of their political influence.

The Kuomintang maintains the policy of capitulation to the Imperialists. Taking advantage of the anti-Japanese movement, it intensifies its attack upon the Chinese labourers and soviet areas. Revolutionary intelligentsia and farmers and the soldiers are being oppressed on the plea of maintaining good order in the areas wrested from the Red Bandits. The Kuomintang assists the invaders to suppress the activities of those who are participating in the great anti-Japanese campaign with force and blood. This is evidenced in the attitude of various cliques in the Kuomintang towards the Manchuria problem. Moreover each clique has its supporter. For instance, the Nanking clique with Chiang Kai Shek as the leader attempted to enter into direct negotiations with the Japanese Imperialists and promised to comply with the requirements of the Japanese Imperialists. Moreover it made a deal of [illegible] the Japanese invaders of Manchuria with the object of [illegible] the Japanese Imperialists [illegible] so that the Japanese Imperialists would [illegible] their plan to occupy the [illegible]

The above facts show that only the Communist International and the Central Organ maintain a reasonable attitude towards the Manchuria Problem. They aim at the overthrow of the reactionary National Government and intend to lead the armed masses to carry on the national revolution and anti-Imperialist warfare in order to maintain Chinese independence. With a view to avoiding failure, we should make every effort to stabilize our party influence in Manchuria and fight for the leadership in the anti-Japanese movement as well as other "People's Activities".

We should try not only to effect the emancipation of our race and to protect "Soviet" China, but also to accomplish our internatipnal duty, that is to support Soviet Russia by force of arms.

In order to reach this goal, we must first of all show and maintain a united front to beat down the running dogs and the Japanese Imperialists, and pave the way to our victory in Manchuria. The following points should be borne in mind when executing our plan :-

(1) To maintain our political independence, i.e. to keep close watch on the intrigues of rebels, and to oppose the "Rightist Elements" and deprive of the leadership of proletarian class.

(2) To pay close attention to the conditions when we execute our plan. Remember always that our activities should start among the soldiers and volunteers to form a strong united front in the anti-Japanese campaign.

(3) To accelerate the political education and organising power of the proletarian class so that they will be able to extend their struggle for their political and economic benefit.

The proletarian class in Manchuria, both in number or in quality, are the greatest political power. They have frequently declared strikes and participated in guerilla warfare which shows that they are fundamental force of the people's revolutionary war front. However, their activities still requires the direction of our party. We should therefore assist them in demanding better treatment from their employers and show opposition to the closing down of concerns whereby they are thrown out of employment.

TRANSLATION OF EXHIBIT NO.98 SEIZED DURING THE COURSE OF A RAID AT NO. 677 CHANGPING ROAD ON MARCH 2, 1934.

General Principles of activities of Industrial Branches.

1) To ascertain the following particulars about factories:- Capital, nationality, business conditions, treatment of workers, wages, number of workers, their sex and native places. Oppression of workers by capitalists and foremen; Factory regulations; strikes and their results; labour unions; picketing parties or boys groups; sufferings of workers and demands.

2) Particulars of communist branches in factories: their activities in the past and present.

3) Organization of Branches: membership, cells, number of female party members.

4) Meetings of Branches: whether the meetings are held within or without the factory and whether the meetings are held regularly.

5) Direction of struggles: views of comrades relating to struggles; do the Branches discuss and prepare for struggles? Do the Branches endeavour to start strikes? Are there strike committees? How to deal with traitors. How to oppose in strikes mediation by the Bureau of Social Affairs.

6) Anti-Japanese movement: The effects of the Manchurian incident on workers. The Anti-Japanese feelings of workers. Have the Branches conducted anti-Japanese movement openly in factories? Have the Branches done anything in the form of anti-Japanese demonstrations? Have the Branches established volunteer armies and storming parties?

7) Particulars of activities against Yellow Labour Unions and their leaders.

8) Propaganda work and training of workers.

9) Particulars of the enlisting of new comrades by the Branches in factories.

10) Particulars of Branches of Youth League in factories. Do the Party Branches direct their activities?

Translation of Exhibit No 96.

Particulars of the 6th Route North-Western Volunteer Army:-

Commander.
Graduate from the Military Academy in Japan. Has held the following positions:- Battalion Commander, Regimental Commander and Commander of the North-Eastern Student Corps.

Officers.
Commanding officers are mostly students of the former Military Academy in the North-east. The junior officers are mostly teachers, students and ex-soldiers.

Strength.
Infantry, Artillery, Cavalry and Machine Gun Corps, totalling 4.740 men. 500 horses.
Armament.
Eight Stokes Guns. 13 Machine Guns. 3.400 rifles.

Daily life of Soldiers.
Apart from attending lectures and undergoing military training they assist the people in farming, in repairing or building roads, as a consequence of which they are welcomed by the farmers and proletarian classess, but the landlords do not sympathise with them.

Financial Resources.
Formerly the army received some financial support from the People's Support Committee but it stopped sending money following the signing of the Peace Pact in North China. At present, the Army is being supported by the private income of the Commander.

Attitude of the Army towards the National Government.
The men of the Army are mostly natives of the North East. They are opposed to the non-resistance policy of the National Government. Moreover the Government does not support them but disarms the Volunteer Armies whenever opportunity presents itself. As a consequence of the attitude of the Government this army is not on good terms with the National Government.

Translation of Exhibit No.100 seized at 677 Changping Road on March 2, 1934.

Condition in Kiangsi

Nan-cheng, Jan. 5.

Number of troops in Eastern Kiangsi

Wu-chow - a portion of 13th Division.
Nan-cheng - a portion of 98th Division.
Nan-foong - 8th Division.
Siao-zuh - 145th Regiment of the 24th Division. The 2nd Battalion of this Regiment are undertaking the construction of roads and fortifications between Siao-zuh and Lee Chuan.
Hung-men - 139th Regiment.
Ts Chi Jao - 143rd Regiment.
Wah Yah; Fee Et; and Ping Kwan - 144th Regiment.
Lee Chuan - a portion of the 6th Division.
Chung Yen - 96th Division.
Tuan Chen - 5th Division.
Sing Kow : 11th and 67th Divisions.
Fee Et - 94th Division.
Kwang Shih - 87th and 89th Divisions.
Hu Faung - 36th Divisions.

The military Headquarters previously at Nan-cheng is now at Shan-yao. General Chen Sheng is at Lee Chuan but is reported to be leaving soon for Fokien. According to an unconfirmed report, General Sih Yah will be promoted Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Route Army.

Fortifications

White armies regard the building of fortifications as their most important task. Whenever they occupy a place they build fortifications at important strategic points. Consequently many fortifications have been built along the [illegible] routefrom Fuchow, Lee Chuan, Nancheng, to Tchoung Kwan. Owing to the mountainous nature of the country only cannons and/or airplanes would be able to launch an effective attack upon them. White armies are in the habit of pulling down people's houses in order to obtain materials for building fortifications. A number of people have returned to the areas occupied by the white soldiers and are indignant at the destruction caused by them. Many of those who have returned to their homes have been killed by White armies on the grounds that they were spies of Red Armies.

[illegible]

The 1st Battalion of the 1st Artillery Regiment with 10 field guns, left [illegible] for [illegible] ([illegible]) on [illegible].
The 2nd Division left Kiangsi for [illegible] about two weeks ago [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] on January [illegible], according at [illegible] on [illegible].

The Cantonese troops in Southern Kiangsi have been withdrawn to the borders of Kwangtung, whilst Kungchow (Kiangsi) has been taken over by General Ho Chien's troops.

The troops of Bau Kong have been transferred from Wu-seng-kwan to the Wu-zang Line.

Nanchang

According to people coming from Nanchang, when the Red Armies occupied Sung Mei Tsung and advanced upon Nanchang, gunfire was audible within the city of Nanchang and the people were greatly excited. The Bogus Military Headquarters at Nanchang immediately issued a proclamation stating that the gunfire was a target practice and that the people should not allow themselves to become excited. Military spies were very active, it was only necessary to speak of the Red Army to be arrested and executed.

Translation of Exhibit No.103 seized at 677 Changping Road on March 2, 1934.

A letter to Huhfei ([illegible]) Hsien Committee

According to a report from the inspectors, the Central considers that the work of the Huhfei Party (Anhwei) is quite strong. Despite several attacks from the outside you have been able to strengthen the organization.

The above result is, however, still insufficient, the following defects are brought to your notice :-

1. The Huhfei Party and the masses are far apart. As the work has not yet penetrated deep into the masses, only a few of them participated in struggles conducted by your party. Furthermore, you do not carry out our work among labourers and soldiers in the locality. You have to break down these obstacles, otherwise developments will be retarded.

2. There are also many errors in the policy and preparations for conducting struggles. You make no proper preparations before establishment and do not follow up the success obtained with a propaganda campaign, as a consequence you are enable to enlarge the scale of the movement and direct the struggle for greater objectives.

3. You must work daily to establish mass organizations. Although a "peasants committee" has been formed in the Huhfei Hsien, it does no practical work.

4. You have done no work among soldiers and workers in your city. No plan for carrying out such work has yet been formulated by you. You moreover don't know how to conduct anti-Kuomintang and anti-Imperialist struggles nor how to support the Soviet.

5. The Hsien Committee has no practical power in holding meetings, directing the work of sub-committees and mass organizations. With the exception of the Su Zung (City) Special District Sub-Committee, the district under the Huhfei Hsien show no appreciable development in activities. At present there are not more than 60 members in the Hsien Committee. This number is much smaller than before.

The Huhfei Hsin Committee up to the present time has not progressed satisfactorily. Now with a view to extending your activities in the future we give you the following instructions :-

The "[illegible]" in North China will not minimize the ambition of the Japanese Imperialists in invading China. The "Anti-War District" in [illegible] is already in the [illegible] of the Japanese Imperialists, [illegible] attack Jihong and at the same time invade [illegible]. Recently the militarists in [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] French Imperialists are now active in [illegible] [illegible] South of [illegible].

In connection with the Wheat and Cotton Loan, it is alleged that the American imperialists by this opportunity planned to exploit North West. The Kuomintang paid no attention and has surrendered to these attacks. It adopted measures to suppress the anti-Japanese and anti-Imperialists movement carried out at the behest of the masses. Unless the Kuomintang is overthrown, we cannot save the Nation from ruin and obtain victory for our revolution.

With Bolshevik greetings,

Central,

August 12.

TRANSLATION OF EXHIBIT NO. 104 SEIZED DURING THE COURSE OF A RAID AT NO. 677 CHANGPING ROAD ON MARCH 2, 1934.

A.

At 2 p.m. on the 22nd the executive staff of the Section and the District Committee held a meeting to discuss the following problems :-

Opposition to the 5th Anti-Communist Campaign,
Organization of Red Army Friendly Societies,
Anti-Imperialist Activities.

I did not participate in this meeting as I went to see the Clerk of the Section who, however, was absent.

Methods of propaganda: I suggest that comrades should meet workers outside factories at the time of going to or leaving work and talk with them about their treatment and living conditions, secure their addresses and induce them to join the party.

A factory newspaper was once issued and a copy was posted in the factory but was torn up by reactionaries. As newspapers from an important propaganda medium, further issues should be published.

About one hundred copies of the "Labourers' Newspaper" of the Labour Federation were disseminated in factories. Some male workers picked them up and read them.

B.

At 6 p.m. October 8, I interviewed the Clerk of the District Committee who gave me the following information:-

The Anti-Imperialist League consists of the following 15 comrades who are all natives of Hunan :-

Weaving Room workers.....7
Cotton Yarn Room Workers.5
Cotton Pasting Room " 2
Hot Water Room " 1

The factory has a complement of 3,000 workers of whom 300 are females. The Clerk of the Branch in the factory is not sufficiently energetic in his work and the Branch has failed to carry out the following duties:-

A movement to support the strike of Shanghai Power Co. Workers and organizing of parties to comfort strikers and dog-beating parties.

I went to see him again on the 9th but I had no chance to talk with him as three of his friends came to play Mahjong with him. When I went to see him on the 11th, he did not appear to be pleased. He did not say anything. I understand that he fears dismissal from the factory should I visit him too often.

C.

1. Social Scientists: at least 5 men.
2. Doctors: as many as possible.
3. Absorb as many assistants of high class shops as possible.
4. Absorb five comrades from amongst industrial workers.

D.

Letters to comrades of Publication Dept. and Printing Dept.

[illegible]

Members of the Publication Department and Printing Department are really the guides of the thousands and thousands of the poor class. Consequently, it is important for them to participate in the above-mentioned tasks. We also suggest that the Publication Department and the Printing Department hold a competition of work in November and December as an encouragement.

Whole Body of Comrades of

the Printing Department.

Translation of Exhibit No.[illegible] seized at 677 Changping Road on March 2, 1934

Report of the Hankow Branch League of the Leftist Clique

1. Politics at Hankow : The flood and the extension of Soviet districts have caused a general slump in business, while the oppression of the Imperialists has driven industry to a road of ruin.

It is safe to say that the political stage at Hankow is made up of loafers and professional corrupt officials. These are "indirect" running dogs of Imperialists and "direct" running dogs of the Nanking Government. Apart from struggling for personal benefits, they take the suppression of revolutionary movements as their main object.

Owing to the extent of farming villages becoming smaller and smaller, they can not help accelerate exploitation of the masses. In other words, they create a number of levies (such as signboard tax, business tax, etc. in farming villages). They furthermore propose the formation of model villages or districts so as to complete their exploitation of the masses.

It is a fact that cotton mills reduced working hours and finally suspended operations. It cannot be denied that it is a heavy blow to the proletariat. However, it can also be said that their revolutionary strength has been augmented thereby. This can be evidenced by the declaration of strikes and putting forth of demands on the part of labourers. These events are published widely in the press.

Armed soldiers and detectives are posted in the vicinity of industrial concerns, which preserves "good" order among the labourers. However, the papers tell us that the labourers are silenced and oppressed.

Not only is the movement of the proletariat limited, but the mouth of the intellectuals who are in sympathy with the proletariat is closed. They want to separate the intellectuals and students from the present society. By such means, they are in a position to monopolize education.

Fascist followers, needless to say, have been posted among teachers and students as spies. The students are given a large amount of work to do (such as military training during the summer vacation, etc) so that they are unable to spare time for other enterprises.

So-called News, Postal Matter and Telegram Censorship Committees are formed to oppress the journalists, etc. [illegible]

[illegible]

2. Civilization in Hankow:

The main object of newspaper men in Hankow is to obtain some allowance. They have no knowledge of journalism and all articles are reproductions of Shanghai papers and foreign news reports. There are a large number of mosquito papers, most of which are, however, dealing with love matters.

The 3rd Department of the Four Provinces Bandit Suppression Headquarters is the organ to conduct civilization movements of a Fascist nature. The departmental chief is Tung Wen-I (鄧文仪), native of Hunan, and his assistants are named Shiang Bei-liang (向培良) and Woo Wei-feng (吳惠風), etc. Shiang Bei-liang published a magazine entitled "Youth Comment" (30,000 characters each issue), which is a Fascist periodical. It is not popular, but it continues to be published. Another man Wong Ching-li (王荆侶), a graduate of the Wuhan University, published a periodical entitled "Middle School Students at Hankow" (80,000 characters each issue). It claims that 3,000 of each issue are sold, but it is hardly a fact.

They also form literary organizations to conduct spy tasks. The men undertaking such work called "civilization secret investigator". Shiang Bei-liang is one of them.

Their "masses" are opportunists and seekers of allowances.

3. Work of the Branch League in the past

We have submitted a detailed report on the events in October of last year. The following is what took place after April of this (?) year :-

a) Organization: We only have some 20 persons. As the number is small, it is impossible to subdivide ourselves into various departments. There are four sections formed according to districts. Each section has a clerk and these sections hold joint meetings. There is a general clerk and a general "communication". Under this general "communication", there is a "communication" at Wuchang and another at Hankow. They are concurrently doing "distribution" tasks.

b) Principles: Apart from "entering" into the bourgeoisie and intellectuals and establishing the case of labourers and peasants civilization the "civilization" workers are required to organize the intellectuals, labourers and peasants. These tasks which have been destroyed should be resumed forthwith.

c) [illegible] The only secret work is to disseminate [illegible] and write slogans. The following are public [illegible]
[illegible] We have the supplements of the [illegible] (时代日报副刊), [illegible] (时代日报副刊) and [illegible] (时代日报副刊). It is a pity that we have very few writers.
[illegible] Owing to lack of opportunity and funds, no theatricals were staged. [illegible] disposed.

Books & Newspaper Society This is a place where books are hired out. It has a membership of 70 or 80 persons. It is one most hopeful organization, but it is not in a position to purchase new books owing to financial difficulties.
Schools: There are some schools for children of workers. The time before a lesson is utilized to explain to the students the duty of labourers, the position of China, etc. Several of the students have entered factories as workers. We are preparing to "enter" into the labourers by this way.

d. Latest Resolutions :

1. That the summer vacation be utilized to extend the "organization".
2. That the summer vacation be utilized to establish "farming village communication cells."
3. That political training of our own be accelerated.
4. That arrangements be made to publish a public periodical and a mimeographed publication of "interior" affairs.
5. That efforts be made to "enter" into private middle and primary schools.

e. Difficulties

(1) Lack of directorship.

(2) Lack of books and periodicals.

(3) Lack of men able to work.

(4) Lack of experience in work.

4. We make the following demands from the National Literary Federation :-

a) That the Hankow Branch League maintain "communication" with the National Literary Federation.
b) That the Federation supply the Branch League with as many books as possible from the point of view of organization.
c) That the Federation compel the Branch League to have direct relation with the Party.
d) That the Federation assign at least one member to direct work in Hankow.
e) That the writers of the Federation contribute as many of their writings as possible to the Branch League.
f) That a reply on the foregoing demands be given forthwith.

August 28.

Translation of Exhibit No.106 seized at 677 Changping Road on March 2, 1934

Statement of Accounts of Section 1 (Printing Works) For the Month of July.

(1) House Rent (two months' actual rent and two months as commission to the rent collector)	$133.00
Tip for the alleyway scavenger (for July and August).	1.00
Rent for Dah Zung (an employee)	8.00
" " Nyi Gee (" ")	13.00
Old Godown for the Printing Machines (? rent)	23.00
New Godown for the Printing Machines (? rent)	13.50
Godown for a thread machine	25.50
Fitting (carpenters)	106.50
" (masons)	16.80
Tip for the alleyway watchman	2.00
Electric fittings, etc.	44.00
Electricity supply	1.63
Tip for loafers	1.00
Allowance for the child of Nyi Gee	5.00
	$ 393.93
(2) Wages of Nyi Gee	$ 15.00
" " Dah Zung	15.00
" " Shih Sung	15.00
" " Moi Zung	15.00
" " Zah Ka	10.00
" " [illegible]	2.00
	$ 72.00
(3) Travelling Expenses	$ 20.50
Paper	38.17

Machine oil	$ 3.30
Machine repairing	1.00
Kerosene oil	.20
Cloth	.50
Thread	.70
Nails	.59
Hammer repairing	.16
Flour	.07
	$ 69/21

(4) Thermos Flask	$ 0.85
Curtain	3.25
Tea pot	2.32
Time piece	3.75
Datachable Table	1.70
Hotel charges (for the mother of Mei Zung)	7.16
Maps	3.50
Cupboard	5.50
Bucket, etc.	1.01
Stove	1.10
Axe	0.50
Repair to a clock	0.16
Ice	0.25
Net basket	0.50
Umbrella, etc.	6.17
	$ 38.42

Statement of Accounts for July

Receipts

Balance from the previous months		$62.15
Yu		550.00
Chang		150.00
Fee		0.90
Second Goods		2.00
	Total	$785.05

Payments

Typesetting works		$152.28
Printing works		573.61
	Total:	$525.89

Sum left : $39.16

$41.84 - $39.16 = 2.68 (sum to be paid to me)

TRANSLATION OF EXHIBIT NO. 107 SEIZED FROM NO. 677 CHANGPING ROAD ON MARCH 2, 1934.

Restoration and Consolidation of Unions of Industrial Workers.

1) Federation of Cotton Mill Workers' Unions :-
   a) The Eastern District Cotton Mill Workers' Office shall have a staff of 11 comrades (8 male and 3 female workers)
   b) As we have connections in the Sung Sing No.1 Mill and the Japan-China Cotton Mill, we can restore the Western District Cotton Mill Workers' Office at once by means of "storming" methods.
   c) We have to consolidate the branch unions in the Heng Foong, Hwo, Sung Sing No.6, San Sing and Shanghai No.1 Cotton Mills, and to ensure that their daily work is duly carried out.

2) Federation of Tobacco Workers' Unions :-
   a) As we have connections in the B.A.T. No.3 Factory, Nanyang Tobacco Co., American Tobacco Co., Kiangnan, Hwa Tung, and Hwa Ping Tobacco Companies, we can now establish therein branch unions and red cells.
   b) We should call a meeting of representatives of various factories prior to the Anniversary of the International Youth Day. Five persons (3 male and 2 female workers) should be chosen to make preparations for the meeting.

3) Federation of Municipal Workers :-
   a) Consolidate the Standing Committee which should consist of five persons, two of whom should be employed at present. (one employed in the post office and one in the Shanghai Tramway Co.)
   b) Consolidate our connections in the post office and the Shanghai Tramway Co., and restore our connections with the workers of the French and Nantao tramway companies, the bus company, and riesha coolies.
   c) Establish connections with other electricity workers and workers of waterworks companies.

4) Federation of Metal Workers :-
   a) Establish branch unions and red cells in the Zoom Yain (佛鏡), Hwa Tung(華東), Sing Cheng(信昌) and Pathe Factories wherein we have connections.
   b) Prior to the Anniversary of the International Youth Day, we should call a meeting of representatives of the above mentioned factories. We should appoint from 3 to 5 persons to make preparations for the meeting (two of the persons should be employed at present).

5) Federation of Wharf Workers :-
   a) Transform the organizations at Wuchow Road, Shiung Yen Jae, Lao Peh Doo, Lan Nyi Doo and other places into branch unions or red cells.
   b) Before the anniversary of the International Youth Day, we should call a meeting of representatives from various places and establish an office of the Federation.
   c) Reorganize the "Lan Nan Hang to Refuse to Buy Japanese Goods" into ten groups.

6) Recover all "lost ground" such as the Federation of Printing Workers, the Federation of Shop Assistants and the Federation of Unemployed Workers, and organize storming parties to undertake this task. The Party and the League should be requested to render assistance.

7) Enlist 1,000 new members on the September 18 Anniversary.-

Federation of Cotton Mill Workers Unions.....	400
Federation of Tobacco Workers Union	150
Federation of Hotel Workers	100
Federation of Municipal Workers	100
Federation of Wharf Workers	250

TRANSLATION OF EXHIBIT NO. 108 SEIZED DURING THE COURSE OF A RAID CONDUCTED AT NO. 677 CHANGPING ROAD ON MARCH 2,1934

To "Central" and Central Publication Department,

I have been attached to the Central Publication Department for a long time and my work and activities in the past are well known to my comrades of the department. I submit hereunder a brief report on the recent "incident" as well as my doings after my release from jail :-

Cause of Arrest

Up to the present we are still ignorant of the cause of our arrest. According to certain workers and my personal conviction, it may be attributed to the following :-

(1) Information given by the chief tenant of House No. 18 Tai Oem Li(蔡安里), Shanse Road, because this individual had quarrels with Dah Loong(大龍) on several occasions and he knew that we were binding. He probably had some connection with the Public Safety Bureau.

(2) Lau Woo(老吳) knew many renegades. He was not very careful of his own movements and went very often to his home in Dalny Road.

(3) Tseu Kwang Yem(周光言) also knew a number of renegades of the Printing Department. The workers did not know the secret work. For instance, one named Zung(陳), who was arrested at the same time, was visiting House No.18 to ask Tseu Kwang Yem to repay some money due to him. None of the workers said anything as to how Zung came to know House No.18.

(4) Yeong Bah(元白) and Wu Sz Ching(胡世清) knew our Publication Department very well. As they have surrendered to the Kuomintang it is possible that information had been supplied by them.

Events following the arrest

House No.18 was raided on April 3. House No. 101 was subsequently visited and workers taken into custody. Kwang Tung Tuh(廣東德) was arrested at 9 a.m. April 4 at House No.18. Lieu Yen Ching(劉安清) and I were arrested at 4 p.m. April 4 at House No.57. We were subjected to severe interrogation and torture at the police station. We were handed over to the Public Safety Bureau on April 12. On May 22 we were transferred to the Soochow High Court for preliminary hearing. The case against Kwang Tung Tuh(廣東德, Tseu Kwang Yem(周光言) and Zung was dismissed owing to lack of evidence, and they were released on July 12. On the other hand, we (the writer, Lieu Yen Ching and others) were charged and committed for trial. On August 22 a verdict of "not guilty" was handed down in my case, whilst Lieu Yen Ching and four workers were sentenced each to 2 years and 7 months imprisonment. I was discharged from jail on September 8 and returned to Shanghai the same evening.

My secret work after release

I was very careful after my release from jail. I [illegible] for about 4 hours, [illegible] and [illegible] for the purpose of [illegible] off [illegible] from my house. I took the 4 p.m. [illegible] alighted at Shanghai Station. I took a rickshaw to [illegible] Road Bridge, Bund, after which I changed my present address. I can absolutely assure you that nobody could have followed me. I am still very careful of my movements since my return to Shanghai and I do not go out on the streets unless it is necessary.

Suggestions to the Party

The Party gained some experience from the split which occurred this Spring. As a result, the Party has improved its contact with its organizations and on this account cases of obstruction to the Party have diminished. However, the Party should reinstate those comrades who are still firm in their political standing, after the Party has made a thorough investigation about them. I request the Party to consider my case.

The Party and the Mutual Aid Society is not doing any work in the jail at Soochow and I request the Party and the Society to consider this matter. A separate letter on this subject has been forwarded to the Society.

Personal opinion about my work

Since my arrest I have naturally become known to a number of detectives and renegades and on this account I am not fit for secret work in Shanghai. I request the Party to transfer me to Soviet Districts for publication work.

Source of my financial support and expenses

My wife remitted me in all $240 from Szechuen. I paid $140 for lawyer's fees. I spent $28 as travelling and food expenses, etc. after leaving jail. I gave $15 to Kwang Tung Tuh and $17 to Lieu Yeu Ching. I spent $10 in jail. I had $30 upon my arrival in Shanghai.

With bolshevik greetings,

Tseu Chuih Noong (左觉農)

(alias Lieu Chi Wah 刘根華)

September 30, 1933.

TRANSLATION OF EXHIBIT NO. 110 SEIZED DURING THE COURSE OF A RAID CONDUCTED AT NO.677 CHANGPING ROAD ON MARCH 2,1934.

"Central" of the Chinese Communist Party,

(1) For the past six months no letters, publications and labour-peasant correspondence have been received. Why?

(2) The address to which publications should be sent is :

(3) To what address shall we send you local publications and grey-coloured mosquito papers?

(4) Hsu Sz Tsong(許世忠), son of Hsu Tso Shuan (許卓然), a politician in Fokien, who went to the Philippines from Fokien during the Party purification movement and who later proceeded to Moscow to continue his studies, is now back in the Islands. According to Zung Lih(承烈), he is a suspicious person. We hope "Central" will find out for us and let us know by writing.

(5) We ask you to send us regularly the "Red Flag", the "Bolshevik Paper" and other publications of the Party. We are urgently in need of assistance from China. The Chinese Section of the American Communist Party has also sent a letter with the hope that you will supply them with as many publications as possible.

(6) Comrade Kau Zung Lih(高承烈) - Lee Vung(黎文) - has left for Shanghai. He has the address of the "Central". It is said that he has been called back to China owing to the danger of his arrest.

(7) Formerly we decided to send Comrade Kau to Java to be a Dean of a school for the purpose of maintaining Party work there, because once the position of Dean was lost, the rest of the comrades (teachers) would be dismissed. The conditions are that the Dean must be a Fokienese and a university graduate. If "Central" can now find a Fokienese comrade to take the position of Dean, you may retain him (Kau ?) in Shanghai to give him some training.

(8) You can send us letters by the new method; in future we shall employ same.

(9) Please use new address after sending letter.

Chinese Overseas Bureau
of the
Central
of the
Philippine Communist Party.

[illegible]

Received [illegible].

COPY OF EXHIBIT NO. 112 SEIZED FROM NO. 677 CHANGPING ROAD ON MARCH 2, 1934.

Envelope: Adolf Lee
Shanghai

'mstel 272, Amsterdam

Dear Degroot :

The enclosed letter is to be forwarded to T.S.H. immediately. We have to ask your assistance in forwarding the same mail because we lost connection with T.S.H. after the change in Berlin. Please see to it that the bearer of the note can return with definite answer before he leaves your port.

With com. greetings

Lee (Shanghai)

Inter-Club of Marseilles (or Vladiwostok)

Secretary of Inter-Club.

Dear friends:

The enclosed letter is to be forwarded to the T.S.H. from her Chinese section. Please do us the favour in forwarding the letter as soon as this note reaches you, and that our courier receives definite answer before he leaves your port.

With international greetings

A. C. S. M. W.

TRANSLATION OF EXHIBIT NO. 115 SEIZED AT NO.677 CHANGPING ROAD ON MARCH 2, 1934.

Central :-

I submit hereunder, as instructed, a report on my activities.

Subsequent to my return from Moscow, most of my time was spent either abroad or in prison. The time I actually spent working in China was about 4 or 5 months in Shanghai Western District and about 2 or 3 months in Amoy. In view of the fact that my actual working period was very short, my report is of little worth.

When I was transferred from the Shanghai Western District by Central, I was requested to make a report on my work. I complied with the order but I have not received a reply so far.

On my arrival in Shanghai from Fokien, I again submitted a report on my activities in that province, but again I have received no reply from Central.

I feel that I have the right to express my personal thoughts as to my period in the Party. Whilst attached to the Shanghai Western District, I detected, by my vigilance, that the route taken by the Party was not correct, but I could not continue to struggle with the bad leadership of the Party. I did not disagree with the Party policy until the Party was face to face with the "Lih San Route". This point I frankly admit is my mistake. I believe that mistakes cannot be avouded, but I hope that under the assistance and correction of the Party I shall be able to refrain from making further mistakes.

Doo Tsiang Ling(杜 檣林) - 31st day.

(My old name is known to many renegades and persons outside the Party, therefore, I have discontinued using it. I am now using the above name and hope the Party will take note of it and put it on record.)

Translation of Exhibit No 116 seized at No 677 Changping Road on March 2, 1934.

Plan of activities to be carried out during the month of August by the Zee Toong District Committee.

1. **The District Committeeman**
   a) The District Secretary will supervise the Women's Section inner communication section, joint meetings to be convened by members of the C.Y. League, Labour Unions and the Party, and undertake the Hung Foong, the Sung Sing No 7, the San Sing and the Shanghai No 5 Cotton Mills.
   b) The Chief of the Organisation Department will supervise the unemployed, the Mutual Aid Society and the Executive Offices of the Organisation Department. He will undertake the Sung Sing ? (No 7), the Sung Sing No 9 , the Wing On , the Middle Steel and the Wei Tung Mills and Factories. The executive offices of the Organisation Department will undertake the 'Egg Factory', The Shanghai No 2 and 3 Cotton Mills, wheelbarrow coolies and soap factories.
   c) The chief of the Propaganda Department will supervise mimeograph printings as well as training and reading classes. he will undertake the Shanghai No 1 Mill, theNew Ewo, the Old Ewo and the Sung Sing No 5 Mill.
   d) The Chief of the Unemployment Department [illegible] will supervise the Unemployment Committee and its executive officers, and undertakes the San You, the Hung Nyieh, the Tsiang (? Soy shops), the Whangpo, the Glen and the Shanghai No. 4 industrial workers.
   The Unemployment Executive Officers look after the Fah Bah Yuen, Sung Tung Li, Zung Zung and San Dah Dou localities.
   e) The Chief of the Women's Department will supervise the female workers of the Dah Kung, Kung Dah, Wei Tung, Sung Sing No. 7 and the Hung Foong industrial concerns as well as the women's departments of various public bodies, the Shanghai No4 and No. 1 Cotton Mills.
   f) Mimeograph printing section.
   g) Publication Department.
   h) Inner communication.

2. **STRUGGLES**
   1. The struggles in the Electric Factory (? Shanghai Power Co.)
      (a) The old members of the Party should convene from time to to time section meetings during which every comrade should be urged to give his own opinion regarding the activities performed
      (b) To intensify the anti-Yellow Labour Union movement.
      (c) To absorb 6 new men into the Party during this month.
      (d) Extend the organization of various labour bodies or societies.
   2. The struggles in the San You Towel Factory.
      (a) Extend the organization of the workers.
      (b) Intensify the anti-Yellow Labour Union activities.
      (c) The District Committee should unexpectedly carry out decided measures in connection with the struggle (to occupy the godown, confiscate and auction the goods stored there.)
   3. The struggles in the Sung Sing No. 9 Cotton Mill:-
      (a) To demand removal allowances from the management. A portion of the machinery of this mill has been removed.
   4. The struggles in the Sung Sing No. 7 Mill:-
      [illegible] the party
      [illegible]
      [illegible]
      [illegible] mass organizations.
      [illegible] the daily struggles of workers.
      [illegible]
      Continue the struggle against the reduction of work.

5. Struggles of Hong Feong Cotton Mill Workers against "5 day shift" and dismissals. Preparations for starting the above struggles have long been made but they have not yet been carried out owing to the following reasons:-
   (1) Vacillation of comrades and their lack of hope for victory.
   (2) Lack of energy on the part of comrades.
   (3) Failure to grasp opportunities when they presented themselves.
   (4) Confinement of activities to the Hunan Clique in the factory.
   (5) Neglect of activities among female workers.
   (6) Neglect of activities among young workers.
   (7) Subsidiary organizations being unhealthy.

   Future plans to develop activities in the Hong Feong Mill:-
   (1) Develop educational work and give the comrades a clear conception of class struggles.
   (2) Endeavour to persuade the comrades to be energetic.
   (3) Organize "storming parties" to carry out activities among Kiangpeh workers and female workers, and extend the party organization.
   (4) Extend the union and the anti-imperialist league and establish branches of the Mutual Aid Society and the Communist Youth League.
   (5) Accelerate the work among female and young workers.
   (6) Accelerate the movement to oppose the yellow labour unions and the fellow countrymen's associations.

6. Struggles in San Sing Cotton Mill:-
   (1) Start struggles against dismissals; demand wages for the period of suspension of work; and overthrow labour traiters.
   (2) Develop the party orga nization by absorbing energetic elements.
   (3) Develop the various organizations in the factory.

7. Struggles in Wei Tung Cotton Mill:-
   (1) Establish Party Branch in one week's time.
   (2) Develop and consolidate mass organizations.
   (3) Accelerate the work among child workers.

8. Struggles in Sung Sing No. 6 Cotton Mill:-
   (1) Endeavour to start a strike of the whole body of workers by utilizing the struggle of workers in one department.
   (2) Pick out energetic elements in the strike and induce them to join the party.
   (3) Accelerate propaganda and educational work in order to acquaint the workers with the political situation.

Summarised description of contents of Communist Booklet (Exhibit No.23, Changping Road Communist Case) entitled "The Present Political Situation in China and the Principal Duties of the Chinese Communist Party".

(Issued by the U.S.S.R. Foreign Labourers Publishing Co.) ~~in March 1932.~~ Published in Moscow in June 1932.

Chapter I - The Two Opposing Governments in China.

This refers to the Kuomintang Government (Nanking) and the Soviet Government (Kiangse) which was established on the conclusion of the First Chinese Soviet Congress held at Suikin on November 7,1931. This chapter mentions the merits of the Soviet rule and quotes various articles from the Soviet constitution concerning the imperialistic Powers, labour, peasant and economic problems, etc. One of these articles (No.8) states :

"The object of the Chinese Soviet Government is to free "China from the imperialistic yoke and to restore to the "Chinese people their independence and autonomy. The "Soviet Government does not recognize the special political "and economic rights enjoyed in China by Imperialistic "Powers,and all unequal treaties concluded between these "Powers and the reactionary Government are declared null "and void. No foreign loans are recognized and no "troops, warships and aeroplanes belonging to any "Imperialistic country are ~~not~~ allowed to enter Soviet "territory..... etc."

Chapter II - The Partitioning of China and the People's Revolutionary War.

This chapter refers to the Japanese policy towards Manchuria and Soviet Russia. Japan's possession of Manchuria is only part of a general scheme of the Imperialistic Powers to partition China and to attack Soviet Russia. A revolutionary war participated by millions of the Chinese masses under the leadership of the Communist Party only can save China from being subjugated by Japan, Great Britain, U.S.A. and France. The writer then enumerates the various reasons why this war is absolutely necessary and how a successful conclusion is possible. Lenin said that such a revolution would be successful. This chapter also mentions the Shanghai Sino-Japanese conflict, the activities of the 19th Route Army and the attitude of Chiang Kai-shek and other politicians during the fighting.

Chapter III - The Chinese Revolutionary Situation and Communist Party's Principal Task.

This chapter discusses the revolutionary situation in China at length, and states that the present reactionary rulers will not be able to continue their rule successfully because the people under their rule cannot endure their sufferings any longer and are all on the point of rising to overthrow the reactionary rulers. The principal task of the Communist Party will be to combine the land revolution and anti-imperialistic revolution into one big mass revolution in order to attain the final object of securing the independence and unification of China and emancipation of its people. To carry out this task the Chinese Communist Party must first consolidate the party on the lines laid down by Lenin.

Fm. 2
G. 35000-1-34

SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL POLICE.

Section 2, Special Branch Station,

REPORT

Date March 21, 1934.

SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL POLICE
File No. C. & S. B. REGISTRY.
No. D. 5703
Date 21 / 3 / 34

Subject (in full) Reference to the attached letter from the H.B.M. Consulate-General dated March 8, 1934.

Made by D.S.I. Golder *Forwarded by* D B Rm D.I.

Reference paragraph 1 of the letter abovementioned, Exhibit No. 23 is a book entitled "The Present Political Conditions of China and the Main Duties of the Chinese Communist Party" of which we have only one copy. Relative to paragraph 2 of the above mentioned letter I beg to state that the envelope and contents listed in the Changping Road Case as Exhibit No. 112 have not been transmitted through the post unless they were enclosed in another cover. The writing on the envelope and that appearing on the two pieces of paper enclosed appear to be the same handwriting but executed with different pens.

The remainder of the documents called for have been duly copied and/or translated and are attached hereto for favour of forwarding.

Em Golder
D. S. I.

Officer i/c Special Branch.

No. D 5703
Date 24 / 3 / 34

March 24 34.

Dear Mr. Steptoe,

In compliance with the request contained in your letter of March 8 on the subject of the seizure of Communist literature at 677 Changping Road, I forward herewith copies of items Nos. 80, 81, 83, [redacted] translations of Nos. 96 and 101 together with translations of Nos. 1, 3 and 6 of the papers dropped by Yang Yih Ling. Regarding Exhibit No.112 the envelope bore no indication of having passed through the post. The writing on the envelope and that appearing on the two pieces of paper enclosed would appear to be the same handwriting but executed with different pens. As to No. 23 only one copy of this booklet was seized and I attach summarised translation of its more importantitems.

Yours sincerely,

YR

H.N. Steptoe, Esq.,
H.B.M. Consulate-General.

SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL P...
C. & S. B. REGISTRY.
D 5703
Date 9 1 3 1 34

BRITISH CONSULATE-GENERAL.
P.O. BOX 259. SHANGHAI

8th March, 1934.

My dear Givens,

Your letter No. D5703 of March 7th.

Many thanks for this letter and its enclosures. I shall be very grateful if you would send me copies of Items Nos. 23, 80, 81, 83, 96 and 101.

Also any further details which you may have concerning Item No. 112. Had this envelope been through the Post?

I should also like if available copies of Items No. 1, 3, 6, of the papers dropped by Yang Yih Ling.

Yours sincerely,

H. Keyloe

D.S.I. Golder.
D.I. Kuh.
DBR 9/3

T. Givens Esq.,

S2, Please prepare. It is probable that copies of these documents will also be required by other authorities. JPL

MAR 9 1934

Fm. 2
G. 35000-1-34

SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL POLICE.

C

SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL POLICE
File No. C. & S. B. REGISTRY.
No. D 5703
Date 21/3/34

Section 2, Special Branch.

REPORT

Date March 21, 1934.

Subject (in full) Reference the attached letter addressed to Mr. Koketsu of the Japanese Consulate-General dated March 7, 1934.

Made by D.S.I. Golder *Forwarded by* [illegible]

With reference to the above letter, Mr. Hashizumi of the Japanese Consulate-General called at this office on March 9 bringing with him the list of exhibits in the Changping Road Case supplied him by the Deputy Commissioner Special Branch. Mr. Hashizumi by marking the list has indicated the documents he would like to have, these have been duly compiled and are attached hereto for favour of forwarding.

[signature]
D. S. I.

Officer i/c Special Branch.

Copies or translations of the documents required by Japanese Consulate General handed to Mr. Hashizumi on 24/3/34.
[signature]

Fm. 2
G. 39000-1-34

SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL POLICE.

Section 2, Special Branch.

REPORT

SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL POLICE
File No. REGISTRY.
No. D 5703
Date 21/3/34

Date March 21, 1934.

Subject (in full) Letter from Mr. Van den Berg of the Consulate General for the Netherlands dated March 10, 1934.

Made by D.S.I. Golder *Forwarded by* D.B.Rm. D.

With reference to the above letter, paragraph three. The handwriting appearing on the envelope of the letter addressed to Mr. W.v.d. Berg, No. 225 Seymour Road, Shanghai, from Louis de Visser, Communist Member of the Netherlands Parliament (See file No. D.4927 and Files Nos. D.4067 and D.4424 on the subject of Tan Malakka) has a light resemblance to that appearing in document No. 112 impounded as the result of the raid conducted on No. 677 Changping Road on March 2, 1934, but under close examination shows many points of difference. Document No.112 is undated, it is therefore difficult to say exactly when it was written. The reference in Document No. 112 to the change in Berlin obviously refers to the action of Herr Adolf Hitler who is at present at the helm of German political affairs and who refuses to countenance party politics and who has waged an unrelenting war on Communism for the past ten months. Bearing the foregoing facts in mind the letter (No. 112) would not be more than six months old and is in all probability a draft of a cablegram or code letter since it appears not to have left Shanghai.

The copies and/or translations of documents called for by Mr. Van den Berg are hereto attached for favour of forwarding.

Em Golder

D. S. I.

Officer i/c Special Branch.

SHANGHAI [illegible] POLICE
C. & S. A. [illegible] TRY.
No. D 5703
Date 24 / 3 / 34

March 24 34.

Dear Mr. Van den Berg,

With reference to your letter No.760 of March 10 on the subject of the seizure of Communist literature at No. 677 Changping Road, I forward herewith a translation of exhibit No.101 together with translation of No.6 of the papers dropped by Yang Yih Ling.

The handwritings on document No.112 and on the envelope of the letter addressed to Mr. W. v.d. Berg, No.225 Seymour Road, Shanghai, from Louis de Visser, a Netherlands Communist, have been compared and show a slight resemblance, but a close examination shows many points of difference.

Yours truly,

J. Van den Berg, Esq.,
Netherlands Consulate-General.

CONSULAAT-GENERAAL DER NEDERLANDEN
VOOR MIDDEN-CHINA.
TEL. AD. HOLLANDIA.

CONFIDENTIËEL

SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL POLICE
C. I. S. B. REGISTRY.
No. D 5703
Date 15 / 3 / 34

No. 760.

SHANGHAI, 10 March 1934.

Dear Givens,

Many thanks for your letter of 7 March 1934, No.D-5703 concerning documents seized at 677 Changping Road. I should be much obliged to you, if I could receive two more photo's of exh. 112 and also a copy of the report on communist activities in Java and Netherlands India (No.6 of the papers dropped by 1st accused Yang Yih-ling).

As soon as a translation of exh. 101 has been made I hope to receive a copy too.

It would be worth while to have an expert compare the handwriting on photo No.3613 of last year (letter supposed to have been sent by the Netherlands Communist, Member of Parliament *Louis de Visser to *W.v.d.Berg, Seymour Road 225 Shanghai concerning °Tan Malakka) with that of exh. 112. To me it looks as though there are many points of similarity.

In case the persons arrested in connection with this case make any statements relative to the above document I should be very grateful for being informed thereof.

Yours sincerely,

[signature]

* See File D. 4927.
° See Files D. 4067 + D. 4424

T.P.Givens,Esquire,
Officer i/c Special Branch,
Shanghai Municipal Police,
SHANGHAI.

S 2
Attention
JR

Form No. 3
C. 25,000-1-34

SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL POLICE.

E

SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL POLICE
File No. REGISTRY.
No. D 5703
Date 21/3/1934

S.2, Special Branch

REPORT

Date March 21. 1934.

Subject (in full) Reference the attached letter to Captain A.T. Wilson-Brand relative to the Changping Road Case.

Made by D.S.I. Golder *Forwarded by* D.S.I.

With reference to the attached letter to Captain Wilson-Brand, the documents called for have been prepared and are attached hereto for favour of forwarding.

2 copies each

E M Golder
D. S. I.

Deputy Commissioner,
Special Branch.

Photographic copy of Exhibit No. 72 will be forwarded when completed.

E M Golder
D. S. I.

Handed to Capt Wilson Brand by me 24/3/34
HR

S. 1A.

D. 5703

Shanghai Municipal Council.

SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL POLICE
C.I.D. REGISTRY.
No. D 5703
Date 7 / 3 / 34

POLICE FORCE.
COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE.
P. O. BOX NO. 158

March 7 1934.

Dear

I forward herewith for your information a list of Communist literature which was seized at No. 677 Changping Road on March 2. If you will kindly inform me of the numbers of any of the items in which you are specially interested, I will arrange to send you copies of translations of them.

Yours sincerely,

J.P.G.

Messrs Steptoe,
Sarly,
Van den Berg
Koketsu
McHugh
Wilson-Brand

LIST OF COMMUNIST LITERATURE SEIZED [illegible] OF A RAID AT NO. 677 CHANGPING ROAD AT 12.30 A.M. MARCH 2, 1934 (UPSTAIRS FRONT ROOM).

(Leather suitcase "A")

1) Book: "Land Politics of the Democratic-Socialists during the Russian Revolution from 1905 to 1907" (by Lenin - Chinese translation from Russian). 1 copy

2) Book: "The origin of the family private property and the State" (by F. Engels. Chinese translation) 1 copy

3) Book: "Brief history of the Chinese Trade Movement", Volume 1, issued by the Central Publishing Bureau in 1930. 1 copy

4) Book: "Materials for the Chinese Trade Movement" (1927 to 1928), issued by the Central Publishing Bureau in 1931. 1 copy

5) Book: "About the Opposition" (by J. Stalin). 1 copy

6) Book: "Selections of Lenin's writings". 1 copy

7) Book: "Marx-Engels and Marxism" by Lenin). 1 copy

8) Book: "Political report submitted by the Central Committee to the 16th Plenary Session of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union", issued by the Central Publishing Bureau in 1930. 1 copy

9) Book: "The Second Five Year Plan". 1 copy

10) Book: "Communist International", Volume 4, Issue No.1, dated January 31, 1933. 1 copy

11) Book: "On the eve of new fights" (by S. Gussev). 1 copy

12) Book: "Biography of Stalin". 1 copy

13) Book: "Proposals and decisions of the 12th Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the Communist International". (Leningrad, 1933). 1 copy

14) Book: "Summary of the work of the 14th Meeting of Representatives of the Russian Communist Party" (by Stalin). 1 copy

15) Book: "Summary of the First Five Year Plan" (by Stalin). 1 copy

16) Book: "A Year of Great Change" (by Stalin). 1 copy

17) Book: "Livelihood and struggles of Chinese Peasants". 1 copy

18) Book: "Duty of Communists in the Trade Movement" 1 copy

19) Book: "Soviet Union and the World Proletariat". 1 copy

20) Book: "Capitalism". 1 copy

21) Book: "What is Profiteers" (by A. Lozovsky). 1 copy

22) Book: "On the national economic plan for 1932" (by Motoloff). 1 copy

23) Book: "The present political conditions of China and the main duties of the Chinese Communist Party". 1 copy

24) Book: "Japanese intrigue towards Manchuria and Mongolia". 1 copy

25) Book: "The Second Five Year Plan". 1 copy

26) Book: "Dangers of war - duties of Fascism and the Youth Communist International". 1 copy

27) Book: "Two lectures delivered by Stalin at the conference of the Youth Communist International in 1920". 1 copy

28) Book: "Duties of the Economic Working-Men".(by Stalin) -

29) Book: "Letters of protest against cases framed by the anti-revolutionary Menshevik". 1 copy

30) Book: "Living of Olessiloff, the leader of the proletariat". 1 copy

31) Book: "Problems of Chinese Trade Movement". 1 copy

32) Book: "Revolutionary Movement in Colonies". 1 copy

33) Book: "Chinese Revolution". 1 copy

34) Book: "World Economic Crisis and the Danger of an Armed Attack on the Soviet Union". 1 copy

35) Book: "February Revolution to October Revolution". 1 copy

36) Book: "Present conditions of the World Labour". 1 copy

37) Book: "Infantile Sickness of Left Wing Communism". 1 copy

38) Book: "Program of Communist International". 1 copy

39) Book: "Leninism"(by Stalin). 1 copy

40) Book: "Problems of Leninism". 1 copy

41) Book: "Preliminary steps of Leninism". 1 copy

42) Book: "Thesis on colonial and semi-colonial revolution". -

43) Book: "Manifesto Kuomintang". 1 copy

44) Book: "State and revolution". 1 copy

45) Book: "Important reports and decisions of the 11th Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the Communist International". 1 copy

46) Book: "Chinese Communist Party in time of emergency". 1 copy

47) Book: "Economics in transient period". 1 copy

48) Book: "Marx's argument before the Hanover Court". 1 copy

49) Book: "Lenin on Food Tax". 1 copy

50) Book: "Lenin's Speech on the State". 1 copy

51) Book: "Communist Manifesto". 1 copy

52) Book: "Will of Lenin". 1 copy

53) Book: "Civil war in France". 1 copy

54) Book: "Comment on Revolutionary Change". 1 copy

55) Book: "Guide to the Trade Movement". 1 copy

56) Book: "Japanese aggressions in Manchuria". 1 copy

57) Book: "Present conditions of the World Labour". 1 copy

58) Book: "Chemical War". 1 copy

59) Book: "Proletarian Revolution and Renegate Kautsky" (by Stalin). 1 copy

60) Book: "Comment on Right Wing Elements in the American Communist Party". (by Stalin) 1 copy

61) Book: "Karl Marx" (by Lenin). 1 copy

62) Book: "Duties of the Communist Youth League". 1 copy

63) Book: "Female workers in the East". 1 copy

64) Book: "Arts to be procured by Chinese workers". 1 copy

65) Book: "Argument between Buharing and Lenin". 1 copy

66) Book: "Opposition to Wuang Ching Wei and the Reorganization Clique". 1 copy

67) Book: "Women, female workers and farm-women". 1 copy

68) Book: "Attention to movements in rural districts." 1 copy

69) Book: "Red Flag". Issue 47, 59, 60, 61 and 62. 1 copy each

70) Book: "Chinese Revolutionary Red Army". 1 copy

71) Pamphlets entitled "Struggle". Issues, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 51, 52, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60 and 62. 1 copy each

72) Handbill: "Red China". Issues Nos. 142, 143, 144, 145, 1, 2 and 3, dated from January 10, 1934 to February 1, 1934. 1 copy each

73) Handbill: "Red Star". Issues Nos. 42, 52 and 62, dated January 14, January 21 and January 28, 1934. 1 copy each

74) Envelope, which bears on its cover the inscriptions "Mr. Wang Pao Sung(王鼎[illegible]), c/o Tu Soong Tu(于松之), Bank of China", contains the following:-
"Report submitted to the 'Central' by Yih Van Tsiung(叶[illegible]), dated February 11, on his activities among the 19th Route Army in South Fukien".

75) Envelope addressed to Sung Jay Ding(鄭[illegible]) from Ming([illegible]) containing:-
"Reports submitted by various District and/or Hsien Committees in various provinces on their activities for the month of January 1934".

76) Small envelope containing a slip of paper bearing the following inscriptions in English :-
"V. Robinson, 204 Embankment Apartment House, N. Soochow Road."

77) Envelope containing the following :-
(a) Instructions to District Committees regarding the duties to be performed by them in their respective districts.
(b) Report dated December 17 on the Fukien Incident.
(c) Letter dated February 26 from the Publishing Bureau of 'Central' to the Kiangsu Provincial Committee regarding the publication work.
(d) Draft report on the plan of work among rickshaw coolies.
(e) Antecedents of Wen Ping Heng(ㄓ ㄏ ㄕ), member of the Shansi Provincial Committee.

78) Lists of communistic publications in stock for the months of December 1933 and January 1934.

79) "China Forum", dated October 22, November 30 and December 21, 1933, respectively.

Literature in English

80) Report of the Panshih Central Hsien Committee, dated December 30, 1933. (5 pages).

81) Report of the Central Hsien Committee of Panshih, Kirin, on its Organizational Problem, dated January 24, 1934. (3 pages).

82) Report from Tangshan re situation in various mines there, dated January 1, 1934 (4 pages).

83) Report from the Hsilung Party to the Manchurian Provincial Committee concerning the problem of the organization, dated January 15, 1934 (2 pages).

84) Report of the Chairman of the Front Committee(15 pages).

85) Lessons learnt from the revolutionary upsurges in Charhar - excerpts from the decision of the Hopei Provincial Committee on the Report of the Front Committee.(12 pages).

86) Report of Comrade Ma on the Kalgan Event, dated January 30, 1934. (28 pages).

Literature in Russian

87) Piece of paper containing abbreviated notes in Russian and Chinese relating to a speech.

(Leather suitcase "B")

88) Communist periodical entitled "Struggle", issues 43, 55, 61, 62 and 63. 1 copy each

89) Statements of accounts of the publication department, petty cash accounts, miscellaneous bills and receipts.

90) Draft of an article bearing on activities of communist sections in villages.

91) Lists of communists in outports.

92) Draft of a report on "White" troops stationed in Shantung.

93) Report bearing on conditions in Manchuria after its occupation by Japan, dated November 26, 1932.

94) Manuscript of a book entitled "Dr. Sun Yat-sen and its principles".

95) Contents of an envelope addressed to Yu Yih Yoen ( ), China Collage, Local (Reading on envelope, in English, "Strother's Advertising Service Agency, 44 Nanking Road, Shanghai, China):-
a) Two blank forms of antecedents of Party members.
b) Eight sheets of paper containing rough notes relating to propaganda among industrial workers.
c) A pamphlet bearing on the work of industrial sections.

96) Report on the 6th Route Volunteer Army in the North East.

97) Several sheets of paper containing rough notes bearing on labour matters.

98) Miscellaneous letters from persons in outports relating to general conditions in their respective places.

99) Two exercise books, one blank and the other contains what appears to be a statement of accounts.

100) A report on the general conditions in Kiangsi.

Literature in Russian

101) 25 sheets of handwritten document in Russian containing four lectures on the subject of organisation of the guerilla warfare among the Chinese peasantry :-
(1) Introduction (2) Process of formation of partisan's forces and general principles of tactics (4) various forms of organization of partisan's detachments.
(Note: The above document appears to have been written in 1934 by a Russian).
And 5 pages of Chinese translation of the above.

102) Communist Books :-
Life of Lenin
Support of the Soviet Movement.
Guerilla warfare.
How to organise?
Theory and Practice of Organization.
Red Flag, Issue No.63.
Construction Magazine, Issue No.8.
How to gain streets.

1 copy each

[illegible]

Containing the following documents seized from the drawers of desk in the front upstairs room :-

103) A lengthy report on conditions in Ankwei, forwarded by Lin Ming(刘明) to Central, and the draft of a reply from Central to the Ankwei Committee.

104) An unaddressed envelope containing a number of drafts of articles bearing on propaganda among labourers.

105) Report on the conditions in Wuhan (Hupeh Province).

106) Envelope containing a statement of accounts of the Publication Department.

107) Miscellaneous papers containing rough notes and drafts of articles bearing on communist propaganda among labourers etc.

108) A report addressed to Central by Liu Chi Hwa(刘啟竹) bearing on his arrest by the S.M.P. (3.4.33, at No. 37 Wei Loh Li, Foochow Road) and also a copy of Court judgment.

109) Small bits of paper containing petty cash accounts.

110) A report addressed to Central from the Headquarters of the Phulippine Communist Party asking for communist publications, etc. (Dated 16.6.33).

111) A circular notice addressed to various grades of communist branches from Central, dated 14.7.33, urging them to accelerate the movement to support "International Red Aid" between 15.7.33 and 23.7.33.

112) Two letters in English contained in an envelope addressed to "Adolf Lee, Shanghai" :-

Copy

Amstel 272, Amsterdam.

Dear Degroot:

The enclosed letter is to be forwarded to T.S.H. immediately. We have to ask your assistance in forwarding the same mail because we lost connections with T.S.H. after the change in Berlin. Please see to it that the bearer of the note can return with definite answer before he leaves your port.

With com. greetings.

Lee. (Shanghai).

Tuter-Club of Marseilles (or Vladivostok).

Secretary of Tuter-Club.

Dear friends:

The enclosed letter is to be forwarded to the T.S.H. from Chinese Section. Please do us the favour in forwarding the letter as soon as this note reaches you, and that our courier receives definite answer before he leaves your port.

With international greetings.

A.C.S. u H.U.

113) A statement of accounts relating to the purchase of printing materials etc. and miscellaneous papers.

114) A bundle of papers containing rough notes relating to propaganda matters.

115) Letter addressed to Central from Doo Chong Ling(杜昌林) reporting on his own mistakes in the performance of duties, and other papers containing rough notes relating to certain communist activities.

116) Memeographed document bearing on communist activities among workers in the Zee Toong District in August 1933.

117) Two rent receipts, one Municipal rate receipt, one Shanghai Power Co., Deposit Receipt, and one Shanghai Waterworks Deposit Receipt. All in respect of house No. 677 Changping Road.
(Issued to Liu Yue Chow).

118) Communist periodical "The Struggle", issue Nos. 5- and 53/ 1 copy each

119) Five small notebooks containing certain rough notes relating to propaganda and organization.
(3 of the books have not been used).

120) A sheet of paper containing notes relating to the January 28th Anniversary and some postal receipts (contained in an unaddressed envelope).

121) Specimens of unused stationery.

122) Two wooden chops, names undecipherable.

PAPERS DROPPED BY 1ST ACCUSED YANG YIH LING.

1) An estimate of expenses for the Training Class.

2) A programme of certain communist meetings.

3) Working plans of Central for the month of February.

4) A paper containing rough notes relating to organization.

5) Draft of an article relating to the dismissal from the Party of Mah Ziang Sung and Lau Tsang.

6) Report addressed to Kwoh Wen(国文), "No.2, 1934", bearing on communist activities in Java and Dutch East Indies, etc. and containing the following addresses in Singapore :-
A) Ling Yui Foh(林子福), c/o Ling Gee Ling(林其林), Hwa Jun Bank(華侨), Tsui Lij Ka, Singapore.
B) Lee Sieu Lai(李秀蘭), c/o Zung Yih Kai(陳一開), Sing Toong Public School ( ), Singapore.

SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL POLICE
C. & S. B. REGISTRY.
No. D 5703
Date 2. / 3. / 34

March 2, 1934.

POLITICAL

Communist Propaganda - Arrests.

Acting on the Authority of a warrant issued at the instance of the Shanghai Bureau of Public Safety, the Municipal Police at 12.30 a.m. March 2, raided a communist base at 677 Changping Road and effected the arrest of three male Chinese named Yang Yih-ling (楊一林), Liu Kwei-ching (劉貴卿) and Tsang Ts-Yuen (張子雲). a considerable quantity of communist literature in the Chinese language and also manuscripte in Russian and English were seized.

The five prisoners, four of whom are claimed by the Chinese Authorities to be members of the Kiangsu Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, will be taken before Court on March 2 when a write of Detention will be applied for to enable further investigation to be made.

Extract of Proceedings in S. S. D. Court for 19 F. I. R. No. Stn. No.

Reg. No. 6/31054-6 Stn. Gordon Rd Procurator Judge

Sheet No.2.

1st accused :- I was waiting in the house for my friend to return. I was told not to move by the Police, how could I throw anything away. I opened the door as I thought mt friend was returning. I am not a Communist. I know the father of the 2nd accused. The 2nd accused owed me $05.00 in all.

2nd accused :- I rented the house at No.677 Changping Road. I am not a Communist. The literature seized was not found in my room. One named Liu lived in the room upstairs in the room where the literature was found. Liu was seldom in his room. I do not know why he did not return yesterday. I do not know the 3rd accused. One of the keys to the house is mine. Liu was in possession of a key which I gave him.

3rd accused :- I came to Shanghai yesterday from Honan. After getting off the train I met a friend who took my luggage and I lost him. I knocked on the door whilst trying to find him. I was arrested by the detective. I ran away as I was frightened. The key found by The Police is not mine. I came to Shanghai to buy goods.

Wong Vung Chuen P.S.Bureau :- The Public Safety Bureau had received information that No.677 Changping Road was being occupied by Communists. A warrant was applied for. The 1st accused is known to me asa Communist.

DECISION.

Remanded till the 6th of March 1934, 10.am. for further investigation.

Enger

8/3/34

SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL POLICE
C. & S. B. REGISTRY.
No. D 5703
Date 26 / 4 / 34

"B"

Misc.P.8/34.

6.

Gordon Road
April 23, 34.

The effects left behind at 677 Changping Road in consequence of the arrests made at this address, on behalf of the Chinese Authorities were handed over to one Tsang Tsing Tai ([illegible]), Detective Sergeant attached to the Special Branch of the Public Safety Bureau at 3.30 p.m. on April 23, 1934. This official gave a receipt which states that all the effects enumerated in the inventory that went before Court have been duly taken possession of by him on behalf of communists now in custody at the Public Safety Bureau. This receipt will be transmitted to the Judges on the case through the A/M.A. on the morning of April 23, 1934.

The policeman posted at the above address has now been withdrawn.

D.S.I.

Sen. Det. i/c.

D.D.O. Copy Seen by
O.C./S.B. 25.4.34
Tu

SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL POLICE
C. & S. B. REGISTRY.
No. D 5703
Date 26 / 4 / 34

"B"
Gordon Road
April 18th, 34.

Misc.P.8/34.

5.

At about 10 a.m. 17-4-34 one named Sung Yoong Ziang (沈荣祥) landlord of house No.677 Changping Road, came to this Station and requested the disposal of the household effects kept at the above premises, which he rented to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd accused in connection with this case prior to their being arrested on 1-3-34. It appears that the above house was locked and watched by Policemen from this Station after they were taken into custody until the date of release of the 6th accused Lieu Loo Sz (劉老氏), female, who went back to the above house and to whom they keys were handed on 6-3-34. She stayed there for about a week and then absconded for some unknown reason, leaving all property on the premises without going back there again. Every effort has been made to find her but no information could be obtained as to where she is now living.

An inventory of the property in question has been taken and this will be submitted together with an application for its disposal on the afternoon of 19-4-34 before the Judges who ordered the handing over of the persons to whom it belongs. A member of the Public Safety Bureau has agreed to be present in Court to represent the owners now in the custody of the Chinese Authorities.

D. S. I.

SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL POLICE
C. S. B. REGISTRY.
No. D 5703
Date 10 / 3 / 34

Copy for Special Branch.

"B"

Misc. P./8/34.

Gordon Road
March 9, 34.

4.

Writ of Detention.

6/3/34.

S.S.D.Court.

The six accused appeared before the S.S.D.Court on the morning of the 6/3/34, when the following judgment was handed down:-

1st., 2nd, & 3rd to be handed over to the Chinese Authorities, together with the sezied property.

4th, 5th & 6th to be relased.

Case completed.

D.R. 10/3/34.

Sr. Det. i/c.

D.S.347.

Copy forwarded to the D.C(Special Branch)

D.I. Ross,
Is this file with you or D.S.I Golder?
Req: File herewith ADD - please return when finished with.
DWR 14/3.

Special Branch Copy.

F. 22F
G. 40000-9-33.

SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL POLICE

SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL POLICE
C. & S. B. REGISTRY.
No. D 5703
Date 6 / 3 / 34

CRIME DIARY.

CRIME REGISTER No:— Misc. P.8/34

"B" Division.
Gordon Road Police Station.
5th. March 1934.

Diary Number:— 3 sheet 1.

Nature of Offence:— Fit of Detention.

Time at which investigation begun and concluded each day		Places visited in course of investigation each day	

RECORD OF INVESTIGATION.

Assistance to the Chinese Authorities.

The 1st. 2nd. and 3rd. accused appeared before the High Court on the morning of 2-3-34 when they were remanded in custody until the 6-3-34.

The 4th. 5th. and 6th. accused appeared before the High Court on 3-3-34 when they were remanded in custody until 6-3-34.

The six accused will appear before the Court on 6-3-34 when the Chinese uthorities will apply for their extradition. No information has been found that would warrant this being opposed. On this date an application will be made to the Court to permit the retention of the communistic literature seized at 677 Changping Road for one week to enable the Special Branch to complete the translation. Also an application will be made for instructions re the disposal of the household effects at 677 Changping Road, which is now vacant by reason of the occupants being in custody. A detailed inventory of the property has been prepared, and the premises are at present locked and watched by police from this station.

On 5-3-34 all the accused were taken to the Crime Branch Studio for photographing.

A list of the communistic literature seized in the upstairs front room of 677 Changping Road is attached.

Reg: please attach to file / [illegible] 6/3/34

Copy sent to D.C. Special Branch.

[signature]
Sen. Det. i/c.

[signature]
D.S.347

Inventory of alleged communists' property at 677 Changping Road.

In the upstairs front room.

One wooden cupboard containing one pair of vases, three tea-pots, two towel bathing gowns, two suits of child's woollen yarn (two jackets and two pairs of pants), two flower pots, two small porcelain sugar jars, one large towel, one towel bed-sheet, one cloth bed-sheet, three lady's jackets, and one piece of white sheep fur for making clothing.

One dressing table containing one cigarette ash tray and one oval mirror. One canvas couch.

One writing desk containing one ink-bottle, one small radio-phone, one small purple porcelain vase, one porcelain box containing material for stamping, and one round mirror. Two paint pictures in glasses front frames. One square teapoy. One round stool.

One wooden cupboard fitted with glasses containing one lady's purple serge long gown, one lady's sheep fur overcoat, five pieces of cloth, five lady's jackets, one drawer full of woollen yarn, eleven pairs of pants, three mosquito nets, four pairs of pants, two gentleman's foreign styled coats, one foreign style woollen overcoat. One blue silk long gown lined with white sheep-fur. One piece of white sheep fur for making clothing. Five foreign style coats. Four pairs of trousers. One black silk lady's long gown lined with white sheep fur. Seventeen lady's jackets.

One blue serge gents. long gown, fifteen articles of clothing twelve articles of clothing various sizes, eight pairs of pants, one table-cloth, twelve pieces of window-screens, eleven articles of lady's clothing, one foreign style coat, one piece of woollen cloth, three pieces of cotton cloth, one sleeping garment, one electric iron, two towel bed-sheets, two bed-sheets, one pair of leather shoes, one pair of lady's rubber overshoes, two cotton bed-covers, two cotton quilts, one new woollen blanket, one blanket, one umbrella, one black serge gents. long gown lined with camel-wool, and six wicker & leather boxes.

In the downstairs front room.

One table clock, four flower vases, one lead tea-cup tray, one porcelain cigarette tray, one Mah Jonng set, one toilet table, one square table, two chairs, two sofa chairs, one electric iron, one woollen blanket of red colour, one bed coushion, two cotton bed-covers, one brass fire basin with stand, one table lamp, two glass frames three glass trays, one washing basin, one small wooden carriage (toy), one iron bedstead, one tea-table with glass surface, one hot water bottle, two porcelain spittoons.

In the downstairs back room.

One square table, one oblong bucket, two oil pumping stoves, two square chairs, two tea-cups, one baby's bed (iron), one night-stool, seven wash basins various sizes, one tea-pot, six small towels.

In the downstairs kitchen room.

Two wooden cup-boards containing eight porcelain bowels, twelve small bowels, twenty two saucers, one tin of kerosene oil, one cooking stove, three zinc cooking pans, and one iron pan.

In the back room above kitchen.

One iron bed, two bed-covers, one paint picture with glass-frame one desk with three drawers, one square mirror, one square chair, two round stools, one hot-water bottle, one ink bottle, one tea-tray two tea-cups, one bed coushion, one purple woollen under-wear, three silk lady's long gowns, three pillows, one silk lady's lined long gown, one blue serge long gown, one blue silk lady's padded long gown, two cotton bed-covers, one bottle of olive oil, one wash basin, and three large and small leather trunks.

F. 22F
G. 40000-9-33.

Special Branch Copy.

SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL POLICE.

CRIME DIARY.

SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL POLICE
C. I. S. B. RECORDS
No. D 5703
Date 3 / 3 / 1934

"B" Division.
Gordon Road Police Station.
March 2, 1934

CRIME REGISTER No:— Misc. P.8/34.

Diary Number:— 2 sheet 1.

Nature of Offence:— Writ of D'tio

Time at which investigation begun and concluded each day	Places visited in course of investigation each day
4.0 p.m. to 5.30 p.m. 6.30 p.m. to 10.0 p.m.	677 Changping Road. 35 Dzoong Zung Li. Woosung Road. Detective Office.

RECORD OF INVESTIGATION.

Assistance to the Chinese Authorities.

At 9.30 a.m. 2-3-34 at 677 Changping Road, C.D.S.22 and C.D.C.26 arrested the 4th accused:-

Zau Ling (趙林) aged 28 years, native of Tientsin, m/unemployed, who knocked at the rear door of the above address and asked for one "Li".

On being questioned, he stated that he arrived in Shanghai from Tientsin on 28-2-34 spending that night with a friend named Tsau Yoh Vung (周学文) who resided at 35 Doong Zung Li, Woosung Road.

On 1-3-34 at 11 p.m. this address ~~was~~ had been searched for communistic literature at the request of the Public Safety Bureau under S.S.D. Court Search Warrant No.1529. The necessary assistance being rendered by D.S. Mc.Keown (Sp.Br.) and detectives of Hongkew Station. Nothing was found.

At 5 p.m. 2-3-34 Det.Insp. Wong Wen Ling (王文惠) P.S.B. came to the Station and requested assistance to execute S.S.D. Arrest Warrant No.1535 and Search Warrant No.1536 at 677 Changping Road. D.S.I. Prokofiev (Sp.Br.) C.D.S 90 and the undersigned rendered assistance and the following persons named in the first warrant were arrested:-

(5) Lieu Tsang Sz (劉珍氏) aged 26, native of Hunan. Sister-in-law of the 2nd accused.

(6) Lieu Loo Sz (劉呂氏) aged 30, native of

F. 22F
G. 40000-9-33.

SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL POLICE.

CRIME DIARY.

CRIME REGISTER No:—Misc. P.8/34.

.....Division.
.....Police Station.
.....19

Diary Number:—2 sheet 2. Nature of Offence:—

Time at which investigation begun and concluded each day		Places visited in course of investigation each day	

RECORD OF INVESTIGATION.

Hunan. Wife of the 2nd accused.

Both of the above arrived in Shanghai at the end of 1933 with Lieu Kwei Ching (2nd accused) and all have resided together at 677 Changping Road for more than a month.

On 1-3-34 when the premises were first searched (Diary 1), both Lieu Tsang Sz (劉孫氏) and Lieu Loo Sz (劉呂氏) were on the premises but nothing was found that would connect them with the communistic activities being conducted on the premises. However, they were kept under observation, and as stated above were arrested by warrant at 5 p.m. 2-3-34.

The 4th, 5th, and 6th accused will appear before the S.S.D. Court on 3-3-34 when a Writ of Detention will be applied for to enable enquiries to be made re their activities.

Each of the two females (5th & 6th accused) has with her a small child. At present they are in the custody of their mothers, no other person being found to care for them.

The premises at 677 Changping Road are now unoccupied. Uniformed police have been placed there to protect the property, orders re its disposal will be sought for from the S.S.D. Court later. An inventory of the said property is being prepared.

Sen. Det. i/c. D. S.

S2 Further report in due course.

T.H.G.

MAR. 3 1934

Zau Ling(趙林), age 28,

Tientsin D.S.I. Prokofiev

Gordon Rd.Stn. 2.3.34. Clerk Zung Zoong Oen.

My name is Zau Ling. I am 28 years of age, native of Tientsin, ex-shop assistant. When I was 6 or 7 years old, I studied for about two yeams under a private tutor. I can read and write a little. Since then I worked as a ~~hawker~~ hawker at my native place until I was 25 years of age, after which I went to Ho Chien Hsien, Hopeh province, where I was employed for two years as an assistant in a secondhand clothing shop. I then left the shop and returned to my native place and I have since been unemployed.

On Feb. 28 I came to Shanghai by rail from my native place for the purpose of visiting my friend named Tseu Yoh Vung (周学文) residing at No. 35 Doong Zung Li (同仁里), Tiendong Road. Tseu was formerly a shop assistant in Tientsin and I do not know his present occupation. I stayed in Tseu's house for one night on February 28. On March 1 Tseu and his wife left Shanghai stating that they were going to their native place in Hupeh to attend to family affairs. I spent the night of March 1 with a prostitute in a house in the vicinity of Nanking Road.

At about 10 a.m., March 2, I went to find one named Lee Ts Ming(李志明), to whom I had been introduced by Tseu at his house on the night of Feb. 28. Lee told me that he lived in a house at the corner of Connaught and Ferry Rds., but I forgot the number of the house upon arrival at the place. When I was enquiring about him there, I went by mistake to No. 677 Chong Ping Road. I knocked at the back door and was immediately arrested by the Police. I desired to see Lee simply for the purpose of saying goodbye to him, as I intended

to leave for Tientsin on the night of March 2.

I do not know any of the persons arrested at No. 677 Chong Ping Road.

The money found in my possession ($171. in banknotes) was given to me by my friend Tseu prior to his departure for my maintenance, as I am unemployed. The fur-lined long gown, which I am wearing, was left behind by Tseu, and the two keys found in my possession also belonged to him.

I am not a communist and I know nothing about communism.

(Zau Ling.)

Liu Tsang Sz(劉張氏), 26.

Hunan. D.S.I. Prokofiev

Gordon Rd.Stn. 2.3.34 Clerk Zung Zoong Oe

My name is Liu Tsang Sz. I am 26 years of age, native of Hunan, married.

I have never attended any school, but I can read a few Chinese characters. At the age of twenty-two I was married at my native place to a man named Liu Lao Nyi(劉老二) who is a land owner. I lived with my husband at my native place until about two and half months ago when I came to Shanghai with my brother-in-law named Liu Kwei Ching(劉克卿) and his family. My husband remained home.

Following our arrival here we stayed in a lodging house in the Settlement for about ten days, after which we went to live at No. 677 Chong Ping Road. This house was rented by my brother-in-law(Liu Kwei Ching). I do not know what business he did before, but I know that he is at present unemployed. I came to Shanghai just for sight-seeing and I have been staying with my brother-in-law as his guest, occupying the room over kitchen with my child.

About two weeks after we had moved in, the upstairs front room was rented by a married couple. The woman left Shanghai soon afterwards owing to sickness, while the man was living there all the time. He left the house at about 5 p.m. March 1 and failed to return. I do not know either his name or occupation, and I have no knowledge whatever about the books etc. seized by the police in his room.

The first accused, whose name I do not know, called on my brother-in-law on three occasions during the past month, to collect some debt from him. I have never seen the 3rd and 4th accused. I am not a communist.

(Liu Tsang Sz)

Liu Loo Sz(劉呂氏), age 30,

Sinyang Foo, Hunan. D.S.I. Prokofiev

Gordon Rd.Stn. 2.3.34 Clerk Zung Zoong Oen

My name is Liu Loo Sz. I am 30 years of age, native of Sinyang Foo, Hunan, married.

I have never studied in any school, and I can neither read nor write Chinese. At the age of 25, I was married to a man named Liu Kwei Ching(劉奎卿) who was then a school teacher at my native place. During the autumn of 1933 my husband visited Shanghai in order to find work as my native place is infested by bandits. He soon returned and about two and half months ago we came to Shanghai together with Liu Tsang Sz(劉孫氏), my sister-in-law. Upon arrival, we lived in a lodging house for several days, after which we went to live at No. 677 Chong Ping Road, a house rented by my husband Liu Kwei Ching. My husband has been out of employment for the past two years and we are living on the money sent from his home in Hunan.

We occupied the gound floor front room, while my sister-in-law was living with her child in the room over kitchen. About one month ago, the front upstairs room was rented by a man who gave his name as "Liu" and his occupation as assistant in a certain bookstore. A woman, who appeared to be his sweetheart, occasionally stayed over-night with him. She was last seen several days ago. All the suitcases seized by the police in Liu's room were brought in by the latter at the time he moved in. I have no knowledge of the contents of the suitcases. About 5 p.m. or 6 p.m. March 1, Liu left the house and failed to return.

The first accused, whose name I do not know, is my husband's friend. I never saw him before. He called on

my husband at about 6 p.m. on March 1 but the latter was out. While he was waiting for my husband's return, the police arrived. As far as I know he came to collect a debt from my husband.

I have never seen the third and fourth accused.

I am not a communist and I know nothing about communism.

(Liu Loo Sz).

F. 22F
G. 40000-9-33.

SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL POLICE
C. & S. B. REGISTRY.
D 5703
Date 2 / 3 / 34

SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL POLICE.

CRIME DIARY.

"B" Division.
Gordon Road Police Station.
1st. March. 1934

CRIME REGISTER No:— Misc. P.8/34

Diary Number:— Nature of Offence:—

Time at which investigation begun and concluded each day		Places visited in course of investigation each day	

RECORD OF INVESTIGATION.

Assistance to Chinese Authorities.

At 11.0 p.m. 1-3-34, D.S.I. Prokofiev attached to the Special Branch, accompanied by Det. Insp. Wong Wen Tsing (王文俊) of the Public Safety Bureau came to this Station for assistance to execute Search Warrant No.1530 issued by the S.S.D.Court to search a Chinese dwelling house situated at 677 Changping Road suspected of containing communistic literature.

The necessary assistance was rendered and in an upstairs room a large quantity of communistic literature was seized, specimens of which will be produced in Court and the bulk scrutinized by the Special Branch.

Yang Yih Ling (楊一林) aged 30 years, native of Chekiang, m/schoolteacher, who was on the premises at the arrival of the Police was taken into custody. He was observed by C.D.S.90 to drop six documents which proved to be of communistic nature.

During the time of searching one Liu Kwei Ching (刘貴卿) aged 27 years, native of Hunan, m/unemployed entered the premises and was placed under arrest.

At 1.30 a.m. 2-3-34 C.D.S.90 and C.D.C. 293 arrested one Tsang Ts Yung (張子雲) aged 29 years, native of Hunan, s/unemployed, who entered the premises with a private key. On seeing detectives he attempted to escape but was easily frustrated.

Noted. D.R. of 2/3/34. [signature] S.2

S2, Further report in due course. [signature]

MAR. 2 1934

D.S.I. Prokofiev [signature] 2/3/34

F. 22F
G. 40000-9-33.

SHANGHAI MU IPAL POLICE.

CRIME ARY.

CRIME REGISTER No:— n

.....Division.
.....Police Station.
.....19

Diary Number:— page n. Nature of Offence:—

Time at which investigation begun and concluded each day		Places visited in course of investigation each day	
	y na tsin tudi		

RECORD OF I and TIGATION.

The three arrester persons gave the following periods of residence in the h International Settlement:-

1st. Arrived fr loyed ngchow on 1-3-34.

2nd. One month' thin sidence at the address searched.

3rd. Arrived fr ce a nan at 1a.m. 2-3-34.

The above na On F persons have been placed on a Writ of Detention pendi the urther enquiries being made prior to their being handed over 学 ne Public Safety Bureau.

d.

not

D.S.347

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Sen. Det. i/c.

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Copy for Deputy Co ht sioner Special Branch.

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Liu Kwei Ching( ), age 27,

Hunan D.S.I. Prokofiev

Gordon Rd.Stn. Da.M.,2.3.34 Clerk S.T.Zung

My name is Liu Kwei Ching. I am 27 years of age, a native of Hunan, unemployed. I am at present residing at 677 Chong Ping Road.

I studied in a primary school at my native from the age of 10 to 17 years. After leaving school, I was employed as a teacher in various schools at my native place until October, 1933. When I came to Shanghai together with my wife and baby in order to find employment. Following my arrival in Shanghai I lived in various lodging houses in the Settlement until January 1934 when I rented house No. 677 Chong Ping Road. I have been unable to find a job and have been living all this on the money (About $800) which I brought with me. The upstairs front room was rented about one month ago by one named Liu who told me that he was employed at a bookstore, the address of which I do not know. A few visitors used to come to see him but I never paid much attention to them. I have no knowledge whatever of the communist literature found in his room. He was the sole occupant of this room. He left his room about tiffin time yesterday and failed to return. This man speaks northern dialect and also can speak Shanghai dialect.

The woman living in the room over kitchen is my sister-in-law. She has been living with me since I rented the house. Her husband left for Hunan long ago and he has never been to my house.

The first accused is my friend whom I have not seen for

many years so that I could hardly recognize him when I saw him. He came to Shanghai to see me about the money ($90) which I owe ~~to~~ him. I never saw the third accused.

I am not a member of the communist party.

(Liu Kwei Ching).

Ts ng Ts Yung( ), age 29,

Hunan D.S.I. Prokofiev.

Gordon Rd.Stn. 2.30a.m. 2.3.34 Clerk Z.C.Zung.

My name is Tsang Ts Yung( ). I am 29 years of age, native of Nanyang, Hunan, unemployed.

I studied for two years at my native place when I was young, after which I was employed as a shop assistant until my departure for Shanghai a few days ago. The object of my coming here was to find employment. I arrived in Shanghai by train at about 11 p.m. March 1, 1934. At the railway station I was met by a friend of mine named Wong Sz Zung( ), also a native of Hunan. He told me that he was living at No. 14 Ferry Road and asked me to call on him. He took away my luggage when he left me. A little while later I took a riesha and instructed the coolie to take me to that address. I am a stranger in Shanghai and it happened that the riesha coolie, instead of taking me to 14 Ferry Road, went to the address where I was arrested immediately upon arrival. I did not open the door of House No. 677 Chong Ping Road and had not the key which the detectives alleges was found in my possession. I had only three keys on me which I brought from my home.

I do not know any of the persons arrested at 677 Chong Ping Road. I am not a communist.

(Tsang Ts Yung)

Yang Yih Ling( ), age 30,

Nyien Chow, Chekiang. D.S.I. Prokofiev

Gordon Rd. Stn. 1[illegible].2.3.34 Clerk Zung Zoong Oon.

My name is Yang Yih Ling. I am 30 years of age, native of Nyien Chow, Chekiang, unemployed teacher. About 5 years ago, I graduated in commercial course of a law college in Hangchow, after which I worked as a teacher in various schools at my native place for about two years. Since that time I have been without a fixed employment.

The day before yesterday I left Shaoshing, where I am living, and came to Shanghai via Hangchow by train which arrived here at about 6 p.m., March 1. My purpose of coming to Shanghai was to collect a debt from my friend named Liu Kwei Ching( ), who was a schoolmate of mine and whom I have not seen for years. From the railway station I went to No. 677 Chong Ping Road where Liu Kwei Ching is living. He was absent and I waited for him for a long time. Then the police arrived and I was arrested.

I had no papers in my possession and did not drop any on the floor as the detective states. I do not know the third accused.

I am not a member of the Communist Party and I have not been connected with communist activities.

(Yang Yih Ling).

District Court for the First Special Area in Shanghai

March 1, 1934.

Search Werrant No. 1530 issued by Judge Dzien at the request of the Shanghai Public Safety Bureau.

Address:- New house No. 677 end of Hart Road.

To search for and seize certain communistic literature on the above mentioned premises. If any seized, the responsible persons to be arrested. The Warrant may be executed at night in accordance with the article 148 section 2 of the Criminal Procedure.

C. & S. B. Registry

File No. 25703

SUBJECT

EXTRACTS OF COURT PROCEEDINGS

Fm. L.D.1.
Revised, 5031.
G. 100 m. 8

5 copies.

Political Section

SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL POLICE
C. & S. B. REGISTRY.
No. 7323-8.
Stn. No. 5703
Date 23 Oct 34

Extract of Proceedings in S. S. D. Court for 19/6/34. 19 F. I. R. No. Misc. 8/34.

Reg. No. 6/31654 31792 Stn. Gord.Rd. Procurator Judge

Sheet No. 8.

Appl.

Application is hereby made to Judges Yoeh, Zau and Chow of the Snd.Branch Kiangsu High Court for the disposal of the property enumerated on attached list which is located in house No. 677 Changping Road and belongs to three persons named Yang Yih Ling, Liu Kwei Ching and Tsang Ts Yung who were arrested at that address by the S.M. Police on March 1, 1934, on behalf of members of the Public Safety Bureau to whom they were ordered handed over by the aforesaid Judges on March 6, 1934 on the ground of being communists.

Inventory of alleged Communists' Property at 677 Changping Rd.

In the downstairs back room:-

1. 1 square table,
2. 1 oblong basket,
3. 2 Oil pumping stove,
4. 2 chairs,
5. 2 tea cups,
6. small iron bed.
7. 1 night soil bucket
8. 1 tea pot.
9. 6 washing basins
10. 5 towels.
11. 1 wooden washing basin.

In the downstairs front room:-

1. 4 porcelain flower vases.
2. 1 brass tea cup tray.
3. 1 porcelain cigarette tray.
4. 1 dressing table.
45. 1 square wooden table
6. 2 chairs.
7. 2 sofas.
8. 1 red woollen blanket.
9. 1 bed cushion.
10. 2 cotton bed covers,
11. 1 brass fire basin with stove.
12. 1 table lamp.
13. 2 framed wall pictures.
14. 3 glass trays,
15. 1 washing basin,
16. 1 small wooden baby carriage,
17. 1 iron bed
18. 1 small table with glass surface.
19. 1 hot water bottle.
20. 2 porcelain spittons.
21. 1 electric iron.

In the Back upstairs room:-

1. 1 iron bed.
2. 2 bed covers,
3. 1 painted picture with glass grame.
4. 1 small desk.
45. 1 small square mirror,
6. 2 chairs,
7. 1 inkstand,
8. 2 lady's silk long gown,
9. 3 pillows,
10. 1 bottle of perfume.
11. 2 washing basins,
12. 1 lady's overcoat,
13. 1 ladys' long gown,
14. 1 table lamp.

In the upstairs front room:-

1. 1 washing table,
2. 1 cigarette ash tray,
3. 1 canvas chair,
4. 1 desk,
5. 1 small set of radio,
6. 1 stamp pad.
7. 2 wall pictures with frames.
8. 1 flower vase,
9. 1 wardrobe containing the following:-
10. 2 lady's fur lined long gowns,
11. 1 lady's long gown
12. 1 iron bed,
13. 1 small table,
14. 7 wicker and leather boxes containing male and female clothing.

Kitchen :-

1. 1 wooden cupboard.
2. 8 large porcelain bowls,
3. 10 small porcelain bowls,
4. 22 small porcelain dishes,
5. 1 tin of kerosene oil,
6. 1 cooking stove,
7. 3 zinc cooking pans,
8. 1 iron pan.

In the upstairs front room:-

Fm. L.D.1.
Revised, 5-31.
G. 100 m. 8-31

Extract of Proceedings in S. S. D. Court for 19 F. I. R. No. Stn. No.

Reg. No.	Stn.	Procurator	Judge

Sheet No. 2

Cont'd.

1. 1 dressing table containing the following in the drawers:-
2. 1 pair of porcelain vases,
3. 2 tea cups,
4. 2 bathing suits,
5. 3 baby' woollen sweaters,
6. 2 small tea cups,
7. 2 porcelain flower stands,
8. 1 large towel,
9. 1 bed sheet,
10. 3 lady's short jackets,
11. 1 piece of sheep skin,
12. 2 rea pots.

(Charge Sheet endorsed in Chambers)

Decision

All properties to be handed over to the Bureau of Public Safety and a receipt to be obtained for same, which will be kept with the File for reference.

A.D.C. S.B.
Information.
SBR 23/4.

Fm. L.D.1.
Revised, 5-31.
G. 100 m. 8-33

Political Section

Extract of Proceedings in S. S. D. Court for 6.3.34 19 F. I. R. No. Msc.8/34 Stn. No. 7323-5

C. M. S. S. REGISTRY.
No. D 3703
Date 8/1

Reg. No. 6/31654-6 Stn. Gordon Road Procurator Tsong Judge Yoeh, Zau Chow

Sheet No. 3.

SECOND BRANCH KIANGSU HIGH COURT (A.M.)

Proceedings. Mr.Y.T.Chang appeared for the Shanghai Municipal Council.
Mr.Y.T.Van appeared for the 1st accused.
Mr. Tsang Ping Sing appeared for the 2nd accused.
Mr.Dau Tseng Hau appeared for the 3rd accused.

Mr.Chang:- Here is a list of literature and the list of furniture seized in the accused house.

2nd accused:- I rent the house, but the literature seized by the Police does not belong to me.

3rd accused:-The key is not mine and it was found by Police not on my person.

1st accused:- I went to see the 2nd accused who is my schoolmate and besides his father owes me $96.00 and thus I came to Shanghai to claim my money.

4th accused:- I arrived from Tientsin and lived for a week in my friend's house. I went to 677 Changping Road to see a man named Lee when I was arrested.

5th accused:- I came to Shanghai with the 6th accused who is the wife of the 2nd accused. I am a wife of the 2nd accused brother. I can not read or write Chinese characters and one of the tenant asked me to keep the box with the pamphlets. I do not know what are their contntes .

6th accused:- I came to Shanghai with the 5th accused I am not a communist.

2nd accused:- I am not a communist.

3rd accused:- I am not a member of communist party.

Wong Vung Chuen, repres. of P.S.Bureau:- Here is a Dispatch and we applied to the Court that the accused to be handed over to S.P.S.Bureau for further investigation.

Summed up.

Mr.Tseng appeared for the Shanghai Public Safety Bureau

MR.Chang:- (in summuning up) The S.M.C. has no objection for the accused, except women, to be handed over to the P.S.Bureau

S2/72

Fm. L.D.1.
Revised, 5-31.
G. 100 m. 8-33

Extract of Proceedings in S. S. D. Court for 19 F. I. R. No. Stn. No.

Reg. No. Stn. Procurator Judge

Reg. No.6/31654-6 Sheet No. 4.

(Here Court adjourns for consultation)

Decision:- the 1st, 2nd & 3rd accused to be handed over together with the seized property to the Shanghai Public Safety Bureau through their representative.

4th, 5th and 6th accused:- It is not necessary for these accused to be handed over, so they are to be released.

Mr. Chang:- The Police waive the right of appeal against those accused who are to be released.

(1st, 2nd & 3rd accused handed over on 6.3.34)

G.R.

D. I. Kuh.
usual action.
SSR 8/3.

Dh. 9/3
Kuh 8/3

Fm. L.D.1.
Revised, 5-31.
G. 100 m. 8-33.

5 copies

Political Section

SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL POLICE
C. & S. B. REGISTRY.
No. D 3703 Stn. No. 7326-8
Date 5/3/34

Extract of Proceedings in S. S. D. Court for 3.3.34. 19 F. I. R. No. Nil

Reg. No. 6/31792-4 Stn. Gordon Road Procurator
Connected with 6/31654-6.

Sheet 2.

Accused

4	(1) Zau Ling	( )	Age. 30 Unemployed
5	(2) Lieu Tsang Sz	( )	" 26 (Female)
6	(3) Lieu Loo Sz	( )	" 30 "

Charge

Application for writ of detention in accordance with Art. 42 of C.C.P. of R.C.

Application is hereby made for the detention of the above named persons who were arrested at various times on 2.3.34. at 677 Changping Road on suspicion of having been concerned in communistic activities.

Compt. S.M.P.

HIGH COURT A M.

Proceedings.

Mr T.Y.Chang appeared for the Shanghai Municipal Council.

Mr Chang :- This case is in connection with a case brought before the Court yesterday. Three accused were previously arrested at No.677 Changping Road. Detectives were left to keep watch for any other persons arriving at the house. This 4th accused arrived at the house at 9.30.am. on the 2/3/34 and was arrested. The 4th accused stated that he came to visit a friend named Loo and that he had come from Tsintsin to Shanghai with a man named Tseu Yoong Yung on the 23/2/34. He stated that he been living at No.35 Nobsung Road. The Police visited that address, nothing of a Communistic nature was found there. At 5.pm. yesterday the representative of the P.S.Bureau came to the station with two warrants, one Search Warrant No.1525 and a Warrant for the arrest of the 5th and 6th accused. (Warrants handed to Court). Then the Police accompanied the P.S.Bureau representative to the House at No.677 Changping Road and arrested the 5th and 6th accused. The 5th accused states that she is the sister in law of the 2nd accused. The 6th accused states that she is the wife of the 2nd accused . When the 1st,2nd and 3rd accused were arrested in the house on the 1/3/34 the 5th and 6th accused were present. The P.S.Bureau did not ask for their arrest at that time and the apparently obtained the names of the 5th and 6th accused whilst listening to the S.M.Police detectives questioning them. The 5th and 6th accused have one child each and they were kept in the detention cell with the accused last night.

Fm. L.D.1.
Revised, 5-31.
G. 100 m. 2.

Extract of Proceedings in S. S. D. Court for 19 F. I. R. No. Stn. No.

Reg. No. Stn. Procurator Judge

Case No.6/31792-4. Sheet 4.

The Police find that the 5th and 6th accused cannot read or write. There is some furniture at the house at No.677 Changping Road and two Policemen were left to watch it. Should the 5th and 6th accused be detained then the Police men will have to remain on duty there for some time. I ask that the P.S.Bureau produce a Prima Facie case against the 5th and 6th accused today, if they cannot then I ask that the 5th and 6th accused be released on security pending their trial. The accused have all made statements, in which they deny being concerned in Communistic Activities.(Handed to Court).

Wang Vung Chuen P.S.Bureau :- The two females were living on the premises as a blind to prevent any persons suspecting that the male members of the household were working as Communists. I ask that they be handed over to the P.S.Bureau for trial. The information we received was that the premises were being used by Communists. It was not stated as to whether they were male or female.

4th accused :- I went to the house to see a friend named Lee Ts Ming. I knocked at several doors in the vicinity and when I knocked at No.677 I was asked to come in. I was then arrested. I am not acquainted with any of the other accused. I am not connected with the Communist Party, I came to Shanghai to look for work.

5th accused :- I have a Husband in Honan. I came to Shanghai with my sister in law, the 6th accused. My husband is named Lau Liu Er. I can only read a few characters. I am not a communist.

6th accused :- The 2nd accused is my husband. I came to Shanghai with the 5th accused last year. My husband intended to obtain employment in Shanghai. I do not know whether he works for the Communist party. I am not a communist.

Fm. L.D.1.
Revised, 5-31.
G. 100 m. 8-13

Extract of Proceedings in S. S. D. Court for 19 F. I. R. No. Stn. No.

Reg. No.	Stn.	Procurator	Judge

Case No.6/31792-4. Sheet 5.

Judge to 5th and 6th accused :- Can you put up security for your appearance at the trial. ?.

5th accused :- No.

6th accused :- No.

Judge :- Then you will have to be detained.

DECISION.

Accused to be detained(Temporarily).

Remand till the 6th of March,1934. am. for trial.

Eager

S2, For attention. Please put up 7 copies of the list of the papers, books and documents which you seized.

J.H.G.

MAR 6 1934

D. 2 Kuli BAE 6/3/34.

Seven copies of list as required passed to D.C. Sp Bch on 7/3/34

Fm. L.D.1.
Revised, 5-31.
G. 100 m. 8-23

5 copies.

Political Section

SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL POLICE
C. & S. D. REGISTRY.
No. D 5703
Date Judge / Show.

Extract of Proceedings in S. S. D. Court for 2/3/34. 19 F. I. R. No. 1 c. P/8 Stn. No. 7323-5

Reg. No. 6/31654-6 Stn. Gordon Rd. Procurator

Accused
1. Yang Yih Ling ( ) Age 30. School teacher.
2. Liu Kwei Ching ( ) " 27. Unemployed.
3. Tsang TsYung ( ) " 29. do.

Charge Application for writ of detention in accordance with Art. 42 of C. of the R.C.

Application is hereby made for the detention of the above named persons who were arrested at various times on 1/3/34 and 2/3/34 at 677 Changping road on suspicion of having been concerned in communistic activities.

HIGH COURT, A.M.

Proceedings. Mr T.Y.Chang appeared for the Shanghai Municipal Council.

Mr Chang :- These accused were arrested on the 1/3/34 at 11.pm. at No.677m Changping Road, on the Authority of a Warrant, and at the request of the Shanghai Public Safety Bureau. (Warrant handed to Court). A quaintity of Communistic literature was seized in the house, and specimens have been brought to Court.(Handed to Court).C.D.S.90 saw the 1st accused throw away these six papers. (Handed to Court).The 2nd and 3rd accused were found to be in possession of keys fitting the front door of the house. The 1st accused stated that he came to Shanghai yesterday from Hangchow. The 2nd accused stated that he had resided in the house for only one month. The 3rd accused was arrested by detectives who had been left to watch the house. The 3rd accused stated that he had just arrived from Honan. As he had a key to open the front door of the house it is obvious that he had been living in the house. All the accused have made statements but deny being communists.(Statements handed to Court).

1st accused :- I am not a Communist. I came from Hangchow to Shanghai yesterday. I went to the house to locate my friend named Lieu Kwei Ching. I did not throw any papers away.

C.D.S.90 :- at 10.50.pm. we raided the house. The 1st accused attempted to escape by the back door. I arrested him. He attempted to throw the papers away as he was being taken upstairs by the detectives. The 2nd accused was arrested as he opened the door. The 3rd accused opened the door with his own key and then when he saw me he ran away. I gave chase and he fell and I struggled with him and arrested him.